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ABSTRACT 
 
“I Really Don’t Need You to Talk for Me. I Can Talk for Myself” 
A Phenomenology of Participating in Life Decisions While in Foster Care 
 
Donna Van Alst 
 
 This study explores the lived experiences of foster youth in participating in 
decisions about their lives while in care.  Using a research methodology grounded in 
hermeneutic phenomenology, the study sought to identify the “essence” of this 
experience through careful analysis of the self-reported experiences of eight former foster 
youth.   
Fifteen themes emerged from the interviews with those young adults: (1) No 
Control; (2) Being Voiceless; (3) A Focus on Now; (4) Not Being Heard; (5) Settling; (6) 
Living a Public Life; (7) I Can Talk for Myself; (8) Being Spoken For; (9) 
Powerlessness; (10) Not Knowing; (11) No One Cares; (12) Alone; (13) Confidence; (14) 
Broken Promises; and (15) Acting Out.  
Some of these themes – such as “No Control,” “Being Voiceless,” “Not Being 
Heard,” “I Can Talk for Myself” and “Being Spoken For” – echo findings from earlier 
literature that identified a lack of meaningful opportunities for foster youth to participate 
in important decisions about their lives while in care.   A second group of themes – 
“Settling” and “Acting Out” – captured the study participants’ experience in reacting to 
having few opportunities to contribute to decisions about their lives while in care.  The 
themes in the final group – “A Focus On Now,” “Living a Public Life,” “Powerlessness,” 
“An Unclear System,” “No One Cares,” “Alone,” “Confidence” and “Broken Promises” 
– provide a more nuanced understanding of the experience of being involved in decisions 
about one’s life while in foster care.   
Findings from this study suggest that foster children would benefit from having 
increased opportunities to be involved in decisions about their lives while they are in 
care.  Such opportunities can be facilitated by ensuring frequent, meaningful interaction 
between foster children and their caseworkers and law guardians; encouraging foster 
children to attend court proceedings; moving toward a child-centered practice paradigm 
in child welfare services; respecting children’s due process rights; and improving legal 
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How can we achieve better transition to adulthood outcomes for youth who age 
out of the child welfare system?  Despite a plethora of research over the past decade, few 
studies have gone beyond describing the population to examine interventions that can 
improve what have been consistently poor outcomes for these youth.  Further, theory, as 
of yet, has contributed little to identifying interventions that could contribute to a 
successful transition, particularly for high-risk populations.  As a result, more than 35 
years since the issues surrounding youth aging out of care first emerged in the academic 
literature and social policy realm, we still know very little about how to help foster 
children to make a successful transition to adulthood.   
My interest in this subject emerged from two sources.  First, my practice 
experience with youth aging out of care gave me a first-hand view of the confusion and 
hopelessness with which aging-out youth often approached life after foster care.  Many of 
the youth I worked with seemed to struggle with even the most basic cognitive concepts 
and independent living skills.  They often had few long-term life goals, struggled to 
maintain interpersonal relationships that could provide them with continued support, and, 
in the most extreme cases, relegated themselves to the low expectations identified in the 
literature and reinforced through the warnings of caseworkers and other adults tasked 
with aiding their transition.  Yet, there were youth who were successful.  They graduated 





friendships and supports.  They seemed to have figured out how to identify and gain 
access to desired services.  In short, they avoided many of the pitfalls that commonly 
plague youth who leave care.  I found myself wondering, what made them different? 
A second informative experience was my involvement in a research study that 
sought to understand the court-related experiences of children and families involved with 
dependency proceedings.  Although the study was part of a children-in-court initiative, 
the sponsors discouraged the research team from collecting any data directly from 
children and minimized our access to their parents and caregivers.  It essentially became 
a study of how court staff, lawyers, child welfare professionals and judges thought that 
children and families experienced court.  The lack of interest in the role and experiences 
of children was further evident in our ethnographic observations of court proceedings.  In 
only one of the more than 20 cases observed, the child who was the subject of the 
proceeding actually attended the proceeding.  In follow-up discussions, attorneys, court 
staff and judges provided numerous reasons for the absence of children in the courtroom:  
It couldn’t be arranged.  It was inappropriate.  Children’s interests were adequately 
represented by the law guardian (who sometimes, they admitted, had never actually met 
the child they represented). When that study was completed, I found myself wondering 
what it was like for foster children to be removed from many of the most important 
decisions being made about their lives. 
This dissertation is an effort to understand the lived experiences of foster youth in 
participating in decisions about their lives while in care.  Using a research methodology 





“essence” of this experience.  From this understanding of the experience, implications for 
practice and policy will be discussed. 
Rationale for the Study 
 
More than 30,000 young adults left public child welfare systems across the United 
States in 2009, having reached adulthood without being adopted or reunited with their 
birth families (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2011d).    Research suggests that, 
after leaving care, these young people tend to experience poor life outcomes including 
high levels of unemployment, homelessness, incarceration and dependency on public 
assistance programs (Barth, 1990; Courtney & Piliavin, 1998; Westat, 1991).  More 
recent longitudinal studies have identified that former foster youth are more likely to 
have mental health problems, less likely to complete post-secondary education programs, 
and more likely to be living below the federal poverty line than their non-foster care 
peers through their mid-20s (Courtney et al., 2007; Pecora et al., 2005).  
Responding to concern over the outcomes for children aging out of foster care, 
Congress expanded independent living, transitional living and support services by 
establishing the John H. Chafee Foster Care Independence Program through the Foster 
Care Independence Act (FCIA) of 1999. A unique feature of the FCIA is its requirement 
that young people take an active role in individual service planning and delivery. In 
particular, young adults who are aging-out of the public child welfare system are 
expected to “participate directly in designing their own program activities that prepare 
them for independent living” and “accept personal responsibility for living up to their 





The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 
(Fostering Connections) further formalized the component of youth participation by 
requiring that a unique transition plan be developed for each child in foster care within 
the 90-day period before the child’s eighteenth birthday.  A caseworker and other system 
representatives are expected to “provide the child with assistance and support in 
developing a transition plan that is personalized at the direction of the child, includes 
specific options on housing, health insurance, education, local opportunities for mentors 
and continuing support services, and work force supports and employment services, and 
is as detailed as the child may elect” (Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing 
Adoptions Act, 2008).  
The participation requirements embedded in both the FCIA and Fostering 
Connections legislation reflect the belief that social work services are most effective 
when they are delivered as a partnership between clients and professionals and when 
client aspirations and goals are given primary consideration (Austin, 2002; Hasenfeld, 
1983; Hasenfeld, 1992; Rapp and Poertner, 1992). Encouraging such a role for clients is 
inherent to the profession’s core value of self-determination (Levy, 1983; Spicker, 1990) 
and reflects its long-standing empowerment tradition (Simon, 1994).  While scholars and 
practitioners agree that power imbalances often strain the social worker/client 
partnership, few efforts have been made to understand how social work clients 
experience such partnerships and the extent to which successful partnering may influence 





Plan of the Dissertation 
 
 The following section describes how this dissertation is organized.  Given the 
contextual emphasis inherent to the qualitative methodology used in this study, Chapter 2 
provides background on child welfare services and foster care in the United States, 
describes how children and families enter and proceed through the child welfare system, 
and examines issues related to whether youth are competent to make major decisions 
about their lives.  In Chapter 3, I will review the existing literature that focuses on how 
youth in foster care are involved in decisions about their lives while they are in care.  
Previous research in this area has focused primarily on describing children’s attitudes 
toward participating in decision making, identifying the barriers that limit children’s 
involvement in decisions while in care, and suggesting supports that can help children 
participate in such decisions.  
 Chapter 4 will focus on the theoretical influences that offer a sensitizing 
framework for this study, specifically the array of social and behavioral science theories 
that suggest involvement in life decisions by foster youth could increase empowerment, 
enhance identity development, and boost perceived fairness leading to improved 
outcomes.  Perspectives from the sociology of childhood, children’s rights, procedural 
justice, and therapeutic jurisprudence are also reviewed.  
Chapter 5 presents the research methodology used in this qualitative study, 
hermeneutic phenomenology, highlighting its unique relevance to conducting experience-
focused social science research.  The specific research methods used in this study are also 





with an emphasis on providing a rich description of their experiences participating in 
decisions about their lives while they were in care.  Chapter 7 presents themes from 
cross-case analysis, leading to a description of the “essence” of participating in decisions 
about one’s life when in foster care. 
In the final chapter, I present the findings within the context of prior literature and 
relevant social and behavioral science concepts.  I will also discuss the limitations of this 
study.  I conclude with observations on the implications of these findings for social work 





CHAPTER 2: STUDY CONTEXT 
 
Introduction and Plan for the Chapter 
 
Hermeneutic phenomenology, the qualitative methodology that guides this study, 
stresses the importance of investigating experiences within the context in which they are 
lived (Lopez & Willis, 2004; Ray, 1994). In this chapter I describe the context within 
which foster youth experience participating in decisions about their lives while in care.  
The chapter begins with an overview of the child welfare and foster care systems in the 
United States.  That section describes the growth of child welfare efforts from local, 
voluntary services to a comprehensive, federally-legislated and multi-faceted system of 
care; reviews the influence of family law and the role of dependency courts in child 
welfare practice; and highlights major legislation that provides the framework for child 
welfare services.   
In the second section of this chapter I describe how children and families enter 
and proceed through the child welfare system, highlighting the key decision points along 
the way.  The chapter’s final section draws on literature from law, child development, 
psychology and health care to explore issues in the determination of whether minors are 
competent to make important decisions about their lives.  
Child Welfare and Foster Care in the United States 
 
 The child welfare system provides services that enhance the well-being of 





for their children successfully” (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2011a, p. 1). It 
includes public (federal, state, county, and municipal) agencies, the court system, private 
agencies and, at times, law enforcement organizations.  Together, these institutions are 
responsible for investigating reported incidents of abuse and neglect; placing children in 
out-of-home care; monitoring case progress; providing supportive services for children 
and families; determining whether parental rights should be terminated; arranging 
adoptions or other permanent placements for children; and, in general, ensuring the safety 
and well-being of children when their parents are unable to do so (Child Welfare 
Information Gateway, 2011a). 
Historical Perspectives 
 
Rooted in the English Poor Laws of 1601, the earliest American child welfare 
efforts focused primarily on assisting poor children (McGowan, 2005; Schene, 1998). 
Public intervention in family matters was typically limited to addressing issues related to 
property inheritance and determining custody arrangements for poor or orphaned children 
(Rendelman, 1971).  Four remedies to address child poverty typically were considered 
prior to the 17th and 18th centuries (McGowan, 2005).  First, “outdoor relief” or financial 
assistance was offered to the “deserving poor” – usually widowed or disabled mothers 
and their children. Although financial assistance was minimal, it often enabled children to 
remain at home with their families (McGowan, 2005).  A second option was to provide 
work, room and board for the “undeserving poor” and their children at a local almshouse 
or workhouse (McGowan, 2005).  Assignment to these institutions was viewed as 





ability to support their children (Myers, 2006). “Farming-out” was a third option, in 
which the poor were auctioned off to citizens who agreed to provide for their 
maintenance in exchange for a contracted fee (McGowan, 2005). A favored option was 
apprenticeship, in which children, sometimes as young as two or three years of age, were 
indentured to other families where, in exchange for room and board, they provided 
household help, farm labor, or were trained in a specific skill or craft (Rendelman, 1971).  
Children remained with the household until they had paid for the cost of their care and 
maintenance through their labor. 
While these early initiatives may seem far removed from today’s vision of child 
protective services, they contributed two major concepts to modern child welfare 
practice.  First, they cemented a belief in parental responsibility to support their children 
financially. Second, these activities reflected the assumption that government had the 
“authority and obligation to care for poor children as a kind of ultimate parent” (Ventrell, 
2005, p. 118).  This assumption was an early expression of parens patriae, a doctrine 
rooted in English Common Law that empowers the state to protect persons who are 
legally unable to act on their own behalf and that undergirds child welfare services today 
(Schene, 1998).   
 By the early 1800s, changing ideas about childhood and concerns about the 
corrupting influence of almshouse life on young children gave rise to a new breed of 
institutions devoted specifically to the needs of the young (Askeland, 2006; McGowan, 





children, while residential schools addressed the specific needs of children who were 
blind or deaf, or who had other types of disabilities (Myers, 2006).   
For example, the House of Refuge Movement sought to replace the practice of 
multi-generational incarceration with child-specific institutions to address juvenile crime 
(Ventrell, 2005). Legislation authorizing the New York House of Refuge in 1825, for 
example, allowed managers of the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents to 
“house children committed as vagrant or convicted of crimes by authorities,” as well as 
children who were committed by administrative order or at the request of their parents 
(Ventrell, 2005, p. 124).  A number of court cases challenged House of Refuge activities, 
particularly the practice of committing children without indictment or a jury trial.  
One such case, the 1839 decision of Ex Parte Crouse in Pennsylvania, involved a 
child who was committed to the Philadelphia House of Refuge through a Justice of the 
Peace Warrant executed by her mother, who felt the child was beyond her parents’ 
control.  The child’s father requested his daughter’s return, arguing that committing a 
child without a trial was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Eastern 
District, rejected the argument on the basis that the House of Refuge was not a prison and 
the child was there for reformation, not punishment. In short, the court upheld the parens 
patriae doctrine arguing that the “right of parental control is a natural, but not an 
unalienable one” (Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839)). 
The Crouse case, which served as a cornerstone for juvenile proceedings for 
about a century, was particularly relevant to the development of dependency courts 





“the case for state intervention into the family where the parents fail, in the state’s view, 
to perform adequately” (Ventrell, 2005, p. 127). 
 The mid-1800s saw the development of other initiatives to address issues related 
to child poverty and its broader effects on society. Concerned about the effects of 
population growth, immigration and poverty on urban children, Charles Loring Brace 
created the New York Children’s Aid Society in 1853 to establish industrial schools, 
night schools, homes for sick children, lodging houses, kindergartens, reading rooms, 
Sunday schools, public baths, and gymnasiums. The Children’s Aid Society also engaged 
in “placing out” children – sending them to live with families in rural America – 
reflecting Brace’s beliefs in the value of rural living, the need for children to be removed 
from the degrading urban environment, and the harsh effects of institutional care for 
children (Holt, 2006; Myers, 2006; Schene, 1998).   
The earliest placing-out efforts sent children from New York City to nearby 
Pennsylvania, Connecticut and rural New York, but eventually “orphan trains” sent 
thousands of children to the Midwest and beyond.  Ultimately, the orphan trains were 
criticized for placing Catholic children in Protestant homes, not obtaining parental 
consent for placing children, and relying on informal arrangements to provide for the 
placed children (Holt, 2006; Myers, 2006).  Additional criticism focused on the society’s 
failure to investigate homes before placing children or to conduct any follow up visits to 
assure the safety and well-being of placed children (Holt, 2006).  Some communities 
receiving placed-out children charged that Brace and others were corrupting their locales 





to rural communities and families (Holt, 2006). Nonetheless, the orphan train movement 
continued until 1929 and was an early predecessor of today’s foster care programs 
(Creagh, 2006; McGowan, 2005). 
 Another early version of foster care emerged with the Children’s Home Society 
movement that began in Illinois in 1883 (McGowan, 2005).  The Children’s Home 
Society provided free foster homes to dependent children, primarily in the Midwestern 
and Southern portions of the United States. 
 Still largely absent from early child welfare efforts were attempts to protect 
children from physical abuse inflicted by parents or other caregivers. Ventrell (2005) 
suggests that the absence of prosecutions for criminal child abuse reflects the widely-held 
view that parents were solely responsible for decisions about how to discipline their 
children and that severe corporal punishment was an acceptable choice.   
Lazoritz and Shelman (1996) identify an intervention in 1871 to assist a 
physically abused child named Emily Thompson as the first case in which a child was 
removed from home and brought to court because of physical maltreatment. Reviewing 
unpublished notes of a biographer of Henry Bergh, the founder of the Society for 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the authors report that the organization was 
approached to help a young girl who was brutally treated by her caregiver.  After sending 
investigators to substantiate that the child had been battered and collecting evidence from 
neighbors who witnessed the abuse, Bergh brought the case to the New York Court of 
Special Sessions, where it was heard as a criminal matter. Although the child was visibly 





but suspended her sentence and returned the child to her care. Publicity surrounding the 
trial, however, led the child’s grandmother to petition successfully for the child’s custody 
(Lazoritz and Shelman, 1996). 
A more well-known case of early court involvement in child abuse concerned 
Mary Ellen Wilson, who after being abandoned as an infant was apprenticed to Mary and 
Thomas McCormack at the age of 18 months. (When Mr. McCormack died shortly 
thereafter, Mrs. McCormack married Francis Connelly, with whom she proceeded to 
raise Mary Ellen.)  In December 1987, Etta Angell Wheeler, a religious missionary who 
ministered to the poor in New York’s Hell’s Kitchen neighborhood, received numerous 
reports about a child who was beaten regularly, forbidden to leave the family’s quarters, 
inadequately clothed and forced to sleep on a piece of carpet on the floor (Myers, 2006).  
Wheeler approached numerous sources for help.  The police refused to intervene in the 
case without clear evidence of assault. Child-serving charities declined to provide 
assistance on the grounds that they had no authority to intervene in family relations.   
Wheeler eventually approached Bergh’s New York Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals (NYSPCA), which after conducting an investigation agreed to 
intercede on the child’s behalf (Myers, 2006).  Elbridge Gerry, the lawyer for the 
NYSPCA, drew up papers that successfully requested the court to authorize the police to 
remove the child from the home immediately. After hearing Mary Ellen’s story, as well 
as testimony from other witnesses, the court agreed to remove Mary Ellen from the 
Connolly’s custody.  Mrs. Connolly was later found guilty of assault and battery and 





relatives, Mary Ellen was placed in an institution for homeless children.  Mrs. Wheeler, 
the missionary who initiated the case, requested that the judge allow Mary Ellen to be 
raised by her family on a farm in upstate New York (Myers, 2006).  
In addition to broadening the application of parens patriae to children who 
experience abuse within their families, these cases led to the creation of New York’s 
Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCC) in 1875.  Through the mid-1900s, 
similar voluntary groups were formed in communities across America.  Taking a law 
enforcement approach to the problem of child abuse, volunteers received complaints of 
child maltreatment, conducted investigations, and brought cases to court with the goal of 
prosecuting parents and caregivers charged with abuse or neglect (McGowan, 2005).  In 
some cases, children were removed from their families and turned over to social service 
agencies for placement and care (Schene, 1998).   
 Studying SPCC organizations in the late 1930s, Gane found that these voluntary 
agencies relied on “police powers and special responsibilities to protect children from 
predicaments which were considered to be detrimental to their welfare”; she described 
their primary responsibility to be “the use of this authority to warn or threaten parents 
who fail to respond promptly to their advice” (Gane, 1940, p. 154).  The SPCC 
movement, particularly its focus on investigating alleged child maltreatment, remains a 
strong influence on today’s child protective services system. 
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, courts continued to uphold the application 
of parens patriae to dependency cases. The 1882 Ferrier case in Illinois, for example, 





her (103 Ill. 367, 1882). The court adjudicated the child as dependent and sent her to an 
industrial school for girls – in other words, it was a case of forced removal of a child due 
to parental neglect.  According to Ventrell (2005), this decision “approved of both the 
state’s authority to interrupt the rights of parents and children to the parent-child legal 
relationship, as well as the right to deprive the child of a degree of personal liberty 
through a state placement” and “repudiated a serious effort to create precedent limiting 
the state’s parens patriae authority” (p. 127-128). 
 The Progressive Era, the name by which historians refer to the period from about 
1890 to 1920, ushered in a broad array of initiatives to improve life for American 
children (Creagh, 2006; Myers, 2006; Schene, 1998).   Although Massachusetts and New 
York had already passed legislation that separated court for minors and adults, the 
country’s first formal juvenile court was established in Cook County, Illinois in 1899 
(Fox 1970; Shireman, 2003; Ventrell, 2005). The Illinois court had jurisdiction over both 
delinquent and dependent/neglected children and was viewed as being able to provide 
centralized, coordinated care for dependent children, with appropriate follow-up and 
supervision (Ventrell, 2005). By 1925, juvenile courts had been established in all but two 
states (Shireman, 2003).  
 The White House Conference on the Care of Dependent Children, convened in 
1909, was particularly influential in addressing growing concerns about the use of out-of-
home, institutional care for children (McGowan, 2005; Schene, 1998).  The conference 
participants recommended expanding the scope of child welfare services to include 





widespread acceptance.  First, the conferees posited that poverty – particularly among 
“worthy” parents and mothers – was not a sufficient reason for placing a child in out-of-
home care.   The group encouraged the provision of “mothers’ pensions” – a subsidy that 
would enable women to remain at home to raise their children and keep their families 
together.  Second, family care was established as the preferred setting in which to care for 
homeless and neglected children.  Institutions, while not preferred, were recommended to 
adopt a cottage plan in which children lived in small family-like units within the 
institutional setting.  Third, the conference called for state supervision of institutions and 
improved recordkeeping to ensure appropriate services were provided to children in care.  
Finally, the conference led to the creation of the Children’s Bureau, a federal agency to 
provide leadership on children’s issues, and to the recognition that “the federal 
government has a responsibility for the welfare of children” (McGowan, 2005, p. 20).  
The Great Depression significantly increased the need for out-of-home care 
services while simultaneously curtailing many voluntary child protective services efforts.  
During this period, destitute families commonly relied on foster homes and orphanages to 
care for their children until the family regained its financial footing (Creagh, 2006).  
Among other things, the increase in demand for out-of-home care for children forced 
agencies to provide stipends to foster parents, replacing what had primarily been a free 
foster care system (Creagh, 2006).   
The Social Security Act of 1935 authorized federal participation in an array of 
social welfare and social insurance programs (McGowan, 2005; Myers, 2006).  Among 





provided financial support for fatherless families (and later extended its coverage to 
include families with a disabled or unemployed parent).  In addition, the legislation 
required the Children’s Bureau to work with state agencies to ensure the protection of 
homeless, dependent, delinquent and neglected children.  The ADC program was 
reconceived as the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) in the 
1960s and amended to allow states to utilize funds to provide foster care for children 
from AFDC-eligible families if a court determined that the child should be in out-of-
home care (Schene, 1998). This effectively established a publicly-funded system of out-
of-home care for children.  
Public interest in child physical abuse was re-kindled in 1962 with the 
identification of “battered child syndrome” by Dr. C. Henry Kempe and colleagues1 
(Schene, 1998; Ventrell, 2005). Focusing on physical abuse of children reported by 
hospitals and prosecutors, Kempe used x-ray technology to make diagnoses based on 
current and previous fractures. In addition to establishing a role for medical providers in 
the identification and assessment of child abuse injuries, Kempe’s work influenced many 
states to enact child abuse reporting laws beginning in the early 1960s. 
Juvenile courts, for both delinquent and dependent children, continued to operate 
largely from the perspective of parens patriae until the late 1960s when two U.S. 
Supreme Court cases began to dismantle that legal model. Until these decisions, it was 
                                                 
1 Although Kempe is commonly credited with the “discovery” of child physical abuse, a 
French physician, Ambrose Tardieu, reported in 1860 on a study of 32 children whom he 
believed died of child abuse.  Tardieu’s study described the medical, psychiatric, social 






assumed that the juvenile court, with its focus on rehabilitation rather than punishment, 
“would uphold the juvenile’s rights even though the constitutional due process guarantees 
afforded to adults were not enforced” (Shireman, 2003, p. 62). 
 First, in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the Supreme Court held that 
a juvenile’s case could not be transferred to criminal court without procedural due 
process. One year later, the Supreme Court obviated the parents patriae authority of 
juvenile courts in delinquency cases.  In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme 
Court declared that both the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights applied to children as well as adults and imposed procedural requirements on 
both juvenile and adult proceedings. Under Gault juveniles were required to be given 
notice of charges, confrontation and cross-examination, prohibition against self-
incrimination, and the right to counsel.  As a result, juvenile courts began implementing 
adult criminal procedures in juvenile practice and, most relevant to the discussion at 
hand, began separating the delinquency and dependency components of their operations.  
Despite its major influence on delinquency courts, Gault did not limit the parens patriae 
authority for dependency court.  
Major Legislative Initiatives 
 
The passage of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) of 1974 
ushered in a period of major growth in federal involvement in child welfare issues (Child 
Welfare Information Gateway, 2011a; Schene, 1998).  Over the past four decades, a 
plethora of federal measures have directed states on developing child welfare services 





investigations, child placement options, family preservation services, and programs to 
help foster children transition to independent adulthood (Rollin, Vandervort & 
Haralambie, 2005).  This subsection reviews the most significant legislative initiatives 
taken by the federal government in this area over the past 50 years. 
In addition to requiring states to enact mandatory reporting laws, CAPTA 
mandated that states establish social service departments to investigate reports of child 
maltreatment and to create standards for dealing with such reports. Federal funding for 
such services was contingent upon ensuring reporter immunity and confidentiality, and 
appointing a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of affected children (Rollin, 
Vandervort, & Haralambie, 2005). CAPTA’s most recent reauthorization, the CAPTA 
Reauthorization Act of 2010, required expanded collaboration between child protective 
services and domestic violence services agencies; mandated that guardians ad litem be 
trained in early childhood, child, and adolescent development; and encouraged states to 
involve families in case decision making. 
The next major child welfare legislation, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 
1978, addressed issues related to the large number of Native American children who were 
placed in non-Indian care settings after being removed from their homes for alleged 
abuse or neglect. ICWA gave tribal courts responsibility for child abuse and neglect cases 
involving children living on reservations.  Tribal courts must also be notified about state-
conducted investigations involving Native American children not living on reservations. 
Growing awareness of child abuse and mandated reporting laws contributed to a 





foster care (Satz & Askeland, 2006).  By the late-1970s, the number of children in care 
and the growing length of their stays had become a subject of concern among 
practitioners and lawmakers (McGowan, 2005; Schene, 1998).  The Adoption Assistance 
and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) of 1980 sought to address this “foster care drift” by 
requiring the states to make “reasonable efforts” to prevent children from being removed 
from their homes and, in cases where removal was deemed necessary, to work to reunite 
children with their families as quickly as possible.  The task of reunification was 
addressed in part through family preservation programs – intensive, in-home social work 
interventions aimed at helping at-risk families address the issues that threatened to result 
in out-of-home placement for their children.  Family reunification services offered similar 
intervention to families that had already had a child removed from their home, with the 
goal of facilitating reunification (Satz & Askeland, 2006).  
AACWA also addressed foster care drift issues by requiring courts to review 
cases on a regular basis to prevent children from languishing in care for extended periods 
(Ventrell, 2005).  In some jurisdictions, courts appointed citizen review boards to review 
on a regular basis the cases of children in out-of-home care.  Court reviews were required 
to ensure that “all family members have been involved in developing a permanent plan 
for the child, and that children are moved as rapidly as possible into permanent homes or 
are well prepared for independent living” (Shireman, 2003, p. 107).  Citizen review 
boards typically invited interested parties to attend the review, made inquiries into case 
issues, and presented findings and recommendations to both the court and the child 





Studies in the early 1980s found high rates of homelessness and other problems 
among former foster youth (Festinger, 1983; Zimmerman, 1982). Those studies spurred 
the creation of the Independent Living Program (ILP) through the Consolidated Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, which was subsequently revised, extended and 
expanded by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts 
of 1989, 1990, and 1993. The ILP funded services to teach life skills to older foster youth 
who were unlikely to be reunited with their families or adopted by age 18.  ILP services 
could include outreach programs to attract participants; education and job assistance; 
training in daily living skills; individual and group counseling; and the implementation of 
a written transitional independent living plan for each participant (Collins, 2001; 
Fagnoni, 1999). Beginning in 1989, states could provide former foster youth with follow-
up services for up to six months after the youth left care. 
The Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986 and the Victims of Child Abuse 
Act of 1990 respectively provided child victims of sexual assault with a civil cause of 
action for damages and aimed to improve the investigation and prosecution of child abuse 
cases.   
The Family Preservation and Support Services Program was created through an 
amendment to Title IV-B of the Social Security Act through the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993. Among other things, the legislation created a state court 
improvement program directed at courts that handled child protection cases, while also 
providing additional funding for family support and preservation programs (Rollin et al., 





The Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, amended in 1996, was enacted to address 
the overrepresentation of minority children in foster care. The measure prohibited child 
welfare agencies from delaying or denying adoptive placements on the basis of race, 
unless a specific child’s needs made race an important issue (Shireman, 2003).    
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act of 1996 replaced the 
AFDC program with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program but 
maintained financial support for foster care provided to eligible families.  
By the mid-1990s, the family preservation paradigm came under increasing 
criticism from practitioners and policymakers who felt that it too often allowed children 
to remain in dangerous situations (Myers, 2006; Gelles, 1996).  Critics argued family 
preservation and reunification services were based on a flawed belief that “all biological 
parents can become fit and acceptable parents if only appropriate and sufficient support is 
provided” (Gelles, 1996, p. 148).  Policymakers were urged to “abandon the fantasy that 
child welfare agencies can balance the goals of protecting children and preserving 
families” and instead to make child safety a higher priority than family preservation or 
reunification (Gelles, 1996, p. 148). 
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 sought to end the child 
protection/family preservation dichotomy that had been a defining feature of child 
welfare practice since its earliest days. The law identified child safety as the primary 
concern of child protective services, followed by permanency, and child well-being 





Another major contribution of ASFA was its expressed preference for the 
expedient termination of parental rights.  The legislation required states to begin 
termination proceedings for children who had been in care for 15 of the past 22 months, 
infants who were abandoned, in cases in which a parent had killed another of his/her 
children, or in other cases involving severe maltreatment.   
ASFA also required states to provide a permanency hearing within 12 months of a 
child entering out-of-home care.  At this hearing, the court was to establish a permanency 
plan, which would outline whether the child ultimately was expected to be returned to a 
parent, placed for adoption, referred for legal guardianship or placed in another setting. 
ASFA also provided funds for family reunification services and programs to promote 
adoption. 
Responding to continued concern over the outcomes for children who aged out of 
foster care, Congress expanded independent living services through the Foster Care 
Independence Act (FCIA) of 1999.  The FCIA replaced the ILP with the more 
comprehensive John H. Chafee Foster Care Independence Program; increased funding for 
independent living activities; allowed states to provide additional assistance, including 
room and board, to former foster youth aged 18 to 21; and gave states the option to offer 
Medicaid to young people who are transitioning from care (National Foster Care 
Awareness Project, 2000).  The legislation also authorized additional funding for 






The Promoting Safe and Stable Families Amendments of 2001 reauthorized court 
improvement activities and added education and training vouchers to the Chafee 
Independent Living Program.  The vouchers were made available to Chafee-eligible 
youth up until age 23 and children adopted from foster care after age 16, provided that 
they remain enrolled in post-secondary education programs and are working toward 
completion in a satisfactory manner. The vouchers provided up to $5,000 per year and 
could be applied toward the cost of attending college or a post-secondary training 
program.   In addition, the legislation funded mentoring programs of children of 
incarcerated parents, expanded family preservation and family support initiatives, 
adoption support, and an infant safe haven program (McGowan, 2005). 
The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 
extended federal funding for foster care under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act to 
age 21 beginning in the 2011 fiscal year and extended Chafee services and Education and 
Training Voucher Program to youth leaving foster care for kinship legal guardianship or 
adoption after age 16. States could use these funds to create and support independent 
living settings. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 extended 
Medicaid coverage to former foster youth younger than age 26 and included tax code 
adjustments to promote adoption (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2011b). 
In sum, the child welfare system of 50 years ago relied upon private voluntary aid 
organizations and, in drastic cases, intervention by the courts.  By the 1970s, federal 
involvement led to the creation of numerous programs offered to and requirements 





child protection and family preservation.  Since 1997, however, legislation has moved 
toward the swift termination of parental rights where necessary, and focused some 
attention on the plight of youth who age out of this system without adoption or 
reunification. 
The Journey through the Child Welfare System 
 
 Understanding how children enter and proceed through the child welfare system 
is critical to understanding the decisions that are made about their lives while they are in 
foster care.  This section summarizes that experience, highlighting the key decisions that 
are likely to be made as a case moves through the system. (See Figure 1.) 
Initial Report 
 
 Children and families enter the child welfare system when a suspected incident of 
maltreatment is reported.  The federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 
1974, as amended, defines child abuse and neglect as “any recent act or failure to act on 
the part of a parent or caretaker which results in death, serious physical or emotional 
harm, sexual abuse or exploitation; or an act or failure to act which presents an imminent 
risk of serious harm.” Although some professionals (e.g., doctors, teachers) are legally 
obligated to report suspected maltreatment, most states will accept reports from any 
concerned person (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2010).  For example, in New 
Jersey, the setting for this study, any person having reasonable cause to believe that a 
child has been subjected to child abuse or neglect or acts of child abuse is required to 
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2009, the most recent year for which data are available, state child protective services 
agencies received about 3.3 million reports of maltreatment involving about 6 million 
children (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2011c). 
Screening 
 
Although there is some variation among states, maltreatment reports typically are 
received through a centralized hotline by child protective services workers who gather 
basic details about the alleged incident and then determine whether further investigation 
is required (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2011a).  Cases are “screened in” if the 
information provided by the caller suggests the need for further investigation.  In cases 
where there is insufficient information or where the details do not meet the state’s 
definition of abuse or neglect, cases are typically “screened out” and receive no further 
investigation. Key decisions at this point include determining whether the reported 
incident meets state definitions for child maltreatment, whether it requires in-person 
investigation and the urgency with which such an investigation should begin (DePanfilis, 
2005).  In 2009, the most recent year for which data are available, almost 62% of the 3.3 
million reports of alleged abuse or neglect were screened in for further investigation 
(Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2011c).   
Investigating Alleged Maltreatment Reports, Assessing Safety and Risk 
 
 After the initial screening, child protective services workers conduct an 
investigation that may include interviewing parents, other adults in the child’s life (e.g., 





the investigation is to determine whether maltreatment has occurred.  In addition, child 
protective services workers typically also conduct safety assessments to determine 
whether there is an imminent risk of severe harm to the child, and risk assessments to 
ascertain the likelihood of future maltreatment (DePanfilis, 2005).  The investigator also 
seeks to determine whether services are needed to ensure the child’s safety, avoid the risk 
of future maltreatment, or provide treatment for any injuries the child has already 
sustained.  
The investigation typically concludes with a determination that the report is either 
unsubstantiated/unfounded (meaning the reported incident did not meet the legal 
definition for maltreatment or there was not enough evidence to determine whether 
maltreatment occurred) or substantiated/founded (meaning the reported incident of abuse 
or neglect did occur). In 2009, 24% of investigated cases resulted in the substantiation of 
at least one incident of child abuse or neglect (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 
2011c).   
If a report is unsubstantiated or unfounded, the case likely will be closed after the 
investigation has been completed, although the family may be referred to community-
based agencies for voluntary services.  
Cases that are substantiated or founded are typically handled in one of three ways.  
First, if the case involves minor maltreatment or a single, isolated maltreatment incident, 
or if the investigator believes that the child is safe and not at risk for future abuse, the 
case may be closed, with the family sometimes referred for community-based voluntary 





Second, if the case involves more serious or repeated maltreatment, or if the 
investigator has safety concerns, the case may be opened for agency supervision.  In such 
cases, the child is allowed to remain at home, with the child welfare agency providing 
both supervision and services for the family.  The families and children are monitored on 
a regular basis by the child welfare system and, if families do not comply with the 
required services or if the risk to the child is believed to escalate, the agency could seek a 
court order for the child be placed in out-of-home care. 
Finally, in cases that involve more serious abuse or neglect or repeated 
maltreatment, or if the investigator identifies immediate, serious safety concerns, the 
child protective services agency may ask the courts for an order to remove the child 
immediately and place him or her in foster care.  
Court Involvement 
 
The court process begins with a protective hearing at which a judge will 
determine whether abuse or neglect has occurred.  If the judge confirms maltreatment, a 
dispositional hearing is held at which the judge decides whether to send the child home 
without services; send the child home with supervision and support services; or remove 
the child from the home.  The judge’s decision generally should take into account 
recommendations from the state child welfare agency, the severity of the maltreatment, 
findings from risk and safety assessments, service availability and state policy 
(DePanfilis, 2005).  Cases in which the child is placed in out-of-home care continue to be 





During the 2009 federal fiscal year, 255,418 children entered out-of-home care 
(Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2011c). Of the 423,773 children in out-of-home 
care on September 30, 2009, about (48%) were living in a non-relative foster home. 
About 24% were in a kinship foster care placement and 16% were living in an institution 
or group home.  A handful of foster children were living in a trial home visit (5%), a pre-
adoptive home (4%), or a supervised independent living arrangement (1%).  About 2% 
were reported as having run away from care (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 
2011d). 
While in foster care, the child attends school, receives medical care and may be 
provided with other therapeutic services as needed.  Depending upon the situation, the 
court may allow the child to visit with his or her parent(s) and, as applicable, siblings and 
other relatives.  Concurrently, the child’s family participates in services that seek to 
address existing family issues or concerns that prohibit reunification.  
For children in foster care, a primary goal of court involvement is to ensure that 
their cases move expediently through the child welfare system.  Of the 276,000 children 
who left foster care in 2009, the average child spent 13.7 months in out-of-home care.  
About 46% of these children were in care for less than 12 months and an additional 24% 
were in care for 12 to 23 months.  About 29% of the children who left foster care in 2009 
had spent more than two years in care (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2011d). 
To move cases through the system more swiftly, the Adoption and Safe Families 
Act (ASFA) of 1997 requires two types of court reviews for children placed in out-of-





every six months. In New Jersey, a child placement review board makes the initial review 
of the case within 45 days of placement (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2009). The 
review examines the goal and objectives of the placement plan; the appropriateness of 
services provided to the child and temporary caregiver; living arrangements for siblings 
also placed outside of the home; the extent to which the child’s wishes were considered 
regarding placement and development of the placement plan; visitation arrangements 
with parents/legal guardians and, if applicable, with siblings; circumstances surrounding 
the placement; appropriateness of services provided to the parent or legal guardian; and 
whether the state agency, parents/legal guardian, and temporary caregiver are fulfilling 
their responsibilities in accordance with the placement plan (Child Welfare Information 
Gateway, 2009). 
The second type of review, a permanency hearing, must be held by the court 
within 12 months of the child entering foster care, and then every 12 months thereafter.2  
The permanency hearing includes a review and approval of the child’s permanency plan. 
In New Jersey, the court’s permanency hearing focuses on the anticipated date of 
achieving the placement goal; intermediate objectives related to attaining the goal; and a 
statement of duties and responsibilities of the state child welfare agency, the parents or 
legal guardian, and the temporary caregiver in working toward the permanency plan 
(Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2009).  
                                                 
2 If the court determines that “reasonable efforts” to work toward family reunification are 
not required in a case, a permanency planning hearing could take place within 30 days of 





Because foster care is intended to provide the child with a temporary home, 
permanency planning begins as soon as the child enters an out-of-home placement and 
focuses on determining where the child will live after leaving foster care.  In most cases, 
the permanency plan initially focuses on reuniting the child with his or her family.  
Services are provided to help the family address issues that led to the child’s removal.  If 
those problems are successfully ameliorated, the child may be returned home, often with 
some continued monitoring by the child welfare agency and/or the courts. 
Of the children in foster care on September 30, 2009, almost half (49%) were 
expected to be reunited with their families, 25% were expected to be adopted, and 8% 
had a case goal of long-term foster care.  Smaller percentages had goals of emancipation 
(6%), living with other relatives (4%), and guardianship (4%) (Child Welfare Information 
Gateway, 2011d). 
In cases in which the family is not able to address serious issues, the permanency 
plan may be changed to focus on establishing alternate option for the child, such as 
assigning guardianship to a relative or finding an adoptive home. Permanency plans for 
older youth also include a focus on providing independent living services to help them 
achieve self-sufficiency if they leave care without being adopted or returned to their 
families. 
Termination of Parental Rights 
 
While most foster children are reunited with their families, the child welfare 
agency may ask the court to terminate parental rights if parents do not comply with the 





parental rights by a court “ends the legal parent-child relationship” and makes the child 
legally free for adoption with the objective of securing a stable, permanent family 
environment that can meet the child’s long-term parenting needs (Child Welfare 
Information Gateway, 2010b, p. 1).  After termination, the natural parent loses the right 
to be consulted about the child’s welfare, to visit the child, or to be notified about the 
child’s whereabouts or adoption (Polowny, Morgan, Keller-Micheli, & Bailey, 2010).  
 ASFA requires states to begin termination proceedings for children who have 
been in care for 15 of the past 22 months (or sooner if the case involves infant 
abandonment, a parent who has killed another one of his /her children or in other cases 
involving severe maltreatment).  In New Jersey and about 30 other states, the child 
welfare agency can choose not to initiate termination of parental rights within the ASFA 
time frame if the child is being cared for by a relative, if the agency can document a 
compelling reason why termination is not in the child’s best interests or if the state has 
not provided necessary services to the family to support reunification (Child Welfare 
Information Gateway, 2010b). 
 Although state laws vary, parental rights generally may be terminated 
involuntarily only after a court determines that the parent is unfit and that severing 
parental ties is in the child’s best interests (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2010b).  
In New Jersey, grounds for termination of parental rights include child abandonment; 
chronic or several abuse or neglect of the child; the failure of reasonable efforts (provided 
for one year) to rehabilitate the parent and/or address the conditions that led to the out-of-





manslaughter of another child or an attempted or actual assault that could have resulted in 
death or serious bodily injury to the child or another child; or the involuntary termination 
of the parent’s rights with respect to another child (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 
2010b). 
In cases in which parental rights of a child are terminated, the goal typically is to 
arrange that the child be adopted or, if adoption is not feasible, that the child be placed 
with a legal guardian.  Despite the system’s focus on finding permanent families for 
children whose parental rights have been terminated, numerous foster children will leave 
care upon reaching adulthood without being reunited with their biological families, 
adopted, or placed with a legal guardian. Of the 276,266 children who exited foster care 
during the 2009 federal fiscal year, more than half (51%) were reunited with their 
parent(s).  About 8% of these children left care to live with another relative and 7% went 
to live with a non-relative legal guardian.  About 20% were adopted.  The remaining 11% 
aged-out of the child welfare system without being adopted or reunited with their families 
(Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2011d).  
Youth Decision Making 
 
 The broader norms related to youth decision making provide additional context 
for understanding how foster youth experience participation in decisions about their lives 
while in care.  Although participation in decision making differs from making decisions 
autonomously, literature in the latter area supplies a framework for understanding issues 





 This section seeks to inform the discussion of how foster youth experience 
participation in decisions about their lives by exploring the literature that focuses on three 
pertinent questions: (1) What decisions are youth permitted to make about their lives? (2) 
To what extent are youth capable of making important decisions? (3) How do other fields 
of practice involve youth in making decisions about their lives, given the limitations on 
their legal rights? 
Decisions Children May Make About Their Lives 
 
 In the United States, the limited extent to which young people are involved in 
important decisions about their lives, regardless of their connection to the child welfare 
system, reflects a historical belief that minors “lack the skills necessary for capable 
decision making” (Hartman, 2002, p. 409).  Laws and policies thus commonly limit the 
decision-making rights of individuals who have not yet reached the age of majority, 
which is defined as age 18 in most states, age 19 in Alabama and Nebraska, and age 21 in 
Colorado, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania (Polowny et al., 2010; Scott, Reppucci, & 
Woolard, 1995).3     
 For example, adolescents typically are not permitted to provide informed consent 
for most medical procedures and treatments (Gitter, Quigley-Rick, & Saks, 1990; 
Polowny et al., 2010).  While they may enter into contracts, minors may be allowed to 
disavow such agreements without liability for breach (Nurcombe & Partlett, 1994; 
Polowny et al., 2010).  In addition, minors generally cannot sue or be sued on their own 
                                                 
3 In some states, youth are no longer considered minors if they marry, join the military, or 





behalf (Polowny et al., 2010). In issues arising from their relationships with others, such 
as adoption, termination of parental rights, custody disputes, visitation with non-custodial 
parents, or grandparent visitation, children also have comparatively few legal rights 
(Dwyer, 2003).   
 Parents in most cases have the legal responsibility for making decisions about 
their children’s lives, including choices about medical treatment, education, religion, and 
most other significant issues (Dwyer, 2003; Foster & Freed, 1972).   With a few 
exceptions such as the requirement that a basic education be provided, the U.S. legal 
system generally has permitted parents to raise their children in the manner they choose 
(Cahn, 2006).  However, when parents are unable to meet their basic responsibilities 
(e.g., providing food, clothing, shelter and safety from abuse), the state may act in parens 
patriae to protect the child’s interests (Cahn, 2006). 
 In some legal proceedings, the opinions of children are routinely sought and 
considered when addressing a specific issue or concern.  For example, judges and 
mediators often consult all but the youngest children about their residential preferences 
before making custody determinations (Polowny et al., 2010). Today, most states have 
established age thresholds – mostly beginning between 10 and 14 – after which a child 
must give his or her own consent to being adopted (Krause, 1995).  
 The area in which minors arguably possess the most decision-making autonomy 
relates to consenting to medical treatment for a limited array of health concerns (Rosato, 
2008; Polowny et al., 2010).  Consenting to treatment requires that an individual be 





Vierling, 1978).  “Knowing,” in the context of consent, means understanding the 
information that is provided by a medical professional.  Grisso and Vierling (1978) 
suggest that “knowing” can be operationalized as the “match between information given 
to the patient and the patient’s own paraphrase of that of which he/she has been 
informed” (p. 416).   
 “Intelligent” consent focuses on the process of using information to make a 
treatment decision. It is defined as the extent to which a patient is competent to “arrive at 
the consent decision rationally” and requires “the ability to delay one’s response 
sufficiently to reflect on the information and to allow the employment of available 
cognitive resources” (Grisso & Vierling, 1978, p. 418). “Voluntary” consent is defined as 
the ability to consent to treatment without conforming to social expectations or requests 
by authority; in other words, it “is not merely an acquiescent or deferent response to 
authority” (Grisso & Vierling, 1978, p. 421).  
 One area in which minors have rights to consent to treatment is reproductive 
health.  In all states, minors are able to consent to treatment for sexually-transmitted 
infections, which may or may not include treatment for human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV) or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) depending on the specific state 
(Polowny et al., 2010; Mutcherson, 2005). Minors are also able to make treatment 
decisions about obtaining birth control or (in some cases) terminating a pregnancy 
(Polowny et al., 2010; Hartman, 2002).  
 To varying degrees, youth can also consent to treatment for drug or alcohol 





all but seven states, minors can consent for substance abuse treatment, typically without 
parental knowledge (Mutcherson, 2005).  In 23 states, children can consent to the 
provision of mental health services without parental knowledge or approval, although the 
age of consent differs by state (Polowny et al., 2010; Hartman, 2002).  
Most states allow minors to be treated without parental consent in emergency situations 
(Polowny et al., 2010).  Finally, a handful of states provide minors who have been 
sexually assaulted the right to consent to care related to the assault (Hartman, 2002; 
Mutcherson, 2005). 
 Scholars suggest that laws enabling minors to consent to treatment for a limited 
group of conditions should not be interpreted as an endorsement of children’s decision-
making abilities or self-determination rights (Ross, 1997).  Rather, the conditions listed 
above are treated as necessary exceptions because some minors would not pursue 
treatment for these conditions if they were required to seek parental consent – putting at 
risk their own health, as well as the broader welfare of society (Hartman, 2002).   
 Unsettled issues relating to health care decision making by minors include 
whether children who can consent to treatment for certain conditions are entitled to the 
same privacy and confidentiality rights as adult patients; whether a minor can decide to 
stop unwanted medical treatment; and whether minors can sign advance directives 
(Hartman, 2002; Rosato, 2008; Wadlington, 1994). Courts in a handful of states have 
authorized withholding or withdrawal of life support interventions at the request of 
adolescent patients (Weir & Peters, 1997). While most states have living will statutes or 





the event that they are unable to do so, the majority of these laws do not address end-of-
life decisions by minors (Weir & Peters, 1997).  The federal Patient Self-Determination 
Act of 1990, which requires hospitals, nursing homes and other health care institutions to 
provide information about advance directives at admission, is limited to patients 18 years 
of age or older (Weir & Peters, 1997). 
 In summary, minors in the United States have few rights to make autonomous 
decisions about their lives, regardless of their involvement with the child welfare system.  
Parents are charged with making most major decisions that affect their children, with the 
state stepping in to do so when the parents are incapable. The few decision-making rights 
that have been accorded to children permit them to consent to treatment for a very limited 
array of health-related conditions. 
Assessing the Competency of Youth to Make Decisions 
 
 A growing social and behavioral science literature has sought to assess the extent 
to which minors are capable of making competent decisions.  This issue has been 
explored from two perspectives.  First, reflecting a belief that knowledge and reasoning 
provide the basis for competent decision making at any age, some studies have focused 
on comparing the cognitive abilities of children and adults. Second, studies rooted in the 
literature on child development have concentrated on psychosocial factors that may 





Assessing Cognitive Differences Between Children and Adults 
 
 Studies focused on cognitive functioning generally have found significant 
differences between adults and younger adolescents, but few differences between adults 
and older adolescents (Grisso, 1980; Grisso et al., 2003; Hale, 1990; Kail, 1997; 
Weithorn & Campbell, 1982).  In general, these studies have concluded that cognitive 
differences between children and adults are no longer significant by age 15. 
Research on the cognitive ability of children to make competent decisions has 
concentrated on two areas:  (1) decisions about legal proceedings; and (2) decisions about 
medical treatment.  
 In an effort to assess the competency of children in legal proceedings, Grisso 
(1980) conducted a series of studies to determine the extent to which children and adults 
understand their Miranda rights, which must be read to criminal suspects before 
interrogation (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).  The first of Grisso’s studies sought to measure 
the extent to which subjects comprehended words and phrases used in the Miranda 
warning by asking them to paraphrase each of the four Miranda warning statements. The 
responses were scored by trained reviewers and rated on a scale from zero (inadequate 
paraphrases of every warning) to eight (adequate paraphrases of each warning).  Another 
phase of this study required subjects to define six words (consult, attorney, interrogation, 
appoint, entitled and right) used in the Miranda statement.  Again, trained reviewers 
assigned points to each response depending on the extent to which the definition was 





indicate whether they felt statements that paraphrased the Miranda warning were true or 
false. 
 Grisso’s second study sought to assess how subjects perceived the function and 
significance of the rights included in the Miranda warning.  Subjects were asked to 
examine a drawing that showed an interrogation scene and respond to questions about the 
scene and the importance of what was happening in the scene. 
 For both studies, the subjects included youth who had recently been admitted to a 
juvenile detention center and residents of correctional schools for boys.  The adult sample 
included parolees who were living in halfway houses after serving a prison term, and 
non-offenders who worked as custodians at universities and hospitals. 
 In both cases, Grisso found “striking and consistent differences” in the extent to 
which youth and adults understood Miranda rights.  He concluded that “as a class, 
juveniles younger than fifteen years of age failed to meet both the absolute and relative 
(adult) standards for adequate comprehension of their Miranda rights” (Grisso, 1980, p. 
1151-1152).   
 In a more recent study that sought to explore the capacity of children as 
defendants in criminal proceedings, Grisso and colleagues (2003) found that subjects 
under age 16 were significantly more likely than older adolescents and adults to have 
compromised ability to serve as competent defendants.  The sample for this study 
included detainees in juvenile detention centers and adult prisons and jails, as well as 
youth and young adults from the general population who were recruited from schools, 





 Through in-person interviews, researchers collected data on the participants’ 
backgrounds and previous experience with the juvenile justice system.  They also 
administered a standardized intelligence scale, which provided an estimate of general 
intellectual ability, and a mental health screening survey, which assessed six domains of 
mental health (substance use, anger-irritability, depression-anxiety, somatic complaints, 
suicidal ideation, and thought disturbance).  Competence to stand trial was measured 
using the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Criminal Adjudication, which 
assesses three components: understanding, reasoning and appreciation.  The 
understanding subscale identified the extent to which the subject understood trial 
procedures, courtroom personnel and the defendant’s rights at trial. The reasoning 
subscale measured whether subjects recognized information that was relevant to a legal 
defense and their ability to process information for legal decision making.  The extent to 
which the subject’s legal decision-making skills were influenced by symptoms of mental 
illness was measured in the appreciation subscale. Controlling for socioeconomic factors 
and intelligence, data were analyzed by four age groups: 11-13 year olds, 14-15 year 
olds, 16-17 year olds, and 18-24 year olds. 
 Analysis found significant differences between the younger and older groups of 
study subjects.  On the understanding subscale, the 11-13 year old group performed 
significantly worse than the 14-15 year old group.  In addition, the 14-15 year old group 
performed significantly worse than the two older groups.  The 16-17 year old group and 





 On the reasoning subscale, the 11-13 year old group performed significantly 
worse than the 14-15 year old group, which performed significantly worse than the 16-17 
year old group.   
 Finally, on the appreciation subscale, the 11-13 year old group performed 
significantly worse than the 14-15 year old group and the 14-15 year old group performed 
significantly worse than the young adult group.  The 16-17 year old group and the young 
adult group did not differ significantly on the appreciation subscale. 
 The authors concluded that about 33% of the 11-13 year olds and 20% of the 14-
15 year olds in the study would not have the capacity to stand trial based on current 
competency standards (Grisso et al., 2003).  Youth with below-average intelligence were 
the most likely to have an impaired competency to stand trial. 
 Studies that examine cognitive differences between children and adults in relation 
to medical decision making echo the findings from the legally-focused studies described 
above. In a study that assessed the competency of children and adolescents to make 
informed decisions about medical treatment, Weithorn and Campbell (1982) found that 
children as young as nine “appear able to participate meaningfully in personal health-care 
decision making” (p. 1589).  The study required children (ages 9, 14, 18 and 21) to 
review four hypothetical treatment dilemmas, imagine themselves in the place of the 
character in the vignette, and select the proposed treatment alternative they felt was most 
appropriate.  Trained coders rated the subjects’ answers based on standards typically 
associated with competency to make informed treatment decisions:  reasonableness of the 





dilemma, and the ability to make inferences based on the information that was provided.  
In addition, subjects were administered a comprehension scale based on a standardized 
intelligence test.   
 Weithorn and Campbell’s analysis found that the 14-year-olds in the study did not 
differ from adults in their capacity to provide informed consent for medical and 
psychological treatment.  The 14-year-olds’ performance was consistent with that of 
adults on all four measures of competency:  evidence of choice, reasonable outcome, 
rational reasoning and understanding across all four vignettes.  Analysis showed that the 
nine-year-old group was less able than adults to understand the information that was 
provided and to be able to make inferences from the information. Most of the nine-year-
olds, however, were able to perform adequately on standards linked to the ability to 
generate alternatives and to select a reasonable outcome.  
 The authors concluded that “children as young as nine appear to be capable of 
comprehending the basics of what is required of them when they are asked to state a 
preference regarding a treatment dilemma” (Weithorn & Campbell, 1982, p. 1596). 
 Findings from these and similar studies have been used as support for the 
argument that adolescents should be permitted to make many of the same decisions that 
adults make (Halpern & Cauffman, 2001).  In particular, the findings on cognitive 
similarities between adults and older adolescents have been used to advocate for allowing 
minors to consent to medical treatment and mental health services (Gardner, Scherer, & 
Tester, 1989; Melton, 1990; Scherer & Gardner, 1990) and to argue in favor of trying 





Assessing Psychosocial Differences Between Children and Adult 
 
 Developmental psychologists have challenged the practice of establishing 
children’s competency based solely on cognitive capacity.  They argue that despite 
cognitive similarities, children and adults differ on a range of psychosocial attributes that 
are likely to affect their ability to make competent decisions (Scott, Reppucci, & 
Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996; Steinberg, Cauffman, Woolard, Graham, & 
Banich, 2009).   
 Several alternatives to the cognition-focused model of competency have been 
suggested. Scott, Reppucci and Woolard (1995) proposed a model that considers both 
cognitive and psychosocial factors, specifically tendencies toward conformity, attitudes 
toward risk, and temporal perspectives. 
 Cauffman and Steinberg (1995) suggested exploring psychosocial issues related 
to maturity and judgment, such as responsibility (defined as self-reliance, clarity of 
identity and healthy autonomy), perspective (defined as the ability to understand the 
complexity of a situation and place it in a broader context), and temperance (defined as 
the ability to limit impulsive behavior and evaluate situations before responding). 
 Steinberg and Scott (2003) furthered the discussion by suggesting four areas in 
which children’s psychosocial immaturity may negatively affect their decision-making 
skills: susceptibility to peer influence; attitudes toward risk; future orientation; and the 
capacity for self-management.  
 An array of research provides support for models that take developmental factors 





decisions. For example, studies have found that children’s susceptibility to the influence 
of their peers begins in childhood and peaks around age 14 before declining in the later 
teenage years (Moffitt, 1993; Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986).  Studies have also found 
differences in the ways that adults and children perceive risk.  Furby and Beyth-Marom 
(1992), for example, found that when making decisions, youth consistently focus more 
heavily on the potential rewards of their decisions, while overlooking the potential risks. 
 Similarly, future orientation has been documented to increase as people age, 
suggesting that it may be easier for minors to overlook the long-term consequences of 
their decisions (Greene, 1986; Nurmi, 1991).  Finally, research has documented that 
youth differ from adults in their ability to engage in self-management or impulsivity. 
Studies have found that impulsivity peaks during mid-childhood and that adolescents 
make continuous gains in self-management into adulthood (Steinberg & Cauffman, 
1996). 
 Several studies have explored the extent to which differences between children 
and adults on psychosocial variables may be related to differences in decision-making 
capabilities. The MacArthur Juvenile Capacity Study (Steinberg, Cauffman, Woolard, 
Graham, & Banich, 2009) sought to examine age differences in cognitive and 
psychosocial factors that are relevant to maturity of adolescents and adults, with a 
specific focus on judgments related to engaging in criminal behavior.  Subjects ranging in 
age from 10 to 30 were recruited from a variety of community-based sites in five 
metropolitan areas across the United States.  Participants completed three sets of 





questionnaires that measured psychosocial capacities (specifically risk perception, 
sensation seeking, impulsivity, resistance to peer influence, and future orientation); and 
assessments of basic intellectual functioning.  
 Examining cognitive abilities by age group, the researchers found few differences 
between adults and adolescents who were 16 or older, a finding that echoed the 
conclusions reached by Grisso (1980) and Weithorn and Campbell (1982). 
 Conversely, the MacArthur study found that psychosocial capacities tended to 
emerge much later in adolescence and continue developing into the mid-20s.  They found 
no statistically significant differences on psychosocial measures among subjects who 
were between ages 10 and 17.   At the older end of the spectrum, subjects between 16 and 
17 years old scored significantly lower on psychosocial measures than subjects aged 22 
and older.  Similarly, the 18- to 21-year-old group scored lower than subjects who were 
26 or older.  The authors concluded that “by age 16, adolescents’ general cognitive 
abilities are essentially indistinguishable from those of adults, but adolescents’ 
psychosocial functioning, even at the age of 18, is significantly less mature than that of 
individuals in their mid-20s” (Steinberg et al., 2009, p. 592).  The authors suggested that 
psychosocial immaturity should be considered in the assessment of youth competency 
and decision-making ability. 
 In a study comparing the decision-making competence of adults and adolescents, 
Halpern-Felsher and Cauffman (2001) found that adolescents were less likely than adults 
to consider the risks and benefits of their decisions and to seek advice from others.  The 





compared results for the students in the sixth, eighth, tenth and twelfth grades, as well as 
adults. Trained coders scored responses depending on whether the subjects mentioned 
options, risks, benefits, long-term consequences or seeking advice. The differences 
uncovered by the authors were most pronounced between the youngest participants and 
the adults.   
 In addition to expanding the cognition-focused model of competency to include 
psychosocial factors, developmentalists have also suggested that issues related to 
adolescent decision making should be explored in the context of a specific decision and a 
specific situation rather than assuming “fixed abilities or competencies that are displayed 
independently of context” (Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996, p. 252). 
 To summarize, the literature reviewed in this section informs the study presented 
in this dissertation in several ways.  First, the reviewed studies have established that 
differences in cognitive functioning between children and adults generally disappear by 
age 15.  Thus if cognitive ability is considered to be the trait upon which decision-making 
competency rests, these studies support allowing older adolescents to make the same 
decisions about their lives as adults. On the other hand, if decision-making competency is 
determined by multiple traits rather than cognition alone, the literature may best be 
interpreted as establishing that typically-developing older adolescents can probably 
understand the issues relevant to most decisions, as well as the implications of the 
choices involved, in a manner that is similar to adults.   
 The emerging literature that examines the influence of psychosocial factors on 





serious consideration. Although more high-quality empirical studies are needed before 
solid conclusions can be drawn, published results document that children and adults 
differ on an array of psychosocial attributes, including attitudes toward risk, susceptibility 
to peer pressure, impulsivity and future orientation. A major limitation of this research, 
however, is that the relationship between these psychosocial attributes and decision-
making ability has not been confirmed empirically. 
Expanding Youth Decision Making: Lessons from the Health Care Field 
 
 While minors have the legal right to consent to a limited array of health care 
treatments, medical professionals have continued to advocate for children – particularly 
adolescents – to play an even greater role in making choices about their health 
(Committee on Bioethics, 1995; Society for Adolescent Medicine, 2004).  This section 
examines these efforts and assesses their relevance to understanding how children in 
foster care experience making decisions about their lives. 
 Patient-centered medicine has emerged as the primary practice paradigm in health 
care today (Tomes & Hoffman, 2011).  This perspective builds on traditions of informed 
consent and collaborative healing and reflects a belief that patients should participate as 
partners with their health care providers in clinical decision making (Tomes & Hoffman, 
2011).   
 While the patient-centered practice model is a relatively modern invention, it is 
rooted in long-standing beliefs about patients’ rights to consent for treatment (Tomes & 





physician who treats a patient without securing the patient’s knowing, willing and 
competent consent risks a tort action (Wadlington, 1994).   
 Issues regarding who is responsible for consenting to treatment for children 
emerged in case law dating back to the early 1900s, when a Pennsylvania court in In re 
Tuttendario refused to overrule the decision of parents not to pursue an operation for their 
seven-year-old son who had rickets, because the condition did not threaten the child’s 
life.  By the 1950s, many states had enacted child protection statutes that could be used to 
circumvent parental decision making by appointing a guardian for the child, or by 
removing the child from his or her parents either permanently or temporarily 
(Wadlington, 1994).  Courts typically upheld such statutes, particularly when the child’s 
life was endangered (Wadlington, 1994).   
 Child protection statutes were also upheld in cases in which parents argued that 
their decision was based on religious beliefs or principles (Wadlington, 1994). For 
example, a New York Court of Appeals case from the 1970s, In re Sampson, involved a 
neglect petition against a mother who refused to consent to blood transfusions for her 
teenage son who was afflicted neurofibromatosis, thus preventing surgery.  Although the 
court recognized that the surgery would not cure the child’s condition, it upheld the 
finding of neglect thus demonstrating that “quality of life can serve as a criterion for 
intervention in at least some instances” (Wadlington, 1994). 
 Wadlington (1994) identifies In re Green, a 1972 Pennsylvania case involving a 
fifteen-year old boy with paralytic scoliosis, as a turning point for a minor’s right to be 





appoint a guardian to consent to risky corrective surgery that would prevent the child 
from being bedridden for life. The child’s mother had refused to consent to the blood 
transfusion that would be required to perform the surgery.  The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania refused to appoint the guardian and instead remanded the case specifically 
so that the child’s views about the operation could be heard.  Although the child refused 
the operation, the case is acknowledged as having sown “some seeds for a subsequent 
movement toward permitting or seeking participation by minor children in decisions 
affecting their own health” (Wadlington, 1994, p. 321). 
 Judicial interest in allowing children to provide input on health care decisions 
reflected broader changes in the relationship between medical providers and patients, 
which began in the 1960s (Tomes & Hoffman, 2011).  Historically, patients have 
contributed to clinical decision making to varying degrees. Early on, patients played a 
significant role in medical decision making primarily because physicians relied heavily 
on patients’ self-reported symptoms to diagnose and treat their conditions. With the 
advent of diagnostic technologies such as x-rays, health care providers increasingly 
turned to objective observations to guide diagnosis and treatment, minimizing the 
decision-making contributions of patients (Tomes & Hoffman, 2011).  
 Coupled with growth in medical research and a trend toward practice 
specialization, advances in technology increasingly widened the knowledge gap between 
providers and patients until, by the mid-twentieth century, “patient passivity became a 





 Tomes and Hoffman identify several factors that contributed to an assault on 
medical paternalism that began after World War II.  First, issues related to consent to 
medical treatment and consent to participation in medical research were clarified through 
the Nuremberg Code and other guidelines (Tomes & Hoffman, 2011).  Second, beliefs 
about self-determination that animated the civil rights and feminist movements led 
patients to reconsider the extent to which they controlled issues relating to their health.  
In the 1960s, for example, psychiatric patients challenged paternalistic medical practices 
by arguing that “people who had suffered from a disease had a unique expertise about its 
nature that had to be accorded equal status with the judgment of medical science” (Tomes 
& Hoffman, 2011, p. 11).  The feminist movement adopted similar arguments to 
acknowledge the role of lay expertise and self-help in addressing a range of women’s 
health issues. 
 By the early 1970s, patient advocacy efforts had spurred the Joint Commission on 
the Accreditation of Hospitals and the American Hospital Association to adopt patients’ 
bills of rights.  These documents declared, among other things, that patients were entitled 
to equitable and humane treatment, had the right to know the identities of the physicians 
responsible for their care, and had the right to receive information about their treatment 
and prognosis. Although these patients’ bill of rights efforts were voluntary and included 
no enforcement mechanisms, they nonetheless represented a major change in thinking 
about hospitals’ duties to the public (Hoffman, 2011).  The American Medical 
Association followed suit in the early 1980s when it added language to its code of ethics 





 In the midst of these broader changes in physician-patient relationships, three 
social and legal trends served to focus the attention of medical professionals on minors’ 
health-care decision making.    
 First, child abuse reporting laws were extended to include medical neglect in the 
definition of child abuse.  Such laws provided a basis for state involvement when parents 
were unwilling to consent for a child’s medical care (Wadlington, 1994).  
 Partially in reaction to the expanded child maltreatment reporting laws, a second 
trend emerged, as states enacted laws to protect parents from prosecution if they declined 
treatment for a child based on their religious beliefs (Wadlington, 1994). While the Child 
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 did not initially include medical neglect in 
its definition of child abuse, the guidelines for enacting the legislation did include model 
language for religious accommodation.  By the time medical neglect was added to the 
definition of child maltreatment in 1987, most states had already adopted legislation 
accommodating the religious beliefs of parents (Wadlington, 1994). 
 The final social and legal trend relating to children’s participation in health care 
decisions was the creation of statutory exceptions that enabled some adolescents to 
consent more broadly to their own treatment (Wadlington, 1994; Weir & Peters, 1997).  
States adopted laws that defined particular circumstances – typically either emancipation 
or the achievement of “mature minor” status – in which adolescents could consent to 
medical treatment outside of reproductive health, substance abuse and mental health.   
 In some states, minors are automatically emancipated when they marry, become 





judicial order, or the achievement of financial independence (Polowny et al., 2010).  
Other jurisdictions have relied on a “mature minor” doctrine to allow adolescents to 
consent to care, regardless of their parents’ preferences (McCabe, 1996).  While there is 
no clear definition of a “mature minor,” it is generally presumed to mean that the child in 
question has “sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of the 
proposed treatment” (Grisso & Vierling, 1978, p. 415).  Courts have most frequently 
recognized mature minors at age 15 or above (Pilpel, 1972). 
 Reflecting the extent to which changes in provider-patient relationships had taken 
root, scholars, medical ethicists and professional associations sought to extend 
opportunities for children “to know about their health, to know about available diagnostic 
and treatment options and their risks and probable benefits, and to choose among the 
alternatives” (Committee on Bioethics, 1995, p. 314).  
 Some scholars have argued that involving children in health care decisions could 
potentially benefit children.  For example, McCabe (1996) identified five goals for 
involving minors in decisions regarding their medical care.  She suggested that allowing 
minors to make such decisions (1) enforces the principle of self-determination or 
autonomy and (2) promotes a sense of control, both of which may facilitate children’s 
positive adjustment to health issues they face. She also contended that children’s 
involvement in medical decision making (3) improves communication between doctors, 
parents, and children; (4) facilitates treatment adherence; and (5) demonstrates respect for 
children’s capacities and provides them with opportunities to develop decision-making 





 To provide guidance, a number of health care and children’s advocacy groups 
have proposed to expand medical consent opportunities for minors.  In 1973, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics’ (AAP) Committee on Youth recommended that states 
adopt legislation “to clarify and expand the ability of minors to give self-consent apart 
from parental consent in a number of clinical circumstances” and to protect medical 
providers from legal action if they provide care to minors (Weir & Peters, 1997, p. 32).  
 In 1974, the National Association of Children’s Hospitals adopted the Pediatric 
Bill of Rights, which was developed by the National Center for the Prevention and 
Treatment of Child Abuse and Neglect.  The document suggested that any child with 
sufficient intelligence to assess the consequences and benefits of a proposed treatment for 
his or her benefit could consent to care and expect a doctor to maintain confidentiality 
(Weir & Peters, 1997).  In 1976, the AAP’s Task Force on Pediatric Research, Informed 
Consent, and Medical Ethics recommended that physicians obtain written consent to 
surgery or other treatment from both children age 13 or older and their parents (Weir & 
Peters, 1997). 
 In 1995, the AAP’s Committee on Bioethics endorsed, in a policy statement, the 
proposition that “patients should participate in decision making commensurate with their 
development” and “assent to care whenever reasonable” (Committee on Bioethics, 1995, 
p. 314). While consent requires the giver to meet an established legal standard for 
agreeing to treatment, assent represents “agreement or concurrence with a decision made 
by others based on a valid understanding of the proposed course of action” (Erlen, 1987, 





 The Committee recommended that the process for obtaining a child’s assent to a 
medical treatment include (1) helping the patient understand (as developmentally 
appropriate) his or her condition; (2) informing the patient about tests and treatments; (3) 
assessing the patient’s understanding of the situation and the factors that are influencing 
his or her response; and (4) asking the patient whether he or she is willing to accept the 
proposed care (Committee on Bioethics, 1995).   
 The Committee advised against excluding children from decision making, except 
when a persuasive case can be made for doing so.  For the youngest children, the policy 
recommends that physicians and parents share health-care decision-making responsibility 
based on the assumption that parents will act in a manner consistent with the best 
interests of their children.  In the case of children school-aged or older, the policy 
recommends that physicians obtain assent from the patient, as well as consent from the 
parent or guardian. 
 Although the Committee’s policy statement suggested that a child’s refusal of 
assent should be respected if the treatment is not essential or can be deferred without a 
substantial risk to the child’s health, it stopped short of requiring physicians to honor the 
child’s wishes in all situations.  In cases in which the child’s opposition to treatment 
cannot be honored, the Committee stated that involving children in discussions about 
their health may nonetheless “foster trust and a better physician-patient relationship, and 
perhaps improve long-term health outcomes” (Committee on Bioethics, 1995, p. 315). 
 In 2004, the Society for Adolescent Medicine outlined an array of policies and 





factors related to consent and confidentiality.  The Society recommended that adolescents 
“receive confidential services based on their own consent whenever limitations on 
confidentiality would serve as an obstacles impeding their access to care” (Society for 
Adolescent Medicine, 2004, p. 343).  The policy also encouraged medical care providers 
to establish procedures for maintaining adolescents’ confidentiality and to inform both 
patients and their parents of such practices.  
 The approach to fostering children’s decision making opportunities that has 
emerged in health care – specifically the practice of allowing children to assent to 
treatment – offers a potentially helpful model for facilitating the involvement of children 
in foster care in making important decisions about their lives.  As Erlen (1987) suggests, 
assent provides children with the “opportunity to be more in control and to make choices, 
although the overall treatment decision is out of the child’s hands” (p. 158).  
Chapter Summary 
 
 This chapter sought to explore the context in which foster youth experience 
participating in decisions about their lives.  The overview of the child welfare and foster 
care systems in the United States, along with the description of how children and families 
enter and proceed through the system, highlighted the issues and concerns that are the 
focus of services.  This review also identified a number of points at which children in 
foster care could potentially be involved in decisions about their lives. 
 The final section of this chapter sought to assess whether minors are competent to 





so.  Studies that have examined differences in competency between minors and adults 
have varied in their findings depending on the extent to which they focus on cognitive 
development.  Cognition-focused studies consistently have found that differences 
between adults and minors dissipate by about age 15.  Research based on a broader 
developmental perspective, however, has identified differences between adults and 
children on a variety of psychosocial factors, many of which are posited to influence 
judgment and decision making.  Finally, this review found that children have very few 
rights to make autonomous decisions about their lives outside of consenting to treatment 
for reproductive health issues, substance abuse, and mental health concerns.  Efforts to 
expand decision making opportunities for youth in health care, however, offer valuable 
insights into navigating the challenging terrain between excluding children from being 







CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction and Plan for the Chapter 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to review the existing literature on how children 
served by the public child welfare system experience making decisions about their lives 
while they are in care. It begins with a brief introduction to client participation in decision 
making within social work, highlighting the challenges the profession has faced in 
extending its participatory values to child clients. Next, the empirical literature on foster 
children’s participation in making decisions is explored. Within this broad area, the first 
set of studies focus on children’s experiences participating in decision making about their 
lives while they are in care.  The second set of studies examines adult attitudes toward 
allowing children to participate in such decisions.  The final studies link participating in 
decision making while in foster care with case outcomes.  Finally, gaps in the literature 
are evaluated and recommendations made for future research efforts. 
Participation in Decision Making and Social Work Clients 
 
 Encouraging clients to take an active role in decision making has been a hallmark 
of social work practice since the field’s earliest days and serves as an expression of the 
profession’s primary values of human dignity and self-determination (Biestek & Gehrig, 
1978; Carroll, 1980; Goldstein, 1983; Marsh 2002; National Association of Social 
Workers, 2011). In an essay examining collaborative practice in social work from the 
1920s to the 1970s, Carroll described this practice model as one that “arises from trust in 





basis of mutuality” (p. 415).  Similarly, Marsh (2002) suggests that “ethical and effective 
practice is based on the worker learning from clients, on the client feeling understood, on 
the worker’s response to the client’s definition of the problem, and on the client’s 
involvement in developing and seeking a solution” (p. 341).   
In a survey of self-determination in early social work practice, Biestek and Gehrig 
(1978) found that social workers believed the lack of self-determination would lead “to 
depression, feelings of rejection, regressive behavior and feelings of devaluation as a 
person of dignity and worth” (p. 110). Conversely, collaborative practice, including client 
participation in decision making, is believed to facilitate engagement with services, 
increase cooperation with change efforts, and contribute significantly to positive 
outcomes for clients (Biestek & Gehrig, 1978; Carroll, 1980; Goldstein, 1983; Littell, 
2001; Marsh, 2002).  
 The hypothesized link between client participation in decision making and 
outcomes has been confirmed, to varying degrees, across an array of social work practice 
fields. Examining family preservation services, Littell (2001) found that greater 
collaboration with clients receiving family preservation services led to better overall 
compliance with services, fewer subsequent reports of child maltreatment and fewer out-
of-home placements. Client participation in decision making has also been linked to 
higher levels of client satisfaction, adherence with treatment and functional outcomes for 
mental health service recipients (Cruz & Pincus, 2002; Frank & Gunderson, 1990; Weiss, 





Participation in Decision Making by Child Clients 
 
 Despite its long-standing commitment to client self-determination, the social work 
profession has struggled with extending these practice ideals to clients who are children 
(Abramson, 1985; Bernstein, 1960; Biestek & Gehrig, 1978; Rothman, 1989). In their 
comprehensive examination of self-determination in social work practice through the 
1950s, Biestek and Gehrig (1978) found little early support among practitioners for 
applying the concept of self-determination to practice with children.  For example, their 
study found that caseworkers practicing in child placement agencies during the 1940s 
stressed the importance of parental rights, including the right of parents to determine the 
solution to problems affecting the parent-child relationship. In this respect, “the primary 
right of the parent to his child is in essence the right of the parent to determine the 
ultimate solution to the conflict in his relationship to his child” (Biestek & Gehrig, 1978, 
p. 68).  The alternative approach at the time focused on the responsibility of professional 
staff to make decisions that promoted the welfare of the child based upon the 
caseworker’s technical knowledge, with no mention of any application of self-
determination principles to the child (Biestek & Gehrig, 1978).  
 By the 1950s, the social work literature began to address client populations for 
whom “self-determination seemed doubtful, less relevant, or impractical” including “the 
aged, the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, children, clients in correction settings, and 
those receiving public assistance” (Biestek & Gehrig, 1978, p. 110).   
Academic literature during this period, however, pushed social workers to 





to these populations. Suggestions focused primarily on the need to individually assess 
each client’s strengths and limitations, and encouraging self-determination as appropriate 
based on that assessment.  
 Self-determination literature in the 1950s further suggested that involving child 
clients in the decision-making process was “a critical preparation for adulthood and 
maturity,” and that the failure to give child clients access to the decision-making process 
for their cases was “far more serious because he [the child] also had lost the opportunity 
for a beneficial, meaningful relationship with an adult” (Biestek & Gehrig, 1978, p. 111). 
 More recent literature on self determination in social work practice continues to 
reflect some hesitation to commit fully to participatory practice with child consumers.  
Bernstein (1960), Abramson (1985), and Rothman (1989) all recognize limitations to 
children’s participation in decision making due to questions about their capacity to make 
informed decisions.  These authors conclude, however, that efforts should be directed at 
helping even young children make decisions as developmentally appropriate. 
Several authors have proposed consumer-centered practice as a way of extending 
self determination to client groups typically viewed as lacking the capacity to make 
informed, rational decisions (Keigher, 2000; Mead & Bower, 2000; Sands & Wehmeyer, 
1996; Tower, 1994).  Rooted in the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, this 
approach views “individuals who have direct experience with a particular life condition” 
as being “more knowledgeable about their own needs and interests than are their 





or service recipient to consumer is hypothesized to increase their sense of control over 
their own lives. 
This client-centered practice model has found solid footing over the past 25 years 
in numerous practice fields.  Within mental health, for example, consumer survival 
groups, clubhouses, and peer-delivered services all reflect a client-centered practice 
model (Adams, Drake, & Fischer, 2006; Linhorst, Hamilton, Young & Eckert, 2002; 
Tower, 1994).  Client-centered practice within the disabilities field has focused on 
increasing accessibility to facilitate independence and engagement (Sands & Wehmeyer, 
1996).  Finally, the independent living movement within the developmental disabilities 
field has resulted in a major shift from institutionalization to community integration for 
people with cognitive and developmental challenges (Keigher, 2000).  
Children and Child Welfare Decision Making 
 
Almost 30 years ago, Bush and Gordon (1982) suggested that children receiving 
child welfare services should be involved in decisions about their care.  That call has 
been increasingly echoed by child welfare scholars and practitioners who contend that 
such involvement will contribute to more ethical decision making within child welfare 
practice, contribute to improved foster care experiences, and help children develop a 
sense of competence, usefulness and empowerment that will benefit them after leaving 
care (Buss, 2010; Khoury, 2010; Massinga & Pecora, 2004; Munro, 2001; Pine, 1987; 
Pitchal, 2008).   Emerging support for a participatory role for children in foster care is 
also reflected in the current dialogue over legal representation of children in abuse and 





take a client-directed or an advocate-directed approach (Khoury, 2010; National 
Association of Counsel for Children, 2001; Taylor, 2009). 
Sinclair (2000) suggests that involving children in decisions that affect them 
reflects a strong commitment to a child-centered approach that considers the child’s 
wishes and feelings and incorporates the child’s views in all matters.  Within the child 
welfare field, she contends, the child-centered approach should be incorporated into 
assessment, care planning and reviews, child protection case conferences, and family 
group conferences.  Sinclair calls for consulting children about their feelings and wishes, 
allowing and supporting them to attend review meetings, offering opportunities for active 
participation, allowing children to bring supporters and/or advocates to meetings, and 
requiring that children receive a copy of their care plan. Finally, Sinclair contends that 
giving children a right to make complaints about the services they receive is a critical 
step toward ensuring that their voices are heard in child welfare procedures.   
Reflecting the emerging interest in the topic, the literature on children’s 
participation in decision making within child welfare is growing. One subject of research 
on foster children’s participation in decision making has been the Children Act 1989 in 
England and Wales, a progressive piece of child welfare legislation rooted in the tenets of 
the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (Maluccio, Ainsworth, & Thoburn, 
2000).  The Children Act 1989 requires that each foster child’s case be reviewed at least 
every six months, explicates the types of matters that should be considered in those 





– to the extent “practicable” – a clear legal right to be consulted before any decisions are 
made (Children Act 1989).  
Existing studies have examined the quantity and quality of the opportunities that 
foster children have in making decisions about their lives; explored adults’ attitudes 
toward children’s participation in child welfare decision making; assessed supports that 
would help children participate more effectively, and identified outcomes related to youth 
participation in decision making. 
Children’s Experiences Participating in Decision Making 
 
Various studies have considered the decision-making experiences of foster 
children, with most focusing on the quantity or quality of those experiences. In general, 
the studies revealed that children have few meaningful opportunities to participate in 
decision making about their lives while they are in care. 
Baldry and Kemmis (1998) surveyed and interviewed foster youth six to 14 as 
part of the quality assurance efforts of a London-based child welfare agency.  The survey 
and interviews covered a broad array of topics including daily life, the experience of 
being looked after, contact with family and friends, impressions of social workers, 
attendance at planning and review sessions, and the extent to which the children received 
information to help them understand their rights when in care. 
The majority of children interviewed (82%) reported that their views were 
listened to in their placement, although fewer (65%) were consulted about daily routines 
in the setting.  Addressing the participation requirements included in the Children Act 





review meeting and felt that their input was considered.  Other findings related to 
planning and reviews were less favorable.  One-third of the children could not recall ever 
having a placement planning meeting, did not know what a care plan was, and were not 
asked to contribute their preferences to the care plan.  About 60% of the children had not 
seen or read their care plans and 75% never received a copy of the document.  The study 
found that 20% of the respondents had not had regular case reviews, while one-third 
received no assistance preparing for their review.  About 13% of the children indicated 
that they did not attend their review meeting and 50% reported not receiving a copy of 
the decisions made at their review. 
Although the London agency had prepared an extensive informational packet for 
children aged 11 and older who were in care, almost half of the respondents who met the 
age threshold had not received the information.  About half of the study participants were 
familiar with the agency’s complaint procedure, but very few actually understood how it 
worked.  Finally, fewer than 25% of respondents knew that they could access an advocate 
who could help them address care-related issues. 
Thomas and O’Kane (1999) studied participation in case reviews and planning 
meetings by children aged eight to 12, again under the 1989 Children Act. The authors 
found a correlation between a child’s age and the length of time the child spent in his or 
her planning meeting.  Of the 222 subjects, 63% of eight year olds did not attend any part 
of the meeting.  This percentage decreased to 53% of nine-year-olds, 33% of 10-year-
olds, 27% of 11-year-olds, and 16% of children 12 or older.  Conversely, a larger 





participation rate (84%) was among children 12 or older, while only 37% of eight-year-
olds were invited to attend all or part of the meeting. 
 The researchers also examined the relationship between the purpose of the 
meeting and whether children were invited to attend.  Thomas and O’Kane found that 
children were most likely to be invited to attend when no significant changes were 
planned in their case.  When the purpose of the meeting was to maintain the status quo, 
68% of the subjects were invited to attend all or part of the meeting.  Only 47% were 
invited to attend all or part of the meeting when significant decisions were expected to be 
made.  
 Thomas and O’Kane also examined the influence of the relationship between 
family and the child welfare agency on children’s attendance.  Seventy percent of the 
children in the study attended the entire meeting if the family-agency relationship was 
described by social workers as one of partnership.  In cases in which the family-agency 
relationship was described by social workers as mixed or conflicted, only 46% of the 
subjects attended the entire meeting. 
 The study also asked children how they viewed their participation.  Most children 
(72%) wanted more preparation before the meetings, while 56% were pleased with the 
support they received at the meetings. Sixty-seven percent of the studied children 
reported feeling that adults listened to them when they spoke at the meetings, but only 
28% felt that they had substantial influence on decisions.  Thirty-three percent reported 
feeling that they had very little influence on the proceedings.  The most negative response 





reported liking the meeting a lot, while 50% rated the meeting as low on the scale as they 
could.     
 Murray and Hallett (2000) examined the role of young people in decisions about 
their welfare under the Scottish Children’s Hearings system, which provides 
opportunities for “direct and active participation of children and young people in decision 
making” (p. 13).  The authors identified key elements of children’s participation in such 
hearings, from the pre-hearing through the post-hearing stage.  Using data from the 
“Deciding in Children’s Interests” study conducted between 1994 and 1997, the authors 
found that children virtually never (1%) initiated a hearing.  Just over half of all youth in 
the study had met with someone before the hearing to prepare for the meeting so that they 
could participate fully.  Most children (87%) attended the hearing, but their contribution 
frequently was limited to an affirmation/negation or monosyllabic response (32%), or a 
one-line comment (39%).  Only 19% of children contributed more than one sentence to 
the discussion in court.  
Murray and Hallet (2000) found that in the 60 hearings observed, most young 
people did not express an opinion about what should happen to them.  In follow-up 
interviews, the children typically expressed the belief that the panel had taken their 
contribution seriously, but admitted that they frequently did not understand parts of the 
proceedings.   
Studies conducted among foster children in the United States found strikingly 
similar results.  In a study of children’s satisfaction with out-of-home care in Illinois, 





input into permanency decisions.  Only 29% of the 1,100 children interviewed during the 
four-year study period indicated that they had helped their caseworker decide what would 
happen to them once they were moved to an out-of-home placement.  The study also 
identified children’s complaints about how they were treated during court proceedings.  
Children most frequently indicated that their input was ignored in court or that no one 
assisted them in understanding the complex proceedings. 
 Lake, Snell, Perry and Associates (2004) surveyed foster care alumni about their 
experiences in foster care.  Seven percent of respondents shared a belief that the biggest 
problem with the foster care system was that children lack sufficient input in their cases. 
Referring to their last caseworker while in foster care, only 36% of respondents reported 
that the caseworker did “very well” at including them in making decisions about their 
case.  
 Only 27% of the respondents reported going to court or seeing a judge about their 
case at least once a year during their foster care placement.  Twenty-nine percent 
indicated that they had never gone to court about their case while 28% had attended court 
only once or twice during their entire tenure in out-of-home placement.  The remaining 
16% reported attending court once every couple of years. 
 Youth in the study reported somewhat more favorably on their experiences at 
court proceedings.  Almost 70% reported that the judge(s) did a good job asking them 
questions and listening to their answers.  Fourteen percent of the respondents indicated 
that allowing children to have more say in their cases was the single most important 





very important or somewhat important to let children in foster care have more say in 
decisions about their case. 
 In a study that examined permanency planning for youth in congregate care 
settings, Freundlich and Avery (2005) conducted in-depth interviews with judges, law 
guardians, child welfare workers, child advocates and youth to understand why 
independent living, rather than permanency, is pursued for a disproportionate number of 
youth in congregate care settings.  In addition to systemic and practice factors, the 
authors found that young people in care had relatively low levels of involvement in 
developing their permanency plans and, when involved, felt that their preferences were 
largely ignored. 
 In another qualitative study, this one focusing on the quality and adequacy of 
independent living services in New York, former foster youth identified that they had 
been afforded few opportunities to participate in planning and decision making affecting 
their lives (Freundlich, Avery, & Padgett, 2007).  Although respondents reported having 
had opportunities to be involved in decisions about school and work, most agreed that 
their input was rarely sought in other areas, including court proceedings.  The child 
respondents expressed the view that youth require assistance in asserting themselves to 
ensure that they are included in such discussions. 
 In their evaluation of a Florida program that provided legal representation to 
children entering shelter care, Zinn and Slowriver (2008) conducted semi-structured 
interviews with 21 youth between the ages of 10 and 17 to assess their court-experiences, 





voice their opinions about their cases.  Respondents who had recently attended a court 
hearing indicated that they felt anxious before attending court, were sometimes angered 
by occurrences that happened at court, and expressed frustration with what they saw as 
the capriciousness of judicial decisions.   
Most youth indicated in their interviews that they felt they had a right to have a 
voice in court decisions about their case, although most said they felt excluded and had 
little control over decisions made by the court.  Additionally, the authors found that 
children who attended court hearings tended to have a more thorough understanding of 
their legal status and the decisions that had been made on their behalf.  Finally, youth 
reported that attending court with an advocate helped to alleviate some of the anxiety 
they experienced when attending proceedings. 
Bridge (2010) reports preliminary findings from a four-site Washington state 
program under which youth ages 12 and older have the right to receive notice of their 
dependency court hearings, be present at the hearings, and be heard personally (either 
directly in court or, if requested by the child, in an in-chambers interview). Data were 
collected through two project-specific youth surveys and a form that was completed by a 
judicial officer after every hearing that a youth was eligible to attend.  The study revealed 
that youth attended about half of the 200 hearings they were eligible to attend during the 
first year of the program.  Although reasons for nonappearance were not documented, 
judges believed that youth did not attend due to conflicts with other activities rather than 
lack of notice or transportation.  Records indicated that nearly all youth who attended 





communications were unclear.  Few youth asked to speak to the judge privately.  Most 
youth respondents who attended court proceedings indicated that they were glad to do so 
and all but a few felt the hearing was fair.  However, only a quarter of the youth indicated 
that they were prepared for the hearing – a percentage that remained the same regardless 
of whether the children were represented by counsel. 
Feedback from judges and judicial officers indicated that providing youth with 
notice of upcoming hearings had not been a significant challenge for the courts, although 
accommodating requests for in-chambers interviews was at times difficult. Bridge reports 
that judges did not expressed any concern that attending court had been harmful to youth, 
although judicial officers suggested a need for training for court personnel to improve 
one-on-one interviews with youth. 
Adult Attitudes Toward Foster Children’s Participation in Decision Making 
 
 A handful of studies have explored the extent to which child welfare 
professionals, law guardians, youth advocates, judges and other court staff, support the 
involvement of foster children in decision making.  In general, the studies found mixed 
levels of support for children’s participation in decision making, with support being 
positively correlated with the age of the youth.  
Freundlich, Avery, and Padgett (2007) examined views held by family court 
judges and referees, private child welfare agency representatives, law guardians, legal 
services social workers and youth advocacy workers about participation opportunities for 
youth aging out of care.  While some adult professionals felt that youth have adequate 





majority of the former foster youth – expressed the view that youth clients should be 
more involved in service planning and goal setting. 
 The interviews revealed that some professionals felt threatened by, or at least 
unaccustomed to, youth who advocated for themselves.  Other professionals suggested 
that some youth do not make an effort to become involved in planning and decision 
making because they do not believe that agencies and courts welcome their input.  Many 
of the professionals interviewed, however, expressed the belief that the youth 
development service model now in favor within the child welfare field should hasten 
more youth involvement (Freundlich et al., 2007). 
 Shemmings (2000) used a mixed-methods approach to examine the attitudes of 
family support and child protection workers about children’s participation in decision 
making.  He found that social workers were divided over the proper age for children to 
become involved with decision making and whether children should attend child 
protection conferences. About one-third of the respondents felt that children should have 
more involvement in decision making and agreed that children were competent to make 
some decisions about their lives as early as seven or eight years old. This group was also 
more likely to approve of children attending conference. The second group, about 67% of 
the respondents, favored less involvement in decision making and felt that such 
responsibilities should be delayed until a child reached age 16 (or older).  Not 





Outcomes of Participating in Decision Making 
 
Two studies have attempted to examine the relationship between foster youth 
participation in decision making and case outcomes.  These studies were limited by their 
reliance on non-experimental research designs that prohibited the researchers from 
drawing conclusions about the extent to which youth participation in decision making 
was an actual causal factor in case outcomes. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a team of social work researchers led by 
Malcolm Bush and Andrew Gordon (1982) examined empirically the benefits of different 
types of placements for foster children.  As part of the study, a random sample of 370 
foster children between the ages of 9 and 18 were interviewed and were asked to compare 
different types of placement settings, including institutions, group homes, foster homes 
and relatives’ homes.  In addition, case record reviews and interviews with the children’s 
social workers, foster care providers and biological parents were conducted.   
 The researchers found that children based their judgments about the quality of 
out-of-home placements on the amount of care, understanding, affection and tolerance 
they received from caregivers – the same criteria used by the child welfare officials.  
Bush and Gordon also examined the role that choice played in children’s satisfaction with 
an out-of-home care setting.  They found that children who had visited their current foster 
home before being placed, who had a choice of placements, and who chose to live in the 
placement were significantly more likely to be satisfied with the care setting than 





finding, Bush and Gordon suggested that allowing children to make an informed choice 
about foster care placement could increase placement stability. 
 Bush and Gordon’s study found similar benefits to involving children in 
identifying placement options and decisions about adoption.  A subset of children who 
lived in an institution that was closing down were able to locate families, primarily of 
school friends, that were willing and able to provide care.  In addition, a large number of 
children in the study were not interested in a permanent adoptive placement, despite the 
fact that they were unlikely to be reunited with their biological parents.  Many of these 
children, according to the researchers, maintained some relationship with their biological 
parents and saw adoption as a betrayal of their families.  The authors contended that 
forcing adoption on such youth could injure their overall wellbeing.   
 Commenting on their finding that 30% of the children studied did not know who 
their caseworker was, the authors concluded that involving children in decisions about 
their care would, by encouraging frequent communication between children and child 
welfare professionals, reduce the number of children who were “forgotten for long 
periods in the child welfare system” or “brutalized in some child welfare institutions” 
(Bush and Gordon, 1982, p. 311).  
 Zinn and Slowriver (2008) examined outcomes of a 2001 Palm Beach County, 
Florida initiative that provided legal representation to children entering shelter care.  
Initially limited to children aged three or younger, the program was later expanded to 





children’s exit from care to permanency through reunification or adoption.  In 2007, the 
program actively served about 350 children. 
 Zinn and Slowriver’s mixed-methods evaluation found that children who 
participated in the program were significantly more likely to exit to permanency than 
children who were not served, mainly because they were more likely to be adopted or 
placed into a long-term custody situation.  
Gaps in the Literature 
 
The studies described above utilized an array of research methods having varying 
levels of rigor to explore how foster children are involved in decisions about their lives 
while in care.  A significant limitation of research in this area is that it rarely extends 
beyond describing the quantity and quality of participatory opportunities experienced by 
youth in care.  As a result, little is known about what participating in decision making 
meant to youth in care or the extent to which involvement in the decisions about their 
own lives while in care could improve foster care experiences.   
Chapter Summary 
 
 The literature reviewed above suggests that children and adolescents involved 
with public child welfare systems want to have a say in decisions about their care and that 
providing opportunities for such participation by youth is generally supported by adults 
who provide child welfare services.  Nonetheless, research clearly indicates that young 
people involved with the public child welfare system rarely have meaningful 





The literature reviewed also identifies a critical gap in what is known about the 
topic of children’s participation in case decisions.  Specifically missing from the 
literature is a descriptive understanding of how youth actually experience participating in 
decisions about their care and how youth make sense of such experiences.  The 
phenomenological study presented in this paper seeks to address this gap and inform the 
development of best practices in social work, particularly public child welfare, by 
contributing to our understanding participation from the perspective of young adults 





CHAPTER 4: SENSITIZING FRAMEWORKS 
 
Introduction and Plan for the Chapter 
 
Phenomenologists typically eschew the use of theoretical perspectives in their 
research, preferring instead to focus exclusively on the experiences of subjects to guide 
their understanding of the essence of a phenomenon (Husserl, 1969; van Manen, 1990).  
To that end, researchers are encouraged to “bracket” or set aside theories, facts, and 
personal experiences in order to see the phenomena without bias (Gearing, 2004; Husserl, 
1969; van Manen, 1990). 
I intentionally chose to include a review of theories in this section because I felt 
that it provided background that would help readers place the description of the 
experience that emerged from my work within the broader social and behavioral science 
literatures.  In preparing this chapter, however, I did take several steps to maintain as 
much consistency with phenomenological research methods as possible.   
I sought to minimize the influence of theory on my analysis by postponing the 
preparation of this chapter until after data collection and analysis had commenced. This 
enabled me to explore theories in the context of themes that emerged from the data itself, 
rather than beginning the study with a specific theoretical framework in mind.  This led 
me to explore a wide range of theoretical perspectives representing an array of social and 
behavioral science disciplines. I felt that the breadth of such a review also offered some 
protection from being biased by any particular discipline or theory.  Finally, I avoided 





these chapters focus exclusively on conveying the experiences of informants in a manner 
that enables the reader to feel that they experienced the phenomena first-hand. 
Theoretical frameworks re-emerge in the final chapter when implications for social work 
policy, practice and research are discussed. 
This chapter will compare and contrast several social and behavioral science 
theories that provide a sensitizing framework through which the experiences of foster 
youth participating in decisions about their lives can be explored and understood.  In this 
section I explore the central tenets of these theories and evaluate their potential 
contributions to understanding how youth in care participate in decision making about 
their lives. 
 
Theoretical Frameworks for Understanding the Experience 




 Empowerment theory has been utilized as an organizing framework for practice in 
numerous fields that address the development of individuals, organizations and 
communities including social work, public health, community psychology, organizational 
development and community organizing (Breton, 1994; Guttierez, DeLois, & GlenMaye, 
1995; Hasenfeld, 1987; Perkins & Zimmerman, 1995; Simon, 1994; Swift & Levin, 
1987).  As a result, the concept of empowerment has informed a diverse literature base 
which may assist in understanding how young people in foster care experience 
participation in decisions about their lives. This review draws primarily on the 





primarily on the individual level of the construct, psychological empowerment 
(Zimmerman, 1995).  
On the most basic level, empowerment is defined as a way in which “individuals 
gain control over their lives” (Perkins & Zimmerman, 1995, p. 570).  Empowerment has 
been hypothesized to include both process and outcome components (Swift & Levin, 
1987; Perkins & Zimmerman, 1995). Empowering processes are the procedures or 
activities in which an individual, organization or community might engage, such as 
decision making, participating in community-based organizations, or engaging in 
collective actions. From that perspective, participating in decisions about their lives while 
in care can be framed as a potential empowering process for foster youth.   
Empowerment outcomes, on the other hand, are the changes that occur in 
individuals, organizations, and communities as a result of engaging in an empowering 
process. Outcomes may include an increased sense of perceived control, the development 
of organizational networks, or increased access to community resources. Viewed from an 
outcome-oriented perspective, being involved in decisions while in care (an empowering 
process) has the potential for increasing empowerment as an outcome for youth in foster 
care. 
Zimmerman (1995) suggested that empowerment is contextually-driven and may 
vary greatly depending on situations, populations and developmental stages.  In other 
words, an individual’s sense of empowerment changes depending on the person’s age, 





implies that young people in foster care may feel empowered in one component of their 
lives (school or work, for example) but powerless in other life functions.  
Empowerment at the individual level is referred to as psychological 
empowerment (PE) (Zimmerman, 1990, 1995).  Zimmerman (1995) described PE as “a 
feeling of control, a critical awareness of one’s environment, and an active engagement in 
it” (p. 592).  Zimmerman’s nomological network of psychological empowerment 
includes three contributory components – intrapersonal, interactional and behavioral – 
that have been supported through empirical research (Zimmerman, Israel, Schulz, & 
Checkoway, 1992).   
The intrapersonal component focuses on “how people think about themselves” 
and includes “domain-specific perceived control and self-efficacy, motivation to control, 
perceived competence, and mastery” (Zimmerman, 1995, p. 588). The focus on 
perceptions within the intrapersonal component of PE summarizes several factors that 
influence people’s desire and motivation to influence outcomes. For youth in foster care, 
this may be expressed as a desire to have a voice in decision making, as well as the sense 
that they can indeed have some degree of control over decisions affecting their lives. 
The interactional component of PE focuses on “the understanding people have 
about their community and related sociopolitical issues” (Zimmerman, 1995, p. 589).  In 
practice, the interactional component focuses on the extent to which people have a critical 
awareness of the structures and systems within their environment through which they can 
act to achieve their goals.  For foster youth who desire to be involved in decisions about 





both the child welfare system and the legal system, the largely opaque domains in which 
many major decisions about their lives are made.  Young people must also develop skills 
that will enable them to interact appropriately within these systems so that they are able 
to advocate effectively for themselves. The interactional aspect of PE suggests that youth 
may need information, training, or support to interact effectively with these systems. 
Finally, the behavioral component of PE refers to “the actions taken to directly 
influence outcomes” (Zimmerman, 1995, p. 590).  Behavioral components are context-
specific and may include advocacy, finding and using resources, and community 
involvement.  Behaviors that help people manage stress or cope with change are also 
integral aspects of behavioral PE.  For foster youth participating in decisions about their 
lives, behavioral components may include attending court proceedings, engaging an 
advocate to represent their views in court, or speaking directly with a judge. 
The integrated, three-part model of PE suggests that to participate in decision 
making, foster youth must desire to influence decisions about their lives and feel capable 
of doing so (intrapersonal component); understand how the child welfare and legal 
systems work so that they can engage in effective self-advocacy (interactional 
component); and have opportunities to behave in ways that exert their control and 
involvement (behavioral component). 
Chinman and Linney’s (1998) Adolescent Empowerment Cycle extends 
Zimmerman’s model of psychological empowerment by drawing on themes from identity 
development, rolelessness, and bonding theories and suggests that empowerment plays a 





engaged in a process to develop a stable, positive identity by experimenting with different 
roles and incorporating the feedback of significant others” (Chinman & Linney, 1998, p. 
398). The cycle begins when adolescents, seeking to experiment with different roles and 
develop a stable identity, begin to participate in activities that they find meaningful and 
that help them learn new skills.  Adolescents then receive positive reinforcement for their 
efforts and bond with positive social institutions.  Ultimately, this process is hypothesized 
to lead to positive identity development, positive role choice, enhanced self-efficacy and 
higher self-esteem.   
Developmental Theories 
 
Several developmental theories provide a lens through which researchers can 
explore how young people in foster care experience decision making about their lives.  
Stage-based models of adolescent development, along with the emerging positive youth 
development framework, offer alternative ways of conceptualizing the developmental 
processes that occur during adolescence and highlight the role that increasing autonomy 
in decision making may play in the transition to adulthood. 
Stage-based models of human development attempt to define the universal 
developmental tasks that human beings experience over the course of a lifetime. Erickson 
(1959, 1963, 1968) posits that a person moves through a series of eight stages, each 
defined by a psychosocial crisis, over the course of their lives.  The primary crisis for 
adolescence, according to Erickson, is developing a sense of identity, that is “the extent 
to which individuals feel secure about who they are and who they are becoming” 





ever-narrowing selections of personal, occupational, sexual, and ideological 
commitments” (Erickson, 1968, p. 245).  While the physical, cognitive and social 
changes that occur during the teenage years converge to influence this process, Erickson 
argues that identity development primarily occurs primarily through interactions with 
others.  Specifically, youth select and choose from many elements that could become part 
of their adult identities and make decisions about whether to incorporate or eliminate 
these elements from their self-identities based on the reactions of others.  From 
Erickson’s perspective, identity development is both a social and a mental process that 
ultimately results in a reciprocal process of the adolescent forging an identity and society 
identifying the adolescent.   
Identity development, however, is complicated by the wide array of options from 
which many youth can choose.  Steinberg (2008) suggested that the proliferation of 
alternative choices relating to careers, education, values and lifestyles has made it 
increasingly difficult for youth to navigate the creation of a new identity, contributing to 
the prolonged adolescent period that marks modern society.   
According to Erickson, problems in identity development can occur for several 
reasons, including failure to resolve earlier developmental crises and not receiving 
adequate time or resources to experiment with identities. Identity diffusion occurs when a 
youth develops an incoherent, disjointed or incomplete sense of self.  It often leads to 
excessive self-consciousness, problems in work and school, difficulty forming and 





Identity foreclosure is another potential negative outcome under Erickson’s 
model.  In this case, youth – willingly or unwillingly – commit themselves to an identity 
without adequately exploring their options.  Identity foreclosure occurs most frequently 
when youth are assigned identity roles by parents or other authority figures or, for some 
other reason, lack sufficient opportunities for experimentation or introspection.  As a 
result, these youth may feel there is not a good fit between the choices they have made 
and their true identity. 
A third troubling outcome – negative identity – occurs when youth appear to 
select identities that are clearly undesirable to their parents and communities. Negative 
identity development is most likely to occur in situations where adolescents find it 
difficult to establish an acceptable identity.  For example, they may fail to receive 
positive recognition for their experimentation efforts from people who are important in 
their lives and, in an effort to receive the desired attention, may adopt a negative identity. 
Cote (2000) identified several characteristics of individuals who achieve a 
coherent sense of identity during adolescence. Among other things, individuals who are 
successful at identity formation approach the process by taking responsibility for 
themselves, feeling they have control over their decisions, and having confidence that 
they can overcome obstacles they may face along the way.  In a later study, Schwartz, 
Cote and Arnett (2005) found these factors to predict identity achievement across both 
ethnic and socioeconomic groups. 
Existing literature on adolescents in foster care highlights identity development as 





qualitative study of youth who had aged out of foster care, Mulkerns and Owen (2008) 
found that most “felt that the emancipation process had influenced their sense of self, 
largely by providing a ‘window of opportunity’ for identity development” (p. 436).   
These youth reported that the need to focus on survival forced them to identify as being 
self-sufficient, separate and independent to the extent that they avoided seeking help from 
others.  Youth in this study also reported that they often felt alone, lacked a safety net and 
had little access to peer or adult support during this period.  
In another qualitative study, Kools (1997) found that living in long-term foster 
care had a negative impact on adolescent identity development that was related to the 
experience of being devalued by others.  Kools found that “excessive restrictiveness, a 
lack of individual consideration and respect, a focus on pathology and deviance, and 
discontinuity of caregiving . . . negatively shaped the central process of identity 
development” for youth in foster care (p. 266). Based on findings from Cote (2000) and 
Schwartz, Cote and Arnett (2005) allowing foster youth to have some control over and 
take responsibility for their decisions may improve outcomes related to identity 
development. 
Developmental theory also suggests that establishing a sense of autonomy – or 
becoming a self-governing person – is a critical step for adolescents.  Autonomy has 
emotional, cognitive and behavioral components; ultimately, it is about feeling, thinking 
and acting independently (Noom, Dekovic, & Meeus, 2001; Steinberg, 2008).  Emotional 
autonomy refers to growing independence in individual relationships, particularly 





ability to make and follow through on independent decisions.  Finally, value autonomy 
refers to having a personal sense of right and wrong and being able to resist pressure to 
follow others.   
Much like identity development, physical, social role and cognitive changes that 
occur in adolescence contribute to the emergence of autonomy issues during this period.  
Freud (1958) suggested that physical development triggers changes in personal 
relationships and encourages adolescents to turn away from their parents and seek greater 
support from their peers.  Similarly, changing social roles – such as becoming a worker, a 
driver, or a parent – bring with them a need for adolescents to manage themselves 
responsibly.  Finally, cognitive changes – being able to understand differing perspectives, 
engage in sophisticated reasoning, and weigh suggestions –are necessary to support the 
ability to make autonomous decisions; these develop substantially during the adolescent 
years (Steinberg, 2008).   
The cognitive changes described above play a particularly crucial role in helping 
adolescents develop the decision making skills that support autonomy.  Lewis (1981) 
conducted a series of experiments in which 12-to-18-year-olds were asked to help another 
teenager solve a series of problems.  Lewis evaluated their responses based on the extent 
to which their answers demonstrated an awareness of future consequences, suggested 
seeking expert consultation, were adapted to reflect new information, and identified the 
vested interests of people giving advice.  Her study found that older adolescents 
demonstrated more sophisticated reasoning abilities than younger adolescents.  The older 





an expert and identify another person’s vested interests.  Other studies, particularly those 
focused on adolescent involvement in legal decisions, have also found significant 
variability in decision-making skills by age groups (Grisso et al., 2003; Schmidt, 
Reppucci & Woolard, 2003).  
Research on the growth of autonomy during adolescence suggests that teenagers 
in foster care must develop the skills needed to make important life decisions during this 
formative period.  Variability in the development of these skills, particularly as it relates 
to age, should be considered when determining the extent to which adolescents should be 
given complete autonomy over decision making. 
The positive youth development (PYD) framework offers an alternative 
perspective on adolescent development.  PYD is a strengths-focused model of 
adolescence that views all youth as resources to be developed (Damon, 2004; Lerner, 
Almerigi, Theokas, & Lerner, 2005; Roth, Brooks-Gunn, Murray, & Foster, 1998). 
Increasing empirical support for this framework has helped it to challenge the long-held 
view of adolescence as a time of turbulence and stress during which youth engage in 
destructive or risky behaviors (Lerner, 2005). 
Academic research, youth service workers, interest and support from large 
foundations, and national policies have all contributed to the development of the PYD 
framework.  Research in developmental psychology – particularly developmental systems 
theories – has supported a model of human development that stresses “the relative 
plasticity of human development” and argues that the potential for systematic change in 





relationships between the developing person and his or her biology, psychological 
characteristics, family, community, culture, physical and designed ecology, and historical 
niche” rather than fixed genetic influences on individual and social behavior (Lerner, 
2005, p. 11). Youth service workers have contributed to the model their practice 
experience with youth who are able to overcome challenges through resiliency and who 
initiate change. Finally, changing family demographics, particularly the increase in 
single, working parents and the number of dual-career households, have focused the 
attention of foundations and policymakers on how children spend their time after school 
and the extent to which those afternoon experiences can contribute to developing the 
skills needed in adulthood.   
Lerner (2005) identified two major features of the PYD perspective: the need for 
developmental resources and the elements desired for healthy development.  First, PYD 
stresses the need to align the strengths of youth with the resources they need for healthy 
development.  In other words, supports that adolescents receive at home, in school and in 
their communities are critical contributors to developing positive functioning and well-
being (Bornstein, Davidson, Keyes, Moore, & the Center for Child Well-Being, 2003; 
Dowling, et al., 2004).  As a result, researchers subscribing to this model have stressed 
the need to focus on ensuring that all youth have access to a variety of “developmental 
assets” (Benson 2003; Benson, Scales, Hamilton, & Semsa, 2006) that they need for 
healthy growth.   
Several efforts have sought to identify the developmental assets that youth 





between a locus in the individual and a locus in the larger environment.  Benson’s assets 
include three that are relevant to youth participating in decisions about their lives while in 
foster care: showing personal responsibility; knowing how to plan and make decisions; 
and having a sense of control over one’s life.  Theokas and colleagues (2005) suggested a 
model of 14 assets (half associated with the individual and half residing within the social 
ecology).  While the idea of developmental assets has been integrated into the PYD 
perspective, the mechanisms through which developmental assets work remain 
unmapped.  Some research suggests that the accumulation of more assets is the best 
predictor of PYD (Benson, Scales, Hamilton, & Semsa, 2006) but it is not clear whether 
specific assets may be more vital in specific types of adolescent experiences.   This 
feature of PYD suggests that attention should be directed to ensuring that youth have 
access to developmental assets at the individual, home, school and community levels.  
Literature in this area supports a strong connection between developmental asset-building 
and youth programs (Blum, 2003; Eccles and Gootman, 2002; Roth & Brooks-Gunn, 
2003; Scales, Benson, Leffert, & Blyth, 2000;). 
The PYD perspective’s second feature is its proposition that healthy development 
occurs when youth achieve competence, confidence, connection, character and caring 
(the “Five C’s”) so that they ultimately contribute (“the sixth C”) to their own well-being, 
as well as the well-being of their family, community, and social institutions (Lerner, 
2005).  
Much research in the area has focused on the extent to which youth programs 





& Hawkins, 2004).  Catalano and colleagues (2004) defined positive youth development 
programs as initiatives that sought to achieve one or more of the following outcomes for 
youth participants: bonding, resilience, social competence, emotional competence, 
cognitive competence, behavioral competence, moral competence, self-determination, 
spirituality, self-efficacy, clear and positive identity, belief in the future, recognition for 
positive behavior, opportunities for prosocial involvement, and prosocial norms.  
Particularly relevant to the way in which foster youth experience decision making while 
in care is the belief that PYD programs should seek to foster self-determination, or the 
ability to chart one’s own course (Fetterman, Kaftarian, & Wandersman, 1996).  This 
focus on self-determination is commonly operationalized within the PYD framework as a 
respect for “each youth’s ability to take an active role in making decisions about their 
lives, as well as the value of their contributions to youth service programs and 
community life” (Nixon, 1997, p. 572). 
Numerous child welfare scholars and practitioners suggest applying the PYD 
perspective in child welfare services, foster care, and services for youth who age out of 
care (Mallon, 1997; Melpignano & Collins, 2003; Nixon, 1997; Seita, 2000).  The broad 
consensus that PYD principles should be instilled into all aspects of child welfare 
services supports the need to involve foster children in decisions about their lives. 
Perspectives on the Sociology of Childhood 
 
 Over the past 30 years, childhood has become a cynosure for sociologists.  Work 
emerging from this area offers important implications for understanding how foster 





contributions are this field’s focus on childhood as a social construct and on the role of 
children as social actors within their own lives (Alanen, 1988; Corsaro, 2011; James & 
James, 2001; James, 2004).   
 Much of the sociological work on childhood has emerged from studies of 
children’s socialization – the process by which children adapt to and internalize the 
norms of society (Corsaro, 2011).  Early work in this area presented a deterministic 
model of children’s socialization.  In that model, parents, family and society socialized 
children, who were believed to play nothing more than a passive role in the process.  The 
deterministic model recognized socialization as a tool for social control and later 
expanded its focus to encompass issues such as social class, access, race and culture.  
Although these deterministic models reflected contemporary thinking in other 
fields, particularly child development, they were later criticized for focusing too heavily 
on the outcomes of socialization while ignoring the process of socialization (Corsaro, 
2011). Further, this work was criticized for its inherent focus on what the child will 
become in the future, rather than what the child currently is (Alanen, 1988).  
A constructivist model of the socialization process began to emerge based on the 
view that childhood is “interpreted, debated, and defined in processes of social action” 
(Corsaro, 2011, p. 9). James (2004) traced the roots of this new paradigm for studying 
childhood to Phillipe Aries’ (1962) historical study of childhood which posited that the 
concept of childhood did not exist in medieval society.  Although Aries’ work has drawn 
substantial criticism, James (2004) suggests that it nonetheless contributed to revising the 





interpretation,” which is heavily influenced by legal, social, cultural and historical 
expectations (p. 28). 
A natural offshoot of this constructivist perspective was the notion that 
“childhood not only shapes children’s experiences, but children also help shape the 
nature of the childhood that they experience” (James & James, 2001). Hence, sociologists 
began to examine the extent to which children are active and eager participants in this 
process. (Alanen, 1988; Corsaro, 2011; James & James, 2001). 
The findings from studies on topics as diverse as education, on-line experiences, 
advertising and marketing, poverty, divorce and sports have highlighted, among other 
things, the extent to which children – even very young children –work to construct their 
social relationships (Aird, 2004; Alanen, 1988; Boykin & Allen, 2004; Cassell, 2004; 
Corsaro, 2011; Etheridge, 2004; Gray, 2004; James & James, 2001; Meacham, 2004; 
Pryor & Emery, 2004; Singer, 2004).   
Corsaro (2011) has provided several examples of how preschool-aged children 
attempt to wrest some control over their lives from their teachers and caregivers. In a 
long-term ethnographic study of an Italian preschool cohort, Corsaro found that the 
children were keenly aware of the lack of control they had over even the most basic 
aspects of their lives and used dramatic role play to explore issues of power, status, and 
control “to project to the future – a time when they will be in charge and in control of 
themselves and others” (Corsaro, 2011, p. 166).   
In the same study, Corsaro (2011) found that preschool children regularly 





behaviors or activities that contradict, challenge, or violate the official norms or rules of a 
specific social organization or institution” (Corsaro, 2011, p. 177).   
Corsaro noted that children frequently engaged in such behaviors during clean-up 
time, when children used many strategies to evade the required effort.  Some children, for 
example, would simply move away from the area that needed cleaning.  Other children 
would ignore the announcement or delay with a personal problem (e.g., being injured, 
needing to use the bathroom, or other demands). 
To date, only one study has focused on the role of children as social actors within 
the child welfare system. Reich (2010) utilized ethnographic research methods to study 
the extent to which children strive to achieve desired personal outcomes by manipulating 
their interactions with child welfare workers (who rely on children to provide information 
to inform a variety of critical decisions). Reich identified four techniques that children 
commonly used to strategize their interactions: strategic subterfuge; absorbing blame; 
nurturing attention; and mobilizing child welfare resources for their own benefit.   
Strategic subterfuge occurred when children attempted to obscure critical 
information from child welfare workers through numerous methods.  Some children 
sought to control the interview agenda by asking their workers explain why they needed 
the information or by straying off topic (for example, demonstrating something they 
learned in school rather than answering a question). Other children engaged in strategic 
subterfuge by answering questions before the social worker finished asking them, 
providing explanations that highlighted middle-class parenting norms, or volunteering 





other children engaged in strategic subterfuge by simply refusing to engage in any 
discussion at all. 
Absorbing blame or claiming responsibility for concerns being investigated was 
another technique that Reich saw children utilize to manipulate communication with 
child welfare workers. Children engaging in such behavior tended either to deny that the 
activities under investigation occurred or to point out that the actions were deserved or 
appropriate.  For example, one youth in the study informed his child welfare worker 
during a home visit that the house was in disarray only because he didn’t clean up the 
mess as he had been directed to do.  Another child, involved in an investigation of 
physical abuse, initially “recast her experience and the resulting marks not as physical 
abuse (parental failure) but as strict corporal punishment for her transgression (her 
failure)” (Reich, 2010, p. 426).  In further follow-up, the girl adopted her father’s 
explanation of the injury – that she had fallen out of a tree. 
Reich described the third technique used by the children in her study as nurturing 
attention on their own terms.  In these cases, children seemed to appreciate the attention 
of the child welfare worker and used that attention to validate positive views about their 
own lives while obscuring any family failings.  As an example of this technique, Reich 
cited a seven-year-old girl who, during an interview about her mother’s drug use, 
provided direct but brief answers about the situation, and supplemented them with 
detailed stories about her own day-to-day activities and routines.   
The final method by which the children in Reich’s study attempted to exert 





benefit.  One young boy denied a school-reported family violence incident to his worker.  
After confirming that relationships within his family were satisfactory, the child 
mentioned that sometimes the family did not have food to eat and that he wanted to move 
because people sometimes used drugs on his front porch.  In this case, the child was 
successful in getting at-home services to help with resource issues, as well as a referral 
for housing services.  Another young woman in Reich’s study was described as using a 
court hearing on the status of her case to obtain assistance in retrieving possessions from 
her home and arranging visits with an aunt.   
Whether engaging in strategic subterfuge, absorbing blame/taking responsibility, 
nurturing attention on their own terms, or mobilizing state resources for their own 
benefit, Reich concluded that these children “entered interactions with social workers, 
child advocates, and judges with some understanding of the system’s power to dismantle 
their families, as well as restructure legal and financial arrangements” and used that 
knowledge “to stunt or mobilize that power according to their own desired outcome” 
(Reich, 2010, p. 433).  
 The sociological perspectives on childhood described above offer several 
important implications for a study of how children understand care experience the 
decision-making process. First, the social constructivist approach posits that there is no 
single experience of childhood.  James and James (2001) suggested that “it is no longer 
practical or even possible to speak, as has often been the case in the past, of the child as a 
universalized and apolitical subject of the modern world”; instead researchers should 





coherent sensibilities of the notion of the child as a common and shared category status” 
(p. 27). This approach suggests that children who spend time in foster care are likely to 
have a different social construction of childhood than children who do not.  That insight, 
in turn, validates a broad research agenda that would explore foster care from the 
perspective of children in care. 
A second implication of research on the sociology of childhood is the need to 
expand Reich’s ground-breaking work on the roles that children craft for themselves 
during the child protective services investigation process by examining the roles that 
children play at other points in the child welfare process. This perspective is consistent 
with research suggesting that children in foster care have an inherent to desire to be 
involved in decisions about their lives while in care, and could provide valuable feedback 
based on their experiences.  
Perspectives on Children’s Rights 
 
 Changing beliefs about the sociology of childhood – particularly the vision of 
children as social actors in their own right – have influenced the changing perspectives of 
academic and practice literature on children’s rights (Freeman, 1987; Freeman, 1998; 
Hearst, 2004; James & James, 2001; Mayall, 2000; Woodhouse, 2004).  The children’s 
rights literature provides a helpful framework for understanding the varying degrees of 
support for allowing children in foster care to be involved in decisions about their lives.   
The idea of children’s rights has long been paradoxical in the United States, 
primarily because rights are viewed primarily as the domain of “an autonomous party 





U.S. law has traditionally treated children as parental property rather than individual 
persons (Grossberg, 1985; Mason, 1994) until the children reach an official age of 
majority, typically age 18.  
The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1989), which to date has been ratified by all 
countries except Somalia and the United States, has brought worldwide attention to the 
issue of children’s rights by defining three types of rights for all children: provision, 
protection and participation (Mayall, 2000; O’Donoghue, Kirshner, & McLaughlin, 
2002).   
Provision rights focus on ensuring that children grow up with access to adequate 
standards of living, education, medical care and other services. Protection rights include 
the right of children to live free of abuse, neglect, discrimination, and exploitation.  The 
Convention broadly defines participation rights as freedom of expression on issues 
affecting young people (Hart, 1992).  Specifically, the Convention maintains that 
participating states must “assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own 
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views 
of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child” 
(Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1989).  Further, it 
requires that children “be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and 
administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative 
or appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law” 





 Hence, the Convention reflects a premise that all children are capable of forming 
viewpoints and in accordance with their age and maturity, have a right to express their 
views freely, be heard in matters affecting them, and to have their views taken seriously 
(Lansdown, 2001).  While the Convention clearly views children as actors in their own 
lives, it does not give children an open-ended right to autonomy in decisions about their 
lives.  Nonetheless, the Convention’s participation rights “introduce a radical and 
profound challenge to traditional attitudes, which assume that children should be seen 
and not heard” (Lansdown, 2001, p. 2).   
 Detractors contend that the Convention seeks to undermine the rights and 
responsibilities of parents and forces children to make decisions of which they may not 
be developmentally capable (Freeman, 1987; Purdy, 1992, 1994).  This hesitation likely 
reflects a broader lack of consensus regarding whether minors have rights of their own, 
and, to what extent they should be allowed to act upon them autonomously (Bohrnstedt, 
Freeman, & Smith, 1981; Head, 1998; Peterson-Badali, Morine, Ruck, & Slonim, 2004; 
Peterson-Badali, Ruck, & Ridley, 2003; Rogers & Wrightsman, 1978; Ruck, 
Abramovitch, & Keating, 1998; Taylor & Adelman, 1986).  
 Researchers have extensively studied public attitudes toward children’s 
nurturance rights (defined as the rights to basic care and protection from harm and 
exploitation) and self-determination rights (defined as the right of children to make 
decisions that affect their own lives) (Peterson-Badali et al. 2003; Peterson-Badali et al., 
2004).  These studies have found that both adults and children are significantly more 





(Bohrnstedt et al., 1981; Rogers & Wrightsman, 1978; Ruck et al., 1998; Ruck, Peterson-
Badali, & Day, 2002).  Across several studies, adults expressed greater support for self-
determination rights for older children than for younger children (Bohrnstedt et al., 1981; 
Peterson-Badali et al., 2003; Peterson-Badali et al., 2004).  The most recent studies, 
however, have shown declining support for children’s self-determination rights among 
adults, college students and early adolescents (Peterson-Badali et al., 2003; Peterson-
Badali et al., 2004).  
 A variety of beliefs influence the current thinking about children’s self-
determination rights (Lansdown, 2001; Staller & Kirk, 1997; Warshak, 2003).  
Arguments challenging children’s right to self-determination have typically focused on 
children’s perceived lack of competence make important decisions (Head, 1998; 
Lansdown, 2001; Staller & Kirk, 1997; Warshak, 2003).  Other commentators contend 
that children should not be given rights until they learn (or are able) to take responsibility 
for their actions; until children reach the age of responsibility, self-determination rights 
for children would infringe upon the rights of parents, ultimately eroding parental 
authority (Head, 1998; Lansdown, 2001).  Finally, some writers have argued that asking 
children to be involved in making serious decisions about their lives would rob those 
children of what should be a carefree childhood experience (Head, 1998; Lansdown, 
2001; Warshak, 2003). 
 The arguments in favor of participation rights for children have focused primarily 
on the fact that adults may abuse the power they hold over children and at times do not 





participation in decision making by children may yield better decisions and better 
protection for children.  Commentators have also contended that participation in decision 
making prepares children to assume their responsibilities as members of a democratic 
society. 
 Archard (1993) expressed the view that the extent to which children should 
engage in autonomous decision making may depend on the extent to which an individual 
child has demonstrated rationality, maturity and independence.  Archard concluded that 
such a model justifies denying self-determination rights to some children at times, and to 
other children all of the time.  Nonetheless, Archard’s model allows for individual 
application and does not summarily restrict self-determination rights for all children as a 
blanket matter. 
Despite continuing controversy over children’s rights in the United States, the 
U.N. Convention has greatly influenced the debate over children’s rights in signatory 
countries by clarifying that children have a right to voice their own opinions in matters 
related to their own lives, as appropriate to the developmental capabilities of the 
individual child.  In particular, much legislation worldwide that requires foster children to 
be involved in decisions about their lives had its origins in Article 12 of the Convention, 
which recognizes that children have a right to be heard in judicial or administrative 
proceedings that affect their lives (Henning, 2010). 
Procedural Justice 
 
 Research on procedural justice has consistently found that people value process 





Roberson, Moye, & Locke, 1999; Thibaut & Walker, 1975).  Studies in this area also 
have linked perceived procedural fairness to greater willingness to accept negative 
outcomes, increased compliance with court demands, decreased recidivism, and 
improved perceptions by minorities of the court processes (Burke & Leben, 2007; 
Paternoster, Bachman, Brame, & Sherman, 1997; Thibaut & Walker, 1978; Tyler, 1994b; 
Tyler, 2000; Tyler, 2001).  Theories of procedural justice offer several valuable insights 
into why so many foster youth express a desire to be involved in making decisions about 
their lives, as well as how factors relating to perceived procedural justice may influence 
how foster children respond to such decisions.  
 Early research on procedural justice focused on the role of “voice” in the 
decision-making process (Cohen, 1985; Thibault & Walker, 1978).  In this context, voice 
describes the ability to express a viewpoint about an issue under consideration regardless 
of whether one has a say in the final decision. In these early studies, voice was 
hypothesized to promote a much-desired sense of control over the decision-making 
process and was considered a key component of procedural justice. Several studies 
strongly supported the proposition that having a voice in decision making contributed to a 
greater perception of procedural fairness, which in turn increased satisfaction with the 
final decision (Burke & Leben, 2007; Lind, Kanfer, & Early, 1990; Roberson, Moye, & 
Locke, 1999).  
 In one such study, Roberson, Moye and Locke (1999) examined procedural 
justice as a mediator between participation in decision making and satisfaction with the 





three conditions.  In the first condition, a class scheduling decision was made for the 
students.  In the second condition, students made their own scheduling decision. In the 
third condition, the class scheduling decision was made in a participatory manner.  The 
investigators found that perceived participation influenced satisfaction by affecting the 
perceived fairness the decision-making procedure.  Roberson and colleagues concluded 
that procedural justice was responsible, in part, the positive effect of participation on 
satisfaction.  They observed that “procedural justice was found to completely mediate the 
participation-satisfaction relationship such that there was no significant direct 
relationship when perceptions of procedural justice were controlled” (Roberson et al., 
1999, p. 591).   
 The importance of voice was further illustrated by studies finding that when 
people were given the opportunity to express an opinion but were told that their voice 
would not impact the decision, they still perceived the situation to be fairer than if they 
had no opportunity to speak (Burke & Leben, 2007).  In one such study, Lind, Kanfer and 
Early (1990) randomly assigned subjects to one of three conditions and asked them to 
rate the perceived fairness of a workload decision.  In the first condition, subjects were 
given the workload schedule and not permitted to provide any feedback.  In the second 
condition, subjects were given a tentative schedule, were asked to provide their opinion 
about the schedule, and were then given the final schedule, which reflected the decreased 
workload they had suggested. In the third condition, subjects were given the workload 
schedule and were told that it would not be changed.  They were then asked for their 





schedule would not be changed.  The research team found that subjects felt that the 
second condition – in which participants could voice their opinion about the workload 
before a final decision was made – was the fairest of the three conditions because it 
provided an opportunity both to express an opinion and to have that opinion be reflected 
in the final decision.  Although subjects did not influence the final decision in either of 
the other conditions, they rated the third condition, in which they were able to provide an 
opinion after the final decision had been made, as significantly more fair than the first 
condition, in which they were not able to provide any input.  The results underscored the 
value that people place upon being able to speak about their opinions and experiences.   
The role of voice in procedural justice theory suggests a reason for the well-
documented desire of foster youth for more opportunities to participate in decisions about 
their lives. From a procedural justice perspective, the ability to voice one’s opinions 
about life decisions would be perceived as promoting procedural fairness. Procedural 
justice research also suggests that allowing foster youth to express opinions about 
pending decisions (as opposed to allowing the youth to make those decisions) still may be 
perceived positively by the youth as participation. 
Subsequent research expanded the basic model of procedural justice to include 
three more key components, in addition to voice:  neutrality, trust in authorities and 
respect (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Burke & Leben, 2007; Tyler, 1994a).  Neutrality refers to 
the extent to which legal principles are consistently applied, decision makers are 
perceived as unbiased and decision making is transparent. Trust in authorities is defined 





their efforts.  Finally, respect refers to the extent to which individuals feel they are treated 
with dignity during proceedings and believe their rights are protected.  The key 
contribution of this model to understanding how foster youth experience decisions about 
their lives while in care is its focus on the extent to which respectful relationships 
influence perceptions of procedural justice.  Specifically, research has found that subjects 
interpret fair procedures as a sign of respect for the worth of the individual and his or her 
status within society.  Being treated as a valued member of society, in turn, enhances a 
person’s perception of fairness (Blader & Tyler, 2003).   
The procedural justice model augments the explanatory power of some of the 
previously-reviewed adolescent development theories, particularly those concerned with 
identity development.  For adolescents, participation in decision making about their lives 
may enhance the process of developing an adult identity by signaling their value as 
individuals. 
Procedural justice research focusing on children has shown that even very young 
children can evaluate the fairness of activities and express more positive attitudes toward 
activities that they consider more fair (Fry & Corfield, 1983; Gold, Darley, Hilton, & 
Zanna, 1984; Hicks & Lawrence, 1993; Weisz, Wingrove, & Faith-Slaker, 2007;).  
Children, like adults, have been found to view expressing an opinion and participating in 
the decision-making process as important components of procedural fairness (Cashmore, 
2002; Goodman et al., 1992; Quas et al., 2005; Smith & Gollop, 2001; Thomas & 





In a study of how older adolescents perceived fairness in family decision making, 
Jackson and Fondacaro (1999) found that older adolescents used criteria that reflect 
procedural justice theory to assess the extent to which they felt their parents made fair 
decisions.  Specifically, fair procedures were those that the youth perceived to be rational, 
objective, and consistent.  As in other procedural justice research, older adolescents rated 
as more fair those techniques that allowed them to voice their opinions on a topic.  Older 
adolescents also favored decision-making procedures that were respectful of their status 
as a family member.  
Consistent with the literature linking perceived procedural justice to support for 
the decision, Jackson and Fondacaro found that youth who felt their parents used fair 
procedures to make decisions were more likely to accept those decisions and less likely to 
act out or engage in deviant behavior.  Conversely, youth who felt that their parents relied 
on unfair procedures to make decisions were more likely to act out and behave 
inappropriately.  
Theories of Legal Representation of Children 
 
Procedural justice theory is reflected in the on-going debate regarding legal 
representation for children in dependency cases (Duquette & Ventrell, 2005; Taylor, 
2009). Neither federal child welfare legislation nor case law currently provides a clear 
directive mandating legal representation for children in such cases (Atwood, 2008; Sobie, 
2006; Ventrell, 2006).  The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) of 
1974, as amended, requires states to appoint a guardian ad litem to advocate for the “best 





Critics, however, charge that the best interests model limits children’s voice in the 
proceedings and is unlikely to protect their due process rights sufficiently (Appell, 2006; 
Glynn, 2007; Sobie, 2006).  This section reviews issues arising from the legal 
representation of children in dependency court.  It examines the on-going debate over 
whether children involved in such cases require legal representation and, if so, which 
model of legal representation would be most appropriate.  Finally, the few empirical 
studies that seek to determine the impact of legal representation on child welfare 
proceedings are reviewed. 
Scholars and practitioners contend that children’s legal representation in 
dependency cases is uneven, at best, with “no two models of child representation among 
the various U.S. jurisdictions” being exactly alike (Duquette & Ventrell, 2005, p. 494).  
Such a conclusion is not surprising given the lack of clarity over whether children in 
dependency cases require any legal representation at all (Pitchal, 2006; Sobie, 2006; 
Ventrell, 2006;).  
While the U.S. Constitution has been held to require legal representation for those 
charged in significant criminal proceedings, the courts have found no similar guarantee 
for those involved in civil proceedings such as dependency cases.  Case law, for example, 
has established that states do not have to provide counsel to indigent adults who are 
involved in proceedings to terminate their parental rights to a child (Rauber & Granik, 
2005; Sobie, 2006).   
In re Gault, a 1967 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, extended the right to 





fortified through subsequent decisions that extended to children involved in such cases 
basic rights applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment (e.g., the right to counsel, 
adequate notice of charges, freedom from compelled self-incrimination, confrontation 
and cross-examination of witnesses, and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt) 
(Appell, 2006; Duquette & Ventrell, 2005; Sobie, 2006).   
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never considered a case involving legal 
representation for children in child protective proceedings, Sobie (2006) identifies state 
court rulings in Alabama, New York and Oklahoma that found children’s due process 
rights were violated by the failure to appoint independent counsel to represent them in 
dependency cases.  In addition, in Kenny A. v. Perdue, a federal district court in Georgia 
held that children involved in protective cases are entitled to counsel (Pitchal, 2006; 
Ventrell, 2006).  This handful of cases, however, does not equate to a national 
requirement that counsel be appointed for children in dependency cases (Ventrell, 2006). 
CAPTA, the federal law that requires states to assign a guardian ad litem to all 
children involved in child abuse and neglect matters that result in court proceedings, has 
been criticized for vaguely defining the guardian ad litem role (Sobie, 2006; Ventrell 
2006).  CAPTA does not require the position to be filled by an attorney, with the 1996 
amendments explicitly allowing volunteers, such as those with the Court Appointed 
Special Advocate (CASA) program, to serve in the role (Bilson & White, 2005; Glynn 
2007).   Nonetheless, about 40 states require the guardian ad litem to be a licensed 





attorneys and volunteers, to fulfill the guardian ad litem responsibilities (Duquette & 
Ventrell, 2005; Glynn, 2007).  
The use of volunteers has been controversial, with opponents charging that such 
appointments are motivated primarily as a cost-saving measure with little concern for 
protecting the rights of the child (Bilson & White, 2005; Glynn, 2007).  Other authors 
have maintained that these volunteers engage illegally in the practice of law, while 
lacking both the training and the skills to present a case in court (Sobie, 2006).  As Glynn 
(2007) notes, these volunteers typically are trained to avoid giving legal advice to the 
children they serve. 
Concerns about the limited qualifications of some guardians ad litem, along with 
changing notions about childhood, children’s rights and procedural justice, have resulted 
in an increasing sense that guardians ad litem do not sufficiently protect children’s due 
process rights or provide them with a voice in important matters that affect their lives.  
As a result, scholars and practitioners have engaged in a well-documented debate 
regarding the appropriate model of legal representation for children in dependency cases 
(Glynn, 2007; Ventrell, 2006).   
This debate, which has been referred to as the “dilemma of child advocacy,” 
centers on two models of legal representation (Haralambie, 1993). At one end of the 
spectrum, the best interests model requires the lawyer to advocate for actions that are 
perceived to be in the best interest of the client, regardless of the client’s expressed 
wishes. This advocacy model informs the use of guardians ad litem under CAPTA. At the 





the client’s expressed wishes.  The client-directed model has been adopted in the United 
States for most contested legal matters involving adults, as well as for juvenile criminal 
proceedings. 
In addition to reflecting the guardian ad litem role described in CAPTA, the best 
interests model has typically been limited to cases involving individuals who are believed 
to lack the competency to direct counsel, including children, the mentally disabled, and 
the mentally ill (Duquette & Ventrell, 2005).  Some argue that the best interests model 
reflects the paternalistic approach of a variety of child-saving efforts, including child 
protective services and juvenile justice (Appell, 2006; Ventrell, 2006). In this model, the 
attorney “is responsible for protecting the minor child’s rights and best interests, and for 
making recommendations to the court on the minor’s behalf” (Polowny et al., 2010, p. 
34). 
The best interests model has been criticized for allowing “substituted judgment” 
in which a lawyer usurps the role of the court to make such determinations (Duquette & 
Ventrell, 2005, p. 499).  Opponents also argue that the attorney may lack the knowledge 
or expertise to formulate an opinion on the client’s best interests (Sobie, 2006) and may 
be inclined to make decisions that fail to consider adequately the child’s race, 
socioeconomic status or age (Appell, 2006).  Further, Appell argues that attorneys 
operating from the best interests perspective in delinquency proceedings can end up “no 
longer seeing a need to protect their clients from the state,” and instead focus on 
“protecting [their clients] from the people whom the state has identified as harmful to 





Critics also contend that the best interests model encourages attorneys to engage 
in “relaxed advocacy” and shirk traditional duties such as meeting with clients and filing 
motions (Duquette & Ventrell, 2005; Glesner Fines, 2008).  Glesner Fines (2008) 
hypothesizes that because lawyers operating from this model are typically appointed to 
serve as the “eye and ears of the court,” they are less likely to pursue a line of advocacy 
that may conflict with the court’s vision or preferences.  Finally, some scholars have 
suggested that the best interests model is virtually impossible to implement due to the 
lack of consensus on how one determines what is in a child’s best interests (Glynn, 
2007).   
Advocates of the traditional client-directed model of representation contend that it 
is the best way to provide youth with a voice in important decisions about their lives and 
ensure that the due process rights of youth are protected in proceedings which place at 
stake their “liberty interests” including “their own safety, health, and well-being, as well 
as an interest in maintaining the integrity of the family unit and in having a relationship 
with biological parents” (Taylor, 2009, p. 607).  Appell (2006) hypothesizes that 
traditional representation promotes children’s moral autonomy and may lead to better 
case outcomes. Hardin (2005) suggests that this model also best serves to protect children 
from inappropriate treatment by the child welfare system itself. 
Nonetheless, the client-directed model of representation is criticized for placing 
too much responsibility on children to determine their own fate.  The concern, 
particularly with younger children, is that they lack the capacity to direct their attorneys, 





Ventrell, 2005). Arguments against client-directed representation for children also 
suggest that children may be particularly susceptible to pressure from their families, other 
involved parties, and even the court process itself; as a result, they may misidentify or 
misrepresent their own interests (Buss, 1996).  In addition, being required to make such 
choices may also provoke anxiety in children (Melton, 1981). 
The debate over the most appropriate method for representing children in 
dependency proceedings remains unresolved. For the most part, state and federal statutes 
continue to favor a best interests approach to legal representation of children in 
dependency cases, while many national professional and advocacy groups promote a 
“child’s attorney” practice model that relies heavily on a client-directed approach to 
representation (American Bar Association, 1996; Duquette & Ventrell, 2005; Kruse, 
2006; National Association of Counsel for Children, 2001).   
Both the American Bar Association (1996) and the National Association of 
Counsel for Children (2001) have established practice standards for dependency cases 
that, for the most part, reflect the client-directed model of representation. Acknowledging 
the challenges of implementing a client-directed model with very young children 
(particularly those who are not yet verbal), both groups allow attorneys to practice from a 
best interests model if the child is unable or unwilling to express his or her own 
preferences. In such cases, practice guidelines suggest that the lawyer should advocate for 
the child’s legal interests based on objective criteria to the extent possible (American Bar 
Association, 1996; National Association of Counsel for Children, 2001). In cases in 





lawyer can request that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent the child from a best 
interests perspective while the lawyer continues to conduct a client-directed 
representation (Duquette & Ventrell, 2005). 
In addition to these professional groups, two major academic conferences – the 
1996 Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in Legal Representation of Children and the 
2006 UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Families – also sought to further 
the traditional lawyering approach for children involved in child protective services cases 
(Kruse, 2006).  
In 2007, the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Representation of Children in 
Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act (Uniform Law Commission, 2010) 
incorporated a compromise approach to legal representation for children, suggesting that 
the court in each case should determine whether to appoint a child’s attorney who is 
bound by the ethical obligations governing the traditional lawyer-client relationship or a 
best interests attorney whose advocacy is not bound by the child’s expressed wishes 
(Atwood, 2008; Hunt Federle, 2008; Spinak, 2006).  In addition to these two distinct 
attorney roles, the model act also allows for a best interests advocate, who is not an 
attorney but who assists the court in determining the child’s best interests (Atwood, 2008; 
Spinak, 2006).  Not surprisingly, the model act has generated harsh criticism from 
advocacy groups and scholars who contend that it “undermines the rights of children, 
violates the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and sets the law regarding the 





October 2011, the ULC proposal has not been adopted by any state (Uniform Law 
Commission, 2010). 
Despite theoretical and philosophical support for each side, little empirical 
evidence is available to support outcomes for either model.  As a result, it is unclear 
whether either practice model has led to “legal or material improvement of children’s 
lives” (Appell, 2006, p. 575). Existing studies tend to focus on examining differences in 
case outcomes that relate to the category of representation (attorney, guardian ad litem, 
CASA volunteer), without clarifying the perspective from which representation is 
provided (Quality Improvement Center on the Representation of Children in the Child 
Welfare System, 2010). These studies have primarily focused on outcomes such as the 
quantity of services made available, placement stability, reunification and timeliness. 
Quantity of Services: Two studies have found that CASA assignment is correlated 
with children receiving significantly more services, including mental health and medical 
care (Caliber Associates, 2004; Litzelfelner, 2000).  
Placement Stability: Several studies examined issues related to children’s 
representation and placement stability.  While two studies found that children assigned 
CASA volunteers had significantly fewer placements than children without CASA 
volunteers (Caliber Associates, 2004; Calkins & Millar, 1999), a third study found no 
statistically significant difference in the number of placements for children in the two 
groups (Litzelfelner, 2000). Duquette & Ramsey (1987) identified a positive relationship 
among training, investigations and placements.  In their study of Michigan dependency 





to increased and more rigorous investigations.  These investigations, in turn, led to more 
court orders for out-of-home placement. 
Reunification: Studies examining the relationship between CASA assignment and 
reunification offer contradictory findings. Caliber Associates (2004) found that children 
who had a CASA volunteer were significantly less likely to be reunited with their 
parents, while Calkins and Millar (1999) found that among cases achieving permanency, 
children with a CASA assignment were reunified with their parents more often than those 
without a CASA volunteer. 
Timeliness: Several studies have focused on the timeframes associated with 
various court processes.  Examining participation in a specialized guardian ad litem 
project, Zinn and Slowriver (2008) found no statistically-significant differences in the 
length of time between out-of-home placement and adjudication or between adjudication 
and case plan approval.  They did, however, find that children with guardians who 
participated in the specialized project exited to permanency faster than children who did 
not.  Reviewing the effects of a guardian ad litem training program, Duquette and 
Ramsey (1987) found that children represented by guardians ad litem who attended a 
specialized training had their cases reach first disposition significantly faster than the 
group without such representatives. 
Studying dependency cases in California, Goodman and colleagues (2008) found 
that children in counties that employed independent types of representation (e.g., private 
firms or a panel of court-appointed attorneys) tended to experience fewer foster care 





district attorneys, public defenders, or county counsel) to represent children.  The authors 
concluded that representation by private firms or court-appointed attorneys offered better 
outcomes for children (Goodman, Edelstein, Mitchell, & Myers, 2008). Similarly, 
Calkins and Millar (1999) found that children with CASA appointments spent 
significantly less time in foster care than children without CASA appointments. 
 Missing from the empirical literature on models of legal representation for 
children is an effort to compare the experiences of children who are involved with both 
the child welfare and the juvenile justice systems.  Numerous recent studies have 
documented the overlap between children served in both systems (Jonson-Reid & Barth, 
2000; Maschi, Smith Hatcher, Schwalbe, & Scotto Rosato, 2008; Postlethwait, Barth, & 
Guo, 2010; Ryan & Testa, 2005; Ryan, Herz, Hernandez, & Marshall, 2007; Stewart, 
Livingston, & Dennison, 2008; Williams, Van Dorn, Bright, Jonson-Reid, & Nebbitt, 
2010).   
 The literature reviewed in this section suggests that the models of legal 
representation provided to children in dependency and delinquency courts differ 
significantly. Representation in child welfare proceedings typically follows a best 
interests lawyering model, while representation in delinquency proceedings relies upon 
the traditional, client-directed model.  Procedural justice theory suggests that the differing 
levels of “voice” inherent to each of these models may result in very different 
experiences and satisfaction among youth who are served by both systems.  Future 





both child welfare and delinquency proceedings could potentially add much to the current 
debate regarding the most appropriate model of legal representation for children. 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
 
 The developing academic field of therapeutic jurisprudence, which focuses on the 
role of law as a therapeutic agent, offers another framework for understanding how foster 
children may experience participation in decisions about their lives while in care 
(Winick, 1997).  Scholarship in this area provides insights into the ways in which laws, 
legal processes and legal actors can affect the psychological and emotional well-being of 
individuals involved in an array of court proceedings (Wexler, 2000; Winick, 1997). 
 Rooted in a belief that law as a social force “produces behaviors and 
consequences” which may or may not be desired, the therapeutic jurisprudence 
perspective focuses on “whether the law can be made or applied in a more therapeutic 
way so long as other values, such as justice and due process, can be fully respected”  
(Wexler, 2000, p. 125).  In other words, the therapeutic jurisprudence perspective does 
not prioritize therapeutic benefits over the fair and thorough application of the law, but 
instead posits that “other things being equal, positive therapeutic effects are desirable and 
should generally be a proper aim of law, and that untherapeutic effects are undesirable 
and should be avoided or minimized” (Winick, 1997, p. 188). 
 The concept of therapeutic jurisprudence emerged in the early 1990s from mental 
health law in general, and issues relating to civil commitment, the insanity defense and 
competency to stand trial in particular (Wexler, 2000; Winick, 1997; Winick, 1999).  The 





that “the individual’s own views concerning his or her health and how best to achieve it 
should generally be honored” (Winick, 1997, p. 192). 
 Wexler (2000) contends that therapeutic jurisprudence can be useful in examining 
laws, legal procedures, and the roles and behaviors of legal actors (e.g., attorneys and 
judges).  Scholars have applied the concept to an array of areas including drug abuse, sex 
offenses, family law, disability law, probate law, juvenile delinquency, child abuse and 
domestic violence (Madden & Wayne, 2003; Winick, 1997).   
 For example, Kavanagh (1995) analyzed the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” rule which, 
until its recent abandonment, sought to address the ban on homosexual or bisexual 
individuals from military service.  The policy prohibited the government from asking 
recruits or soldiers about their sexual preferences while banning recruits or soldiers from 
talking about them.  Kavanagh suggested that the policy likely had unintended 
consequences that could have been antitherapeutic for military members.  She argued that 
the ban may make soldiers afraid to talk about a variety of subjects – such as vacation 
plans and living arrangements – out of fear that their answers may be viewed as 
addressing prohibited topics. As a result, Kavanagh suggested that soldiers may feel a 
need to be guarded about any or all information they share with others, leading to 
isolation, marginalization and the avoidance of social relationships. 
 Looking at legal processes, Weinstein (1997) analyzed child custody proceedings 
from a therapeutic jurisprudence framework.  She argued that the adversarial process 
inherent to the American legal system is likely to have detrimental effects on parties 





negative attributes and argue publicly that the other is less qualified to parent the child 
(Weinstein, 1997).  Such practices, she contends, are often traumatic for the child and 
make it difficult for the parents to maintain a friendly, supportive relationship in their 
continued roles as the parents of the child. 
 In examining legal roles through a therapeutic jurisprudence lens, Wexler (2000) 
argues that the behavior of lawyers and judges can have unintended consequences for 
participants in legal proceedings.  Wexler provided as an example the need for judges to 
issue clear instructions regarding probation requirements. Wexler observed that “if a 
judge is not entirely clear in formulating a condition of probation, someone may not 
comply with the probationary terms because he or she never quite understood what it is 
that he or she was told to do or not to do” (Wexler, 2000, p. 128).  By ensuring that the 
defendant understands the rules of probation, the judge may forward therapeutic goals. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence literature has influenced the development of problem-
solving courts that focus on individuals who need social, mental health or substance 
abuse treatment services (Winick, 2003).  Beginning with the creation of the first drug 
treatment court in Miami in 1989, these initiatives reflect a belief that, in many 
circumstances, sentencing a nonviolent offender to prison is unlikely to succeed in 
changing the offender’s addictive behavior.  Instead, problem-solving courts emphasize 
rehabilitation by placing the judge as a critical member of the treatment team (Winick, 
2003).   
Following this problem-solving model, domestic violence courts have been 





and intervention programs, and to monitor compliance with court-ordered treatment.  Re-
entry courts use this model to provide judicially-supervised parole and facilitate 
integration into the community.  In some jurisdictions, teen or youth courts have been 
created to hear cases involving juveniles charged with minor offenses (Winick, 2003).   
 Therapeutic jurisprudence has also applied social science theory and, to a lesser 
degree, its empirical methodologies in examining how law impacts the mental and 
physical health of those involved in court proceedings (Winick, 1997).  Some authors 
have suggested that therapeutic jurisprudence has a natural fit with social work practice 
theories and principles (Madden & Wayne, 2002 and 2003).   
Scholars who have applied therapeutic jurisprudence perspectives in analyzing the 
experiences of juveniles in court have called for numerous reforms, including increased 
opportunities for youth to participate in proceedings and improved representation (Glynn, 
2007; Henning, 2010).  In examining the value of designing a judicial system that offers 
therapeutic experiences for youthful participants, Glynn (2007) suggests a court process 
that “minimizes the stress of the situation and gives the children a voice in the decisions 
that affect them” (Glynn, 2007, p. 65). 
Writing about delinquency cases, Henning (2010) suggests that from a therapeutic 
jurisprudence perspective, the legal representation of child defendants “enhances the 
child’s respect for the law and its enforcement, increases the likelihood that the child will 
‘buy into’ the process of reform and gives the child an opportunity to improve his 
evolving decision-making capacity” (p. 125).   Similarly, Winick (1999) contends that 





dignity are more likely to accept responsibility for their conduct and engage in reform 
and rehabilitation activities.  Conversely, he maintains, children who had little 
opportunity to participate are more likely to perceive the procedures as unfair and 
paternalistic, and typically have less respect for law and legal authorities. 
Brooks (1999) suggests that child protection “at least in theory, promotes a 
‘therapeutic’ legal standard and a ‘therapeutic’ goal for children”; it should therefore be 
an ideal field in which to operationalize therapeutic jurisprudence principles.  Yet, she 
argues, law and practice in dependency cases have become increasingly antithetical to 
such principles. 
In particular, Brooks identifies the focus on adoption and the rigid time frames 
included in the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997 as examples of policies 
and practices that are potentially untherapeutic for children and families.  Using a family 
systems theory framework, Brooks argues that such regulations focus inappropriately on 
individual family members and fail to address the needs of the family as a whole.  Brooks 
also maintains that the ASFA’s requirement to pursue termination of parental rights when 
a child has been in care for 15 of the past 22 months may have harmful effects on the 
participants it is supposed to assist. In many cases, she argues, services to ameliorate 
family issues are inadequate or unavailable in such a short time frame.  Hence, children 
and parents are left feeling that parental rights were terminated unjustly and for reasons 
beyond their control. 
Brooks also maintains that concurrent planning practices, which allow child 





of a case, can bias proceedings in the direction of terminating parental rights and 
adoption while minimizing the amount of due process afforded to children and their 
families.  Finally, Brooks argues that the growing judicial role in U.S. child welfare 
practice has resulted in “an increased amount of highly stressful, adversarial litigation” 
when a focus on helping child welfare-involved families avoid litigation might be more 




 Despite a growing literature on how young people in foster care are involved in 
decisions about their lives, relatively little is known about what the experience actually 
means to these youth. As suggested by the theories reviewed above, participating in life 
decisions while in foster care could contribute to empowerment, identity formation and 
the development of a sense of personal autonomy, all of which may positively influence 
children’s lives both in and out of foster care.  In addition, a variety of legal theories and 
frameworks – procedural justice theory, competing perspectives on legal representation 
for children, and the emerging therapeutic jurisprudence framework, all suggest that 






CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction and Plan for the Chapter 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research methods used in this study.  
First, the rationale for selecting a qualitative approach to inquiry is discussed.  Next, 
hermeneutic phenomenology, the qualitative methodology used in this study, is 
described.  Finally, the specific research methods used in this study are outlined. 
Rationale 
 
 Despite the growing literature on how foster youth are involved in decisions about 
their lives, no study has explored what this experience means to such youth. The paucity 
of empirical work in this area, coupled with the need to understand further the experience 
from the client perspective, suggests that a qualitative methodology would be appropriate 
for this study (Creswell, 2007; Padgett, 2008; Patton, 2002).   
 Qualitative research reflects a human science orientation toward inquiry, which 
inherently requires “description, interpretation, and self-reflective or critical analysis” 
(van Manen, 1990, p. 4).  The methodology offers powerful tools to understand the lived 
experiences of subjects and the meanings attached to such experiences (Padgett, 2008).  
Creswell (2007) identified five key philosophical assumptions that underlie the 
qualitative perspective and define the paradigm for qualitative research.  
First, in qualitative research, reality is viewed as subjective rather than objective.  





universal truth, but rather expect study participants to present multiple subjective realities 
based on diverse perspectives, feelings, experiences and views.   
Second, qualitative researchers view themselves as having a critical role in the 
inquiry process.  Qualitative researchers therefore spend time in the field with subjects in 
an effort to reduce the distance between researcher and the subject.  Data are collected 
primarily through interactions (e.g., interviews, observations) between the researchers 
and participants.    
The third assumption isolated by Creswell (2007) is that social research is value-
laden and, as a result, requires a thorough recognition of the values and biases that may 
influence the research efforts.  This assumption suggests that researchers must be 
forthright in presenting their own beliefs about the topic being examined and must offer a 
critical analysis of how these beliefs may influence the study.   
Fourth, assumptions about rhetoric lead qualitative researchers to write in a less 
formal style, attempting to the extent possible to reflect the voice of the research 
participants in their manuscripts.  Therefore, evidence in qualitative reports is frequently 
presented through verbatim quotations from informants.  
Finally, qualitative research is conducted on the assumption that the research 
process should employ inductive, rather than deductive, logic.  As a result, qualitative 
research typically begins analysis by examining the details collected through interviews 
and from other sources.  From these details, the researcher moves toward broader 







 The specific qualitative approach for conducting this study is derived from 
hermeneutic phenomenology.  Rooted in a social constructivist worldview in which 
“individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live and work,” 
phenomenology focuses on understanding the lived experience of individuals who have 
experienced a phenomenon, in this case, participation in decisions about one’s life while 
in foster care (Creswell, 2007, p. 20).   
 Smith (2009) traces the roots of phenomenology to Western and Eastern 
philosophy.  Both Buddhist and Hindu philosophers, as well as Kant, Descartes, and 
Hume, all reflected concepts of phenomenology in their work. The approach is most 
frequently associated with the philosophy of Edmund Husserl (Spiegelberg, 1984). 
Husserl’s claim that “we can only know what we experience” defines the basic goal of 
phenomenological inquiry:  producing a description of “an essence or essences” of a 
shared experience (Patton, 2002a, p. 69-70).  Such inquiry is intended to uncover the 
essential or universal meaning of an experience. 
 According to Husserl, individual experiences are transformed into essences 
through the process of ideation.   The object that appears in the consciousness is an 
“absolute reality while what appears in the world is a product of learning” (Moustakas, 
1994, p. 27).   
 Husserl contended that phenomenology was the appropriate method for the study 
of the life-world: “The life-world is a realm of original self evidences. That which is self-





or, in memory, remembered as the thing itself; and every other manner of intuition is a 
presentification of the thing itself” (Husserl, in Welton, 1999, p. 367). 
 From Husserl’s work, as well as contributions by Martin Heidegger, two main 
schools of phenomenological research have emerged (Creswell, 2007).   Hermeneutic 
phenomenology (more closely associated with Heidegger) focuses on understanding lived 
experience through interpreting the “texts” of life, while Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology focuses more strictly on the descriptions from research subjects and less 
on the researcher’s interpretations (Creswell, 2007).  In phenomenological research, the 
methods used will differ reflecting whether an interpretative or descriptive approach is 
followed (Caelli, 2001; Lopez & Willis, 2004). 
This study draws upon hermeneutic phenomenological methodologies for several 
reasons.  First, hermeneutic phenomenology’s emphasis on interpretation “provides the 
richness to understand the human condition in the changing yet continuous social-
historical reality in which we find ourselves” (Ray, 1994, p. 122).   While transcendental 
phenomenology seeks to identify universal essences of an experience, the hermeneutic 
branch, with its focus on interpretation, is more open to examining situational influences 
on the subject’s experience.  A focus on situational influences is appropriate in light of 
the proposed study’s aims of understanding the experience of participating in life 
decisions while in foster care. A transcendental phenomenology framework would have 
been more appropriate if the study aimed at defining the “essence” of the experience in 





A second reason for using hermeneutical phenomenology as the philosophical and 
methodological framework for this study is that such techniques have proven beneficial 
in understanding experiences between clients or consumers and professionals in other 
helping fields.  The method has been used extensively in nursing to examine topics such 
as early professional socialization (Price, 2009), patient experiences living with terminal 
illness (Spichiger, 2008), experiences of homeless people in the health care delivery 
system (Martins, 2008) and the experiences of patients who receive a cancer diagnosis 
(Tobin & Begley, 2008).  Phenomenological studies in education have focused on 
children and microcomputers (Kreuger, Karger & Barwick, 1988) and the experience of 
listening to music (Dura, 2006).  In psychology, phenomenology has been used to 
understand the experience of recovering from severe mental illness (Bradshaw, Armour 
& Roseborough, 2007; Wertz, 2005). The success of hermeneutic phenomenology in 
“understanding unique individuals and their meanings and interactions with others and 
the environment” in other helping professions suggests its appropriateness as an inquiry 
tool in social work (Lopez & Willis, 2004, p. 726). 
Third, hermeneutic phenomenology was chosen for this study because, unlike 
transcendental phenomenology, its research methods have been clearly expressed.  
Hence, scholarly sources were available to guide the creation of a sampling plan, 
interview questions, a data analysis plan, and reporting procedures.  Adhering to the 
procedures used by scholars in related disciplines helps to establish rigor in the study and, 





 Finally, the selection of hermeneutic phenomenology was informed by the 
growing call among scholars across disciplines for children to have a more direct role in 
research about their lives and experiences (Corsaro, 2011; Fox & Berrick, 2007; Grover, 
2004; Thomas & O’Kane, 2000). Because social science research plays an active role in 
the social construction of childhood, scholars have contended that children should have 
the opportunity to define themselves during the research process, rather than being 
defined by “adult interests, biases and agendas” (Prout & James, 1990, p. 29).   
The foster care literature is surprisingly devoid of children’s self-reported 
experiences in out-of-home care (Bogolub, 2005; Curran & Pecora, 2000; Fox & Berrick, 
2007). A review conducted by Fox and Berrick (2007) identified a mere two dozen 
studies that involved interviews with current or former foster children.  Rather, most 
research in the field has been conducted from the perspective of caregivers, social 
workers, case records, and data collected by agencies and institutions (Fox & Berrick, 
2007).  Although scholars and practitioners alike call for more research on foster care 
from the perspective of foster youth themselves, there are numerous legal and 
institutional barriers to involving current foster youth in research studies.  These barriers 
include gaining access to foster youth, acquiring consent from multiple sources, 
managing caregiver suspicions, and managing children’s disclosures of unsafe situations 
(Berrick, Frasch, & Fox, 2000; Bogolub, 2005; Mishna, Antle, & Regehr, 2004).  
Grover (2004) defines “authentic research” about children as research that gives 
“power and voice to child research participants” to provide “insights into their subjective 





of research to viewing children as subjects and, even more appropriately, collaborators in 
the research process.  
Scholars have argued that qualitative methods in general, and hermeneutic 
phenomenology in particular, provide a tool for facilitating such a paradigm shift because 
they value and defer to the subject’s expertise on his or her interpretation of an 
experience being studied (Altschuler, 1999; Grover, 2004; Mitchell & Kuczynski, 2010). 
More so than other research methods, phenomenology allows children “to communicate 
their experience without having it transformed by the researcher so as to alter its meaning 
in any significant manner” (Grover, 2004, p. 84). 
Study Methods 
 
The research methods outlined in the sections below are consistent with the 
application of hermeneutic phenomenology in other helping professions, including 
education and nursing, and are drawn largely from the work of educational scholar and 
phenomenologist Max van Manen (1990) and nursing researchers Marlene Zichi Cohen, 
David Kahn and Richard Steeves (2000) and Patricia Benner (1994). 
Sampling and Recruitment of Participants 
 
 Given the focus on understanding a phenomenon from the perspective of an 
individual who has experienced it, informants were selected purposively with a focus on 
identifying individuals who had been in the care and custody of a mid-Atlantic public 
child welfare agency between ages 14 and 18.  At the time of the interview, all of the 





without being adopted or reunited with their birthparents). These youth also had closed 
child welfare cases. 
Cohen and colleagues (2000) contend that the key criterion for determining 
sample size in a phenomenological study is “the intensity of contact needed to gather 
sufficient data regarding a phenomenon or experience” (p. 56).  Wertz (2005) suggests 
that the sample size for phenomenological studies should be determined by the nature of 
the research question itself, with a single subject being appropriate for some studies.  In 
most cases, however, Wertz suggests continuing to recruit subjects until saturation – the 
point at which findings become redundant – is reached.  Polkinghorne (1989) suggests 
involving between 5 and 25 subjects for phenomenological studies, while Starks and 
Brown Trinidad (2007) report typical sample sizes between 1 and 10.   
For this study, a convenience sample of eight informants was recruited from a 
pool of approximately 50 current and former foster youth age 18 and over who were 
receiving supportive services from a mentoring and service-learning program coordinated 
by a major mid-Atlantic public university. Program participants were all attending post-
secondary educational programs through scholarships provided to foster youth by the 
state child welfare agency. Hence, subjects also reflect the eligibility requirements for the 
scholarship program, which include being up to 25 years of age, holding a high school or 
general equivalency diploma, and being admitted to an accredited post-secondary 
educational institution.  In addition, to receive the scholarship, youth must meet one of 
the following requirements regarding their involvement with the child welfare system:  





at the time of the scholarship application; (2) to have been adopted through the agency 
after age 16; (3) to have been in an agency-paid placement and in the care and custody of 
the agency for nine months or more following their 16th birthday; or (4) to have been in 
an out-of-home placement and in the care and custody of the agency for 18 cumulative 
months after age 14.  (The scholarships are also available to homeless youth who have 
resided in a transitional living program or supportive housing program for three or more 
months.  Because these youth have not been in the care and custody of the public child 
welfare agency, they were not eligible for participation in the study.) 
 Because hermeneutic phenomenology values both the lived experience and the 
informant’s reflections and meaning of the lived experience, it takes a retrospective 
approach to research.  As van Manen (1990) suggests, “A person cannot reflect on lived 
experience while living through the experience” (p. 10).  Cohen contends that the lag 
between experience and reflection requires that inquiry occur “after the experience has 
been lived” (Cohen et al., 2000, p. 57).   As a result, this study was retrospective in 
nature, allowing subjects who are age 18 or older to look back on their experiences of 
participating in decisions about their lives while they were in foster care.  
Drawing from Cohen and colleagues (2000), several advantages to conducting a 
retrospective study were identified.  First, informants had time to reflect on their 
experiences in participating in making life decisions while in foster care. Second, because 
informants had already aged out of the public child welfare system, they had completed 
all of those experiences.  Thus, the study was able to take account of changes in 





The recruitment effort involved program staff sending a recruitment flier and e-
mail to potential subjects.  A copy of the approved recruitment flier and e-mail is 
included in Appendix A. Once subjects were informed of the study, those interested in 
participating contacted the researcher directly by e-mail or telephone. 
Description of Participants 
 
 The eight former foster youth interviewed for this dissertation are participants in a 
University-sponsored program that provides support to current and former foster youth 
who receive scholarships to pursue post-secondary education.  All eight participants had 
aged out of the child welfare system in a mid-Atlantic state; their cases were closed at the 
time of the interviews.  One informant had also experienced a stay in foster care in a 
neighboring state.   
The participants included one male and seven female students, ranging in age 
from 18 to 23.  Most came to the attention of the child welfare system due to a parent’s 
substance abuse problem.  One informant entered the system when her mother died, 
while another entered the system due to domestic violence and physical abuse issues.   
Five participants were African-American and three were white.  Participants spent 




 Van Manen (1990) has identified two purposes of interviewing in hermeneutic 
phenomenology.  First, interviews provide an opportunity to collect narrative that 





understanding of that experience.   Second, interviews provide an opportunity for the 
researcher and the informant to converse about the meaning of an experience.  From this 
perspective, interview questions for this study fell within one of two categories:  (1) 
questions that elicited a description of the informant’s experience, and (2) questions that 
delved into the meaning that an informant attached to the experience.  Reflecting 
hermeneutic phenomenology’s belief that “individuals’ realities are invariably influenced 
by the world in which they live,” follow-up questions sought detail on relationships, 
interactions, and situations in which the informant’s experience was lived (Lopez & 
Willis, 2004, p. 729).   
Guided by this approach, data were collected through semi-structured, in-person 
interviews with informants.  All interviews were recorded electronically and transcribed 
verbatim for use in analysis.  The interviewer attempted to conduct interviews in a 
conversational style, using broad question that were “close to a level of experience that is 
common to everyday life” (Cohen et al., 2000, p. 64).   
 Two interviews were conducted with each informant.  The first interview, which 
typically lasted about 90 minutes, was used to solicit a description and interpretation of 
the experience. The first interview focused on five primary questions, with follow-up 
questions and probes delving more deeply into the answers.  Questions and probes 
included: 
1. Tell me about your time in foster care. 
Probes:  When did you enter foster care?  Why did you enter foster care? 





2. When and how did you become an “aging-out” youth, (meaning someone who 
was not expected to be reunited with their biological family or adopted before 
turning 18)? 
Probes:  Who told you and how? What were you told about services to 
help you transition from care?  How “aging out” was explained to you? 
3. Tell me about any experiences in which you were involved in a decision about 
your life while you were in foster care. 
Probes:  Why were you involved?  How did you get involved? What were 
your choices? Who helped you with the decision?  What choices did you 
make?  Were you preferences heard? Were your preferences honored?  
Did anyone support your preferences?  If your preferences were not 
honored, did you have any recourse?  
4. What was it like to be involved in the decision you described? 
Probes:  Did you present your preferences or did someone else? Did you 
have an opportunity to explore your choices?  How much time did you 
have to think about your decision?  How comfortable did you feel telling 
people your preferences?  How do you think adults felt about your 
preferences? 
5. What did it mean to you to become an “aging-out” youth? 
6. What did it mean to you to be involved in decisions about your life while you 





The second interview, which ranged from 45 to 90 minutes, was used to review 
transcripts from the first interview, discuss tentative findings that were formulated as 
themes, and to ask any follow-up questions on areas that needed further clarification. 
Field notes and memoranda were also be used by the researcher to track potentially 
important occurrences, themes and discussions before, during and after each interview. 
Data Management 
 
 Numerous efforts were made to manage, record and assure the quality of all data.  
All interviews were recorded electronically and transcribed verbatim after the interview.  
The researcher then listened to tape recordings while reading the transcripts to ensure 
accuracy and completeness.  Electronic and paper copies of the original transcripts were 
maintained. All analytical work was conducted using photocopies of the original 
transcripts. 
 To further ensure the quality and integrity of the data, the study utilized member-
checking, as described by Creswell (2007). This technique required the researcher to 
provide preliminary data, analyses, interpretations and conclusions to participants so they 




Reflecting the multitude of approaches to phenomenology, a variety of procedures 
are available to guide analysis to achieve the goal of developing a deeper understanding 
of the phenomena being studied (Cohen et al., 2000; Creswell, 2007; Moustakas, 1994; 





approaches, however, is the movement between “field text, constructed through the 
activities of data collection, and . . . narrative text, which is meant to convey the 
researcher’s present understanding and interpretations of the data to all other readers and 
which stands alone as the findings of a hermeneutic phenomenological study” (Cohen et 
al., 2000, p. 71).  
The hermeneutic circle provides a metaphor for understanding this process 
(Cohen et al., 2000). Analysis starts by understanding parts of the text, in relation to the 
whole text and, conversely, by examining the whole text in relation to its parts.  The 
ultimate goal of the analysis is the production of a “thick description that accurately 
captures and communicates the meaning of the lived experience for the informants being 
studied” (Cohen et al., 2000, p. 72).  Van Manen (1990) contends that these meanings are 
typically multi-dimensional and multi-layered. Starks and Brown Trinidad (2007) suggest 
that the ultimate product of a phenomenological study should allow the reader to “feel 
that she has vicariously experienced the phenomenon under study” and to “be able to 
envision herself (or someone else who has been through the experience) coming to 
similar conclusions about what it means” (p. 1376). 
Bracketing 
 
Wertz (2005) contends that the “highly empathic” nature of phenomenological 
analysis requires that the research adopt an attitude that is “free of value judgments from 
an external frame of reference and instead focuses on the meaning of the situation purely 
as it is given in the participant’s experience” (p. 172).  In this study, that objective was 





researcher suspends or holds in abeyance his or her presuppositions, biases, assumptions, 
theories, or previous experiences to see and describe the phenomenon” (Gearing, 2004, p. 
1430).  
Despite the widespread appearance of bracketing in the literature on qualitative 
methodology in general and phenomenology in particular, little consensus exists 
regarding how bracketing itself should be accomplished (Caelli, 2001; Gearing, 2004; 
LeVasseur, 2003; van Manen, 1990). Gearing (2004) offers a typology that includes six 
different models of bracketing. Rooted in the tradition of descriptive phenomenology, 
ideal or philosophical bracketing requires the researcher to hold in abeyance both internal 
and external suppositions about the phenomena of interest beginning with the 
investigation of the phenomena and ending when a pure description has been obtained.  
Within this tradition, bracketing is viewed as critical to obtaining a true and universal 
description of an experience. 
Descriptive or eidetic bracketing, according to Gearing, is rooted in the Utrecht 
school of phenomenology.  In this case, bracketing starts and ends around a specific 
phenomenon, with the researcher putting aside most (but not all) internal and external 
assumptions.  Rooted in existential phenomenology, existential bracketing begins from 
the perspective that it is impossible to set aside all internal and external suppositions 
when analyzing data from a phenomenological perspective.  This type of bracketing, 
according to Gearing, focuses on avoiding a priori theoretical exploration before 





Analytical bracketing emerges from ethnographic and grounded theory traditions 
within qualitative research and requires the researcher to set aside most personal and 
cultural/institutional assumptions regarding the phenomena under study. This model, 
however, permits the use of theoretical orientations and frameworks to guide analysis. 
Pragmatic bracketing, according to Gearing, is rooted in a variety of qualitative traditions 
and is the most open to interpretation and definition by the researcher. 
Finally, reflexive or cultural bracketing, which emerges from hermeneutics and 
phenomenology, suggests that most internal and external suppositions related to the 
phenomena cannot realistically be set aside by the researcher.  Instead, this type of 
bracketing suggests that values, cultural issues and judgments should be clearly identified 
by the researcher as part of the research process.  This identification is typically 
completed at the beginning of a study and, at times, during the analysis. 
For the purpose of this study, the researcher engaged in reflexive bracketing.  
Prior to commencing data analysis, the researcher prepared the introductory chapter of 
this dissertation, which includes a description of the genesis of this researcher’s interest 
in the topic.  The goal of preparing this statement was to identify values and cultural 
issues that may influence the analysis.  
Phenomenologists approach their work without a specific theoretical perspective 
and absent a theory-development goal (Husserl, 1969; van Manen, 1990). While this 
study includes a review of theories and perspectives that can serve as sensitizing 
frameworks, I sought to minimize the influence of theory on my analysis by postponing 





me to explore theories in the context of themes that emerged from the data itself, rather 
than beginning the study with a specific theoretical framework in mind. Finally, although 
this process is not traditionally associated with bracketing, the researcher shared 
transcripts and preliminary analyses with the informants.  The goal of this co-researcher 
model was to ensure that the subject’s experience was accurately captured with minimal 
interference from the researcher’s values, culture or beliefs. 
Initial Reading of Transcripts and Memo Preparation 
 
Hermeneutic phenomenologists suggest beginning data analysis by “immersing 
oneself in the data” (Cohen et al., 2000, p. 76).  Immersion begins during the interview 
process, as the researcher listens and considers how informants describe a particular 
experience.  This phase continues as transcripts are prepared and reviewed for accuracy.  
Hence, data analysis for the proposed study began with careful listening during 
interviews, followed by focused reviews of audiotapes and/or transcripts.  
Memoranda related to potential themes, interview experiences, and context were 
prepared immediately after the interviews were conducted and again when the transcripts 
were transcribed and read. 
Thematic Analysis 
 
Although there are multiple ways of analyzing data within the hermeneutic 
phenomenology tradition, thematic analysis was used for this study. In phenomenology, 
thematic analysis focuses on understanding the “structures of experience” (van Manen, 
1990, p. 79). From the verbatim transcripts, the researcher began thematic analysis with 





A challenge to this process is balancing “the line-by-line coding necessary for thematic 
analysis with reduced chance of being overly reductionist and losing sight of the meaning 
of the whole encounter” (Cohen et al., 2000, p. 76).   
According to van Manen, thematic analysis –identifying themes that comprise 
complex experiences – provides order and control to the analysis and writing process.  
Themes, in van Manen’s view, extend beyond mere generalizations and serve as “knots 
in the webs of our experiences, around which certain lived experiences are spun and then 
lived through as a meaningful whole” (van Manen, 1990, p. 90).  
Van Manen (1990) suggests three approaches to isolating themes during 
phenomenological data analysis.  First, van Manen describes a wholistic or sententious 
approach in which the researcher examines the field text as a whole and attempts to 
identify phrases that capture the document’s fundamental meaning or significance.  Those 
phrases, which can come directly from the text or be constructed by the researcher, 
summarize the experience based on the entire field text. 
A second approach to thematic analysis is van Manen’s “selective” or 
“highlighting” approach.  This approach requires the researcher to listen to or reread a 
field text several times with the goal of identifying statements or phrases that appear 
essential and/or revealing about the phenomenon.  Finally, van Manen suggests a detailed 
or line-by-line approach to analysis during which the researcher examines every single 
sentence (or sentence cluster) to determine what that component reveals about the 





In this study, the researcher primarily followed van Manen’s selective approach, 
but also utilized the line-by-line and wholistic approaches as appropriate. In light of the 
concern expressed by phenomenologists over the need to find balance between small 
details and the big picture when analyzing data for a phenomenological study, the use of 
highlighting as the principal approach, backstopped by the line-by-line and wholistic 
approaches, was helpful in drawing broad conclusions based on the entire field text and 
identifying discrete and specific themes through close textual analysis.  
Identifying the Essence of the Experience 
 
Once essential themes were identified, the researcher distinguished between 
incidental and essential themes. Van Manen suggests that a researcher can accomplish 
this task by asking: “Is this phenomenon still the same if we imaginatively change or 
delete this theme from the phenomenon?” (van Manen, 1990, p. 107).  Many researchers 
describe this phase as requiring quiet contemplation and withdrawal by the researcher to 
gain insight and understanding into meanings (Patton, 2002; Cohen et al., 2000).  Once 
essential themes were identified, original transcripts were again reviewed to identify 
exemplars that could illustrate essential themes. 
Creating the Phenomenological Text 
 
Hermeneutic phenomenologists consider writing to be a critical part of the data 
analysis process. The ultimate goal of such analysis, according to van Manen (1990), is 
the creation of a phenomenological text. Cohen, Kahn and Steeves (2000) have 





phenomenological text facilitate the identification, comparison and understanding of 
themes.   
For this study, the process of preparing the phenomenological text – moving 
between field text and constructed narrative – was utilized as a key component of data 
analysis. Transcripts were analyzed first for each individual respondent, and then across 
individuals.  Cross-case analysis focused on identifying the common themes of the 
experience and then developing a synthesized understanding of the experience in 
narrative form.  
Ensuring Quality 
 
 The process for assessing quality in qualitative research studies is less clearly 
defined than in quantitative research, where validity, reliability and generalizability can 
be evaluated through research design, measures, sampling strategies and statistical 
techniques (Armour, Rivaux & Bell, 2009).  Criteriologists in the qualitative tradition 
suggest considering issues such as length of field engagement, peer review and debriefing 
practices, clarification of researcher bias and member checking as techniques that can be 
utilized to ensure quality throughout the research process (Creswell, 2007).  Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) suggest that qualitative research may be assessed by focusing on concepts 
such as credibility, transferability, dependability and trustworthiness.  
 Others scholars have suggested that diverse approaches to qualitative inquiry 
require diverse approaches to quality assessment. Patton (2002) has offered five sets of 
criteria for evaluating qualitative research: traditional scientific research criteria 





subjectivity, trustworthiness, authenticity, reflexivity, contribution to dialogue), artistic 
and evocative criteria (creativity, aesthetic quality, interpretive vitality, stimulation), 
critical change criteria (critical perspective, whether change-making strategies are 
identified, whether historical and values context are clear) and pragmatic criteria (utility, 
feasibility, accuracy, contribution to program improvements). 
 Holloway and Todres (2003) have posited that the evaluation of qualitative 
research should include an examination of the extent to which the researchers 
consistently and coherently reflect the underlying values and goals of their specific 
approach. In phenomenological studies, Holloway and Todres (2003) contend that the 
primary “knowledge claim” is the description of “transferable general qualities (essences) 
of what makes the experience what it is” (p. 349).  Similarly, grounded theory studies 
would be assessed based on the extent to which they result in a plausible explanatory 
model that can be tested in the future.  The assessment standard for ethnographies, 
according to Holloway and Todres, would be the extent to which they successfully create 
knowledge about people within a setting or situation. 
 Several efforts were made to ensure a credible, quality product at the completion 
of this study.  First, the researcher strived to develop research methods that reflect the 
spirit of phenomenology and are based on work by phenomenologists in other disciplines.  
Adhering to these procedures helped to establish rigor in the study and, relatedly, assisted 
in supporting the authenticity of the findings within the selected qualitative tradition.  
Second, the final product included a critical assessment of subjectivity that may result 





of consumer participation in social work practice decisions.  This section was written 
before data analysis began and was referred to on a regular basis so that the researcher 
could remain alert to such influences throughout the research and data analysis process.  
Third, data analysis was documented in a manner that provides a clear record of 
movement from original transcriptions to interpretive text.  Finally, member checking – 
having informants review the interpretive texts resulting from their individual interviews 
for accuracy and completeness – was utilized to ensure that the study findings accurately 
captured their experiences of participating in decisions about their lives while in care, the 
primary goal of this phenomenological study. 
Role Management Issues and Strategies 
 
 Reflecting the belief prevalent in qualitative inquiry that the researcher and the 
subject are inextricably intertwined, role management issues and strategies were defined 
and considered prior to the commencement of the study.  One such issue was the 
possibility that some informants would be struggling with life problems typical to the 
aged-out population, such as housing instability, unemployment and social isolation. For 
a researcher within the social work field, that fact could raise ethical dilemmas about 
balancing the roles of researcher and social worker in such cases.  To address such 
situations, the investigator planned to refer informants to appropriate community-based 
agencies that provide “after-care” services for youth who have exited the foster care 
system.  One informant requested referral information for a sibling, which was provided.  
Because informants served as co-researchers in the project and reviewed the 





manage any role issues surrounding potential conflicts in interpretation.  Specifically, 
because no identifying information would be reported on informants, final decisions 
about interpretation and analysis remained the province of the researcher.  In the process 
of carrying out the study, all eight informants were provided with thematic analysis 
resulting from their initial interviews and all eight reported that the themes captured their 
experience and feelings. 
Ethical Issues and Protection of Human Subjects 
 
 The study was submitted to both the Columbia University Institutional Review 
Board and the Rutgers University Institutional Review Board for review.  Columbia 
University’s Institutional Review Board approved the study on February 24, 2010, with a 
continuing review approved on January 16, 2011 (see Appendix B).  The Rutgers 
University Institutional Review Board approved the study on October 29, 2010 (see 
Appendix C).  
 Participation in the study was voluntary and the identity of each participant was 
kept confidential.  All informants received and signed consent forms prior to being 
interviewed (see Appendix D).  The forms included consent to participate in the 
interview, as well as consent to have the interview audio-recorded. Given the challenges 
faced by many youth who age-out of foster care, referrals were available for any 
informant who demonstrated distress during the interview or who asked for information 
about available services (see Appendix E).  None of the informants became distressed 
during the interviews.  One informant requested referral information for a sibling, which 





Informants were each paid $100 for participating in the study.  Subjects received 
$50 in cash at the completion of each of the two interviews.  Compensation was provided 
because informants would not receive any other direct benefit for volunteering 
approximately four hours of their time.   
 Each informant was assigned a unique case identifier that was linked to all the 
digital recordings and transcriptions for that informant.  Only the researcher could link 
the identifier with a particular informant.  All files, both electronic and hard copies, were 




This chapter described the research methods used in this study.  First, the 
rationale for selecting a qualitative approach to inquiry was discussed.  Next, hermeneutic 
phenomenology, the qualitative methodology used in this study, was described.  Finally, 





CHAPTER 6: LIVED EXPERIENCES 
 
Introduction and Plan for the Chapter 
 
 This chapter begins the process of presenting the data collected through individual 
interviews with the eight former foster youth who participated in this study.  The goal of 
this chapter is to provide a rich description of the life experiences of these youth, with 
particular attention to their experiences participating in decisions about their lives while 
in out-of-home care.  
 Reflecting the goal of phenomenological research, this chapter draws on “other 
people’s experiences and their reflections on their experiences in order to better be able to 
come to an understanding of the deeper meaning or significance of an aspect of human 
experience, in the context of the whole of human experience” (van Manen, 1990, p. 62).  
  Each vignette begins with a brief description of the subject, followed by an 
account of the subject’s experiences in foster care. 4  Next, specific opportunities in which 
the subjects participated in decisions about their lives are described, along with their 
reflections about the meaning of such experiences. 
                                                 
4 The names of the youth who were interviewed for this study were changed to protect 
their privacy. In some cases, the young person selected the name by which they are 






The Lived Experiences of Patrice 
 
 Patrice is a 23-year-old African-American woman who lives on her own in a mid-
sized central New Jersey city.  She works about 30 hours each week as a medical office 
assistant and takes classes at night toward a nursing degree.  
Foster Care Experiences 
 
 Patrice entered foster care when she was 11 years old.  Her mother was addicted 
to cocaine and unable to provide a stable living environment.  Although Patrice doesn’t 
remember a particular incident that led to her involvement with the child welfare system, 
she vividly recalls being removed from her mother’s care with no other place to go: 
They didn’t have no home for me. They had this 24-hour 
hotline. Kids with their clothes packed and I’m in this room 
with DYFS [the state child welfare agency] making calls 
looking for foster parents for me.  It was just a horrible 
experience. 
 
   Patrice’s first out-of-home placement was with a foster family in Newark, New 
Jersey – about 10 miles away from where she had lived with her mother. Patrice said that 
her first foster mother physically abused her.  Although she reported the abuse to her 
caseworker, Patrice felt that her caseworker did not take her claims seriously.  
It all started in Newark.  It wasn’t very nice.  Actually it 
was kind of like a bunch of physical abuse that she did to 
me.  And it was ignored by DYFS . . . they didn’t want to 
find me another placement so I felt like they just ignored 
me . . . and didn’t believe it. I was pretty young so my word 
against my foster parent was not important or wasn’t good 
enough, you know. 
 
 Patrice left that first foster home within six months.  After bouncing from one 





period, lived at a shelter.  Patrice admits that her placement instability was due, at least in 
part, to her habit of acting out if she wasn’t happy with her living arrangement.  
I’ve been in placement after placement because if I was 
uncomfortable somewhere I would always act out to leave, 
especially if I’m not safe.  If it wasn’t clean, I wouldn’t stay 
there.  I was in placement in like 11 homes. 
 
 Whether she was living with a family or in a congregate care setting, Patrice did 
not feel connected with others while she was in out-of-home care.  In fact, she admits that 
she purposefully maintained an emotional distance from others.  “It was just basically I 
was there, going to school,” Patrice explains. “I always kept my distance because I knew 
they were strangers. So I kept to myself.”  The one exception was a foster mother whom 
Patrice still maintains contact. 
 Patrice recalls often feeling embarrassed by her status as a foster child.  In 
particular, she felt ashamed when her caseworker would come to her school to meet with 
her or take her to visit her mother.   
I was always embarrassed by that whole coming in school 
and kids knowing that I’m being picked up in this vehicle 
that says ‘State of New Jersey’ on it.  Everyone knew what 







Leaving Foster Care 
 
 When she was 17 and living in a group home, Patrice recalls meeting once with 
the “skills man” who talked with her about aging out of care.  She remembers talking 
with him about opening a bank account and her plans for the future. Although she looked 
forward to leaving the child welfare system, Patrice also was frightened at the prospect of 
living own her own:  “It was frightening. I wasn’t prepared to . . . it was too fast. Too 
fast. I knew I was growing up but to actually be 18 – to me I was still a kid. What am I 
going to do?” 
 When Patrice turned 18, she moved in with her older sister, who was in her mid-
20s and caring for two toddlers.  Because Patrice was still in high school when she turned 
18, her sister received a stipend to cover Patrice’s room, board and other expenses. 
Patrice lived with her sister until she graduated from high school several months later.  
Shortly thereafter, following several clashes with her sister, Patrice left her sister’s 
residence to move in with a friend. 
 Patrice estimates that she has lived in about a dozen places throughout New 
Jersey since leaving foster care five years ago.  She spent several months with a former 
foster family from whom she rented her previous bedroom.  Patrice also rented rooms 
and stayed with friends for short periods.  Despite her housing instability, Patrice is proud 
that she’s never had spend time in a shelter since leaving foster care. 
 Patrice currently lives in a one-room basement apartment.  She has a microwave, 
hot plate, and mini-refrigerator in her own room but shares the bathroom with another 





apartment” even if it is requires living with a roommate:  “I know where I live now is just 
a first step but it’s just so depressing,” Patrice says. “It’s dark and dingy. There’s no light.  
I don’t like being there – it just makes me feel so alone.   
 In high school, Patrice learned that she was eligible to receive a scholarship to 
pursue post-secondary studies through the New Jersey Foster Scholars Program.  Patrice 
decided to enroll in a private vocational school and graduated three months later, having 
completed a training course to become a medical office assistant. Although the school she 
attended had promised to provide support in searching for a job, Patrice struggled to find 
full-time work in the field.  She was offered only part-time or temporary positions, the 
longest of which lasted about six months.  
 Patrice enjoyed the work, particularly interacting with the patients.  She struggled, 
however, to develop relationships with her co-workers.  Looking back, Patrice thinks that 
she may have had difficulty because she tended to isolate herself from others, preferring 
not to share too much personal information with anyone at her workplace.  She feels that 
her co-workers often misinterpreted her social hesitancy as conceit. 
I kept to myself.  I didn’t socialize. I just didn’t want to 
have to answer a whole lot of questions about my life.  I 
didn’t want them to know that I had been in DYFS.  I 
didn’t want them to know that my family was a mess.  I 
thought that if they knew those things, they would think I 
was a bad person – that there was something wrong with 
me.  So I just wouldn’t talk to anyone. 
 
 When she was 21, Patrice reapplied to the scholarship program and enrolled in a 
local community college on a part-time basis to pursue a nursing degree. She has found 





completing remedial requirements.   Because she must work to pay her living expenses, 
Patrice typically limits herself to one or two classes each semester.  Nonetheless, she 
considers the scholarship program to be “the only good thing” about having been in foster 
care. 
 Patrice is alternately proud of, and disheartened by, her achievements since 
leaving foster care.  On one hand, she feels a sense of achievement in having a job, taking 
classes and recently purchasing a car.  On the other hand, Patrice expected that she would 
have been more settled by now:  “I’m still trying but today it’s so hard to get ahead. Life 
has so much stuff.  If you’re not stable, everything just has to stop.” 
Making Decisions While in Care 
 
 Patrice recalls having few opportunities to be involved in decisions about her life 
while in foster care.  She never attended a court proceeding and cannot recall ever having 
met with a law guardian or Court-Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) volunteer.   
Patrice described a few instances in which she was asked about her placement 
preferences. When she was leaving one of her early foster homes, for example, her 
caseworker expressed frustration over the failed placement and asked Patrice where she 
wanted to live. 
I told ‘em ‘I don’t want to be here’.  They always say, ‘So 
where do you want to go?’  I say ‘Home.’ That was never 
an option.  They’d say, ‘This is all we have for you, you 
have to accept it for now.  Until you get 18 then you make 
your own decisions.’  So that’s how it was. 
 
 She also remembers being presented with two different residential options when 





to live with her older sister or could join a transitional living program which Patrice 
described as “a place for kids who have nowhere to go when they age out.”   
 Patrice identified trade-offs that each option would require.  She thought the 
transitional living program would enable her to be with other youth in the same situation, 
as well as remain in the same high school.  But she bristled at the rules and regulations:  
“I was like no – I’ll still feel like I’m in DYFS.  It was timed, it was supervised. So I still 
feel like it was jail incorporated.” 
 Patrice presented a third option to her caseworker: getting her own apartment.  
Patrice was concerned that her sister was already overwhelmed with raising two small 
children as a single mother.  Space was also an issue.  “I knew my sister’s life wasn’t 
right,” Patrice explains. “So I asked if it was possible if they could have me in an 
apartment or something.”  Ultimately, Patrice said she felt pushed by her caseworker to 
live with her sister. 
She [the caseworker] had no sympathy.  She was just doing 
her job.  She said, ‘If I was you Patrice, that would be my 
best first option, to go home.’ It wasn’t organized with my 
sister either but I just decided to go there. To be out of 
DYFS’ care. 
 
 Patrice describes her experiences participating in decisions about her life while in 
foster care as dehumanizing: 
Throughout the whole journey with DYFS it wasn’t what I 
said, it was what was easy for their jobs. I was like a client 
to them. I wasn’t a human being that have decisions or 
make decisions and have a voice. I had always had this 
judge that talks for me or someone else talking for me. 






She admits that many times she just went along with what her caseworker 
recommended: 
I just settled. I was never the type to try to put up a fight. 
You know…okay.  I’m out of DYFS, I’ll go with my sister.  
And I always was smart and I was aware of things but I just 
didn’t open my mouth. I knew they were just putting me 
somewhere to get me off of their schedule. ‘Okay – this is a 
done case.’ 
 
 Looking back, Patrice resents the indifference with which her caseworkers 
approached the important decisions about her life.  She wishes that they had cared more 
about her present and future life: 
I just felt that anyone who was a part of DYFS just didn’t 
have no sympathy for how my life went. It was like a 
project they had to do.  It should have been more hands on. 
It’s like the only time that they would have more to say is 
when something bad happened. They wasn’t too much into 
my wellbeing and how I would turn up. They wasn’t too 
much into service.  
 
Patrice thinks that being more involved in decisions about her life might have 
enabled her to be more assertive in her interpersonal relationships: 
Um, if I would have had those decisions I think I would 
have been a little bit more . . . Like . . . I don’t know. I’m so 
timid sometimes. Like I know I can do it but I’m so 
worried about what other people are going to say all the 
time. That had a lot to do with that.  People in my life too, 
not allowing them a chance to get to know me. It could be a 
friend, a boyfriend, whoever, someone I just met. I’m very 
short with that. 
 
 She also believes that “there’s not enough money, not enough resources and not 





The Lived Experiences of Angelina 
 
 Angelina is a 23-year-old white woman who lives in Northeastern New Jersey.  
She recently received her bachelor’s degree in psychology from a state university and 
will soon begin working toward a master’s degree in counseling.  She lives with her 
fiancé in a condominium that they recently purchased together.  She hopes to be a 
counselor for children when she has completed her studies. 
Foster Care Experiences 
 
 Angelina entered foster care when she was about 11 years old.  Her mother, who 
has been incarcerated since Angelina was a toddler, terminated her custody rights before 
entering prison.  Angelina’s father, a long distance truck driver, signed over guardianship 
of his daughter to his mother (Angelina’s grandmother) because he was often away from 
home for extended periods of time.  Angelina describes the arrangement as largely a 
matter of convenience: 
This was just him signing over custody so she could sign 
my school papers and, you know, things that I needed. 
When he came back [from road trips], you know, we all 
lived in the same house. 
 
 During her elementary school years, Angelina’s father developed a substance 
abuse problem, which led to job instability and eventually foreclosure on their home.  
The state child welfare agency became involved with Angelina’s family when her 
grandmother became seriously ill and was no longer able to care for Angelina and her 
younger sister.  Concerned that their father could not care for the girls adequately, 





 Angelina and her sister were immediately placed in foster care, with their father’s 
girlfriend serving as their foster mother.  Because of her father’s substance abuse 
problem, he was allowed only minimal supervised contact with his daughters.  
Nonetheless, at times he “practically lived” with the girls and their foster mother: 
DYFS, like I said, they come in and out whenever. And 
very rarely do they actually come in. So it was like there 
were times when he would stay with us for months on end 
and they had no idea about it. 
 
 Angelina considers herself to be “a very lucky case” because she liked her foster 
mother and was able to live in one placement her entire time in foster care.  
 Despite her satisfaction with her foster care placement, Angelina has many 
complaints about her experiences with the child welfare system. She contends that the 
agency’s involvement brought a disruptive influence to what was otherwise a stable 
living environment for both children.  As an example, Angelina cites an example an 
instance in which a child welfare worker threatened to disqualify her father’s girlfriend as 
a foster parent because she left 15-year-old Angelina home alone while she was at work: 
Just the drama of them [the child welfare agency], like, 
they would literally call my dad’s girlfriend and she would 
be at work and at this point, I’m 15 years old. You know, 
I’m not grown up, but I’m grown up enough that I can be in 
the house by myself without you calling the police and, you 
know, the DYFS worker would tell me on the phone, well, 
if you don’t get your dad’s girlfriend on the phone right 
now, we’re going to have cops come there today and come 
and take you out of the home. And I would call my dad’s 
girlfriend and she’d be like, ‘I just talked to this woman an 







 Such conflicts were frightening for Angelina, who feared that her father’s 
girlfriend – a foster mother she liked – would become fed up with the agency’s intrusions 
and demands and would give up on being a foster parent.  Increasingly, Angelina came to 
view the child welfare system as more interested in causing angst and turmoil for her 
foster mother than in protecting her and her sister:    
They would make her [Angelina’s foster mother] go to 
these parenting classes. She left one of the meetings 15 
minutes early so they called and threatened to take us away. 
I mean, she [the foster mother] really did bend over 
backwards for DYFS and they continued to mess with her 
and always threatened to take us away over the silliest 
things.   
 
 Angelina also resented what she felt was the condescending manner in which 
caseworkers treated her family.  She feels that these attitudes precluded the development 
of a productive relationship between the child welfare system and her family:  
I didn’t like any of their attitudes. They treated us like we 
were crap, like we were below them. It was the attitude 
they all had and I remember this one lady – I could not 
stand this lady. She just came in like she was a millionaire 
and we were peasants and she was better than us.  She 
talked to us like such garbage to the point where I didn’t 
even deal with her. I even called her supervisor on her a 
couple of times saying ‘Hey, keep this woman away from 
me because she’s a terrible, terrible person. I will never 
give her any information whatsoever and I don’t want her 
in our home at all.’ 
 
 By high school, Angelina went out of her way to avoid the child welfare agency 
as much as she could:  “I just kept to myself and went to school.”  She began working in 





I worked crazy hours. At 13, I was working way too much. 
But it was a pizzeria so it was off the books. Nobody knew, 
you know what I mean, and that’s kind of how I focused on 
something other than just DYFS. 
 
 Her efforts to “hide” from the system often were foiled by caseworkers who 
would show up without warning at her job or her school. These surprise visits angered 
Angelina because they often forced her to share information with others that she would 
have preferred to keep private. 
They [DYFS] would come. They would wear these big 
nametags. Everybody knew exactly who they were and 
then I would have to sit there and tell my boss, ‘You know, 
listen, I need to take a break. This is an important meeting.’ 
Nine times out of ten they [Angelina’s supervisor] would 
ask ‘Well, what’s it about?’ and then you have to go into 
the whole story – that my parents are a mess and I’m 
involved in DYFS.  And even when they would come to 
school, you know, they would come to school and they’d 
pull me out of classes sometimes and everybody knew 
exactly who they were. They wear these big nametags, like, 
you know they’re a DYFS worker.  It was ridiculous, 
absolutely ridiculous and mortifying. Everybody in my 
school knew that I was in DYFS. 
 
 When she did meet with her caseworker, Angelina always approached the 
conversation guardedly. “It gets to the point where you are afraid to say anything,” she 
explained. “You feel like anything that you say is going to be misinterpreted and used 
against you.” 
 Angelina feels that the agency could have closed her family’s case much more 
quickly by allowing her father’s girlfriend to assume permanent, legal guardianship of 
both children: 
I think it was kind of like a good day for them [DYFS] 





some of the cases are terrible – so it had to be like a breath 
of fresh air when they visited us because our case wasn’t 
that bad.  We were being taken care of. Everything was 
fine.  You know, DYFS was just prolonging it for 
absolutely no reason.  The case could have been closed 
years before it actually was. 
 
Leaving Foster Care 
 
 By her senior year of high school, Angelina had grown tired of dealing with what 
she calls “DYFS family drama” and moved into her own apartment, even though her case 
was still open with the child welfare agency.  She was 17.  Her friend’s mother – whom 
Angelina describes as ‘the best woman ever’ – co-signed the lease and allowed Angelina 
to put the utilities in her name.  “DYFS didn’t even know I wasn’t living there [with her 
foster mother],” Angelina says. “At 17 years old, in all honesty, should I have had an 
apartment? No. Should I have been on my own? No, but they didn’t even know.” 
 Angelina’s case was closed with little fanfare when she reached age 18.  She 
doesn’t remember much about her case closing:  “My experience with DYFS was terrible 
so I couldn’t wait to turn 18 because I knew I was an adult. I knew they would no longer 
have control over me. I knew that the gig was up at that point.” 
 Angelina doesn’t recall discussing aging out of care with anyone, and, in fact, 
doesn’t remember seeing her caseworker at all after reaching age 16. Angelina was never 
offered independent living skills training and doesn’t recall having a transition plan. 
Nonetheless, she felt that she was ready to live on her own partly because growing up in 





I grew up very fast. I don’t want to say that I was an adult 
at 13, but when you think of somebody who moved out at 
17, you’re pretty much an adult at 13, which I know is 
crazy to most people because most people grew up in a 
loving household think back to it they’re like, well, I was 
still playing with Barbie’s at 13 . . . I wasn’t. I was 
basically an adult at that point and so I was making adult 
decisions and seeing things in a different way than a typical 
child.   
 
 The lack of transition planning had some negative consequences, however.  
Angelina’s caseworker never informed her that she was eligible for the New Jersey 
Foster Scholars Program, which provides post-secondary scholarships to former foster 
youth. The caseworker also failed to help Angelina take advantage of a Medicaid 
extension program that would have provided her with health care insurance through age 
21. While she was eventually connected with the foster care scholarship program through 
a high school guidance counselor, Angelina has never obtained the health insurance for 
which she should have been eligible. 
 After graduating from high school, Angelina enrolled in a state university, where 
she studied psychology. She continued to live in her apartment and commuted to the 
campus, which was about 20 minutes away.  She worked a variety of part-time jobs to 
pay her rent and other living expenses:  “I’m not going to lie to you – it was really hard,” 
she explains. “I know what it’s like to be dead-tired – from working and studying and 
dealing with everything you have to deal with when you are on your own.” 
 Angelina sees her sister and foster mother regularly and even visits with her father 





however, and looks forward to having children of her own.  The two recently purchased a 
townhouse together and plan to marry next spring. 
Making Decisions in Care 
 
 Angelina recalls few opportunities to be involved in major decisions about her life 
while in the child welfare system.  In general, she felt she had little control over most 
aspects of her life: 
As a child, I had no control over anything. I mean they 
were adults and on top of that, they were the state, so I had 
no control over what they did.  I had to just listen to it and 
put up with it.  It was like I wasn’t even a person. It was 




 Angelina hypothesizes that her lack of involvement in decision making may have 
stemmed from the fact that she rarely saw her caseworker: 
I don’t know how I could have been involved in any 
decisions – they really didn’t show up much to be honest.  
All throughout – you know, growing up and being involved 
with them [DYFS], I probably talked to them one-on-one, 
face-to-face maybe seven or eight times in all those years. 
Even when I was little, they didn’t care enough about me to 
even talk to me. 
 
 Angelina recalls having a CASA volunteer when she first entered the child 
welfare system.  The CASA worker met with Angelina regularly and “represented” her in 
court proceedings when she first entered foster care:   
They would come, talk to us and take us out to lunch and, 
you know, ask how are we doing, how’s everything and 
they actually had much more of an impact and much more 
one-one-one with us than the DYFS workers ever did.  It 





very comfortable. And they would actually go to court as 
well. I mean, I was too young. I didn’t go to court. But I 
know they went to court on our behalf and would speak for 
us.  
 
 The CASA volunteers also were the ones who explained to Angelina what was 
going on with her case:  
I think it was a really good experience because I think they 
. . .  they actually took the time to explain what was going 
on and hear us out.  DYFS treated us like, you know, 
children.  They assumed that we have no idea what’s going 
on but in actuality, we should be the ones governing things 
because we are the ones that know what’s going on, you 
know? 
 
 Over time, however, the visits diminished and the original CASA volunteer was 
replaced: “Eventually they just disappeared and we didn’t talk to them anymore.” 
 Angelina doesn’t recall ever meeting a law guardian or even knowing if one was 
assigned to her case. Although she knew her father and foster mother sometimes were 
required to appear in court for her child welfare case, Angelina was never invited to 
attend a court proceeding.  
I knew what was going on, they [CASA] explained to me 
there would be a court date, you know, you couldn’t see 
your father until this day. I knew that was the day they 
were going to court to straighten everything out. But it’s 
really all I knew. I didn’t really know the details. 
 
 Although she would have “definitely wanted to be in court if something would 
have gone down and they would have taken me out of my home or something,” Angelina 
preferred not to be bothered: 
I was so focused on just really doing my own thing – 





change, I’d rather just go to school and work.  I didn’t want 
to have to deal with it.  
 
 Angelina did not try to be more involved in decisions about her life while she was 
in care, in part because she wanted to avoid contacts with DYFS, but also because she 
was satisfied with the decisions that were made:  
If I didn’t like the decisions they were making about my 
life – if they tried to change my foster home, if they 
separated me and my sister – you can bet I would have 
made a stink about that. But I was fairly happy with the 
way things were and I didn’t want to rock the boat. I didn’t 
have much but I had too much to lose. 
 
 She cites visitation arrangements with her father as one example of a case 
decision with which she was satisfied: 
They were very strict about my father not being any part of 
our lives at all, not being around us at all.  I had to agree 
with that. I mean, at that point, I will be honest, my father 
was a mess and visitation probably shouldn’t have been an 
option. 
 
 Angelina wishes that she could have had more influence in setting the boundaries 
for her relationship with the child welfare system. For example, she wishes that she and 
her caseworker could have agreed on a regular meeting place and time and kept to an 
agreed-upon schedule: 
It was never my choice. It was always demanded of me to 
be in certain areas, and I know I was very rebellious so I’ve 
told a lot of them off.  Like, you know, ‘This is my life. I’m 
working. This is not my problem that you people can’t get 
it together so I’m not going to sit here and stop my life to 
go for a meeting that I know you’re not really going to 
make.’  And if they really felt it was necessary to see me, 
they would come down to my job, which was completely 





lose my job just because they might come once every 
month, you know? 
 
 Angelina also suggested that child welfare workers should give children some 
choice over how much information they receive, for example, by waiting for children to 
ask questions about their case rather than indiscriminately sharing details that the children 
may not be ready to know.  As an example, Angelina described being shocked when a 
caseworker presented her with the details of her father’s substance abuse problems 
shortly after she entered the system at age 11: 
My grandma had tried to hide everything that was going on 
with my father. I found out everything through the DYFS 
worker. I was 11 years old and she just came straight out 
and told me that my father was no longer in the house 
because he was a heroin addict. Then she just left. I had to 
go to my grandmother and my dad’s girlfriend and say, 
‘What’s going on?’ And they had to lay out what was going 
on, but I was too young to find that out. I shouldn’t have 
known that at that point. 
 
 Reflecting on her decision-making experiences while involved with the child 
welfare system, Angelina said that she felt her only real choice was “whether or not to 
cooperate” with them. 
I mean, I couldn’t control the fact that they [DYFS] were 
involved, but I could control how involved they were going 
to be. I wasn’t going to make their job easy at all. I hated it. 
And I let them know all the time. I guess that’s why they 
kind of, like, stayed away from me a little bit, because they 
knew I was giving them shit every time I saw them. 
 
 Angelina tried to exert some control by refusing to change her work or school 





frequently failed to show up for meetings, however, Angelina is not sure her efforts to 
“act out” were noticed: 
All the time they would tell me, you know, ‘You have to be 
home at this time to meet with me – We have a DYFS 
meeting’.  I would be losing work and missing time at 
school and they would never show up.  So it got to a point 
where even if they said they were showing up, I didn’t 
bother. I couldn’t care less. I knew they weren’t going to 
come, and it never became an issue, because nine times out 
of ten, the person missed the meeting anyway. 
 
 When Angelina was required to meet with her caseworker, she often refused to 
engage in conversation, preferring to give monosyllabic responses: 
I would never give them any information. Anything they 
asked, all I’m going to say is ‘no’. Everytime, no matter 
what the questions are, so you’re not getting anything out 
of me, so everything was wasting my time and yours. 
That was probably the only control I had in the situation 
was, you know, I can control not to say anything to you and 
eventually, I’m hoping you’re going to eventually go away.  
 
 Angelina admits that she enjoyed aggravating her caseworker by not cooperating 
during meetings. 
I kind of liked pissing them off.  I know they came to the 
meeting thinking that they would get all of this information 
out of me.  But I was always a jerk about it. I was like ‘No, 
you’re not getting anything today.’ 
 
 Angelina’s efforts to “control how involved [the DYFS workers] were going to 
be” eventually included challenging the agency’s procedures in handling her case: 
They would say all these things about what was going to 
happen, about what they could do. Eventually it just got to 
the point where I would say ‘Quote it from your book.  
Show it to me in writing. Let me see exactly where it says 





would never stand up in court. I just would go on and on . . 
. whatever.  Eventually they stopped messing with me. 
 
 Angelina thinks her lack of opportunity to be involved in decision making 
concerning her foster care reflected a belief that foster children are less capable or less 
competent than other children:   
There’s this stigma to being a foster kid – people think that 
because you’re in foster care there’s something wrong with 
you.  I remember they used to have this commercial on the 
radio to try to convince people to become foster parents.  
They had a bunch of foster kids talking about why they 
need more foster parents and. . . and they all sounded like 
Forest Gump. I hate to put it this way – but they sounded 
retarded. It’s a huge part of the problem – they don’t give 
foster care kids much of a chance to realize, like, we’re 
capable of a lot more. We have a lot of background and we 
have a lot of life experience that can be carried on in 
multiple aspects if we’re given the right chance. 
 
The Lived Experiences of M’Chelle 
 
 M’Chelle is a 21-year-old African-American woman and a full-time student at a 
private, urban college in Northern New Jersey.  A junior, she is studying biology and 
hopes to work as a research lab assistant after graduating.  Although her child welfare 
case is officially closed, M’Chelle continues to live with her former foster family.     
Foster Care Experiences 
 
 M’Chelle spent most of her life in foster care.  Her father died before she was 
born and her mother struggled with a chronic substance abuse problem.  Her first 
placement, at 18 months old, occurred after her younger half-brother was born addicted 
to cocaine.  M’Chelle and her brother were placed in the same foster home while an older 





 M’Chelle remembers little about those early placements:  
The only thing I remember is this:  When I was in a foster 
home, it was me and my brother. We were with this lady 
and she wanted me to call her ‘mommy’ and I wouldn’t call 
her mommy and so she wouldn’t feed me. My uncle found 
out about it and told our caseworker so I got taken out of 
there.   
 
 At this point, she and her brother were separated for a brief period but then were 
quickly placed together in a new foster home. 
 When she was eight, M’Chelle and her brother returned to live with their mother, 
who had completed substance abuse treatment and had remained clean. Although their 
child welfare case was eventually closed, M’Chelle nonetheless remembers many 
problems while living in her mother’s care: 
When we were living with my mother, it was, I mean, it 
was good at first, but then things went downhill…I had to 
take care of my little brother a lot. It got to a point where if 
he got in trouble at school or something happened at 
school, his teachers wouldn’t even call our mother. They 
would call me or they would tell me about it and I would 
do something about it or I would have to sign his work and 
stuff like that.  
 
 M’Chelle also took on many household responsibilities. She remembers sorting 
through the mail to find the monthly social security check for her dependent benefits and 
cashing it to buy food. 
If we didn’t have any money, I would, like, babysit the kids 
around there and me and my brother, you know, I would 
have money for him and myself. And a lot of people knew 
our situation so they would help us as much as they could. 
 
 On her own, M’Chelle made alternate living arrangements for herself and her 





friend but would check on her mother regularly.  She persuaded a relative to take in her 
brother.  
 M’Chelle’s informal living arrangements were successful until “something 
happened with my brother and somebody called DYFS on the people he was living with.”   
As part of the case investigation, DYFS discovered the informal living arrangements and 
took custody of both children.  M’Chelle was about 16 at the time. 
Honestly, I was upset because the way I found out – um, I 
think I was in school because I was already staying with 
them [her foster family], like I said before, but I was in 
school and they [DYFS] called, they called me because I 
was 16. I was old enough to understand what was going on, 
and they left a message on my phone. Yeah, they left a 
message on my phone, telling me to contact them. So I did. 
And I told them who I was staying with, but she [the 
caseworker] said they [DYFS] already contacted her [the 
foster mother]. So I was upset, but at the end of the day, it 
happened. But afterwards it didn’t bother me.  I knew it 
was for the best. 
 
 The family she had been living with informally agreed to foster M’Chelle and 
completed the necessary paperwork, reviews and training.  M’Chelle doesn’t recall 
seeing her caseworker at all after the placement was arranged, although she believes the 
caseworker spoke on the telephone with her foster mother once in a while.  
My caseworker, she was nice. She was good.  Well, she 
didn’t speak to me, but she would speak with who I was 
staying with. She [the foster mother] would tell me like 
‘Oh, your case worker called and asked about you’ or ‘She 
emailed me and asked about you.’ I was like ‘Oh, okay, 
that’s nice of her but I’m fine.’ 
 
M’Chelle was happy to receive as little attention from her caseworker as possible 





system. She feels strongly that there’s a stigma associated with being in foster care.  As a 
result, she prefers to hide this part of her life from all but her closest friends. M’Chelle 
explains:  
It is embarrassing because you – one, don’t want everyone 
to know your business, like, ‘Oh, she’s in DYFS’ and ‘Why 
isn’t she with her parents?’ I think they’re very judgmental 
about people in foster care. Like most people who know 
my situation are like, ‘Oh, your mother was this, your 
parents were this, your parents should have did that.’ My 
brother used to be so embarrassed, he used to come home 
and say like, ‘Oh, this person came and they told me that 
they saw mommy doing this’ and ‘They saw her getting 




While M’Chelle was in high school her mother’s parental rights were terminated 
– “she gave up.”  Nonetheless, M’Chelle continues to have some contact with her mother, 
who she believes is still using drugs: 
I still communicate with her. In fact, she called me to wish 
me a happy mother’s day if you can believe that.  I’m like, 
‘No, I don’t have a child. It’s your child. But I’ve been 
taking care of him.’ 
 
Leaving Foster Care 
 
 M’Chelle’s child welfare case closed sometime after she turned 18 – she’s not 
certain exactly when it happened. She doesn’t recall talking with anyone about preparing 
for life after foster care and she never participated in a transition planning meeting.  
M’Chelle discovered that she was eligible for the New Jersey Foster Scholars Program 





 Looking back, M’Chelle wishes she had been told more about the services 
available for aging-out youth, such as independent living programs and transitional living 
programs. “I never knew exactly how to go about doing all that,” she says. “No one told 
me a thing.” 
 In addition to attending college, M’Chelle works part-time at a local tax 
preparation office.  It’s a job that she has held for almost three years.  She started as a 
receptionist, greeting customers and scheduling appointments.  This past year the 
company trained her to complete basic tax returns. She likes the work and her co-workers 
but looks forward to graduating from college and finding a position where she can use the 
scientific training from her biology major. 
 M’Chelle continues to live with her foster family.  Despite no longer receiving a 
stipend from the state for her support, they have allowed M’Chelle to live there free of 
charge: 
They are really good people – I thought they would want 
me to leave when the money stopped coming from the state 
but they’ve let me stay. I feel guilty about it sometimes, 
like I’m being a burden on them.  But I try to help out in 
other ways – cleaning up, shoveling snow, never causing 
any problems. 
 
 Still, M’Chelle feels the precariousness of her situation acutely and worries about 
what she would do if her living situation were to change. Her brother, who has also aged 
out of foster care, continues to live with a relative and isn’t in a position to provide much 
help or support.  If she has no other option, M’Chelle would move back in with her 





It worries me a lot. Sometimes I wake up at night in a panic 
thinking about what I would do if I had to leave where I’m 
living.  I’d really have no place to go. No place. I’m really 
on my own. 
 
Overall, M’Chelle is ambivalent about her experiences in the foster care system. 
After finishing school and settling into adult life, she wants to be a foster parent: 
I think that, probably a lot of people, they use it [foster 
care] as an excuse, like ‘Oh, I’ve been through this and I’ve 
been through that.’ Everybody’s been through something.  I 
like to help people. Like, when I get older, this is what I 
want to do, too. I want to be a foster parent and stuff like 
that.   
 
M’Chelle feels that her life experiences, both in foster care and during the brief 
time she lived with her mother, helped her to develop self-confidence and resilience, 
although the process may have been a slow one:  
I feel like, well – I feel like that starts from first of all 
having some type of self confidence or something, so when 
I was younger, like I just started getting self confidence. I 
had to build that on my own. So it’s like I’m just starting to 
become more sociable, but it’s like it’s something that 
should have been started, but it’s just now starting because 
I had to build it and teach myself. It was something that 
should have been instilled in me when I was younger. 
 
She would like to see foster care focus more on providing guidance for youth and 
helping them to develop self-confidence: 
I think that most people, most kids that are in DYFS they 
don’t have a lot of guidance, or self-confidence. I think that 
plays a big role in who you are. I think it’s why a lot of 
them act out. They don’t know who they are, who they 
want to be. So – and nobody has shown them. I mean, even 
though you go in foster care, they still need you to be that 
parent they don’t have. You can’t – everybody needs some 






Making Decisions While in Care 
 
 M’Chelle remembers very little about her first experience with the child welfare 
system, which lasted from the time she was 18 months old until she was around seven.  
She cannot recall her caseworker, her foster parents, or even being removed from her 
home.  In light of her age at the time, M’Chelle would not expect to have been involved 
in any decisions about her foster care placement or other aspects of her life. 
 M’Chelle’s second stay in foster care, which began around age 16, was different.  
When decisions had to be made, she was sometimes asked about her preferences and 
readily shared them with her caseworker.  
The second time they definitely asked me what I wanted 
because I was old enough at that point. They asked me if I 
was happy. I let them know everything was okay. 
 
 One of the decisions in which M’Chelle was involved concerned where she would 
live while in care.  Because she was already living informally with the family of a school 
friend, M’Chelle told her caseworker that she wanted to stay there.  The friend’s family 
was open to becoming her foster parents and the DYFS worker was able to make the 
appropriate arrangements: 
We all sat down and had a meeting and they asked me 
whether this was where I wanted to be. I said ‘Yes.’  They 
had to inspect the house. My guardian, she had to go to 
classes, I think every weekend for a month. Somebody had 
to go to court – I think it was my mother. I’m not sure. But 
in the end it worked out – I ended up where I wanted to be. 
 
 M’Chelle felt that the greatest benefit of being involved in this decision was that it 





I wouldn’t have wanted to go anywhere else. I don’t like to 
be out of my comfort zone and where I was, I was 
comfortable. I’m not a people person, so it’s like when I’m 
comfortable with something, I’m comfortable with it. It 
meant that every day I was someplace where I felt I 
belonged, where I could be myself.  
 
 In M’Chelle’s view, by allowing her to be involved in such a critical decision, the 
child welfare system demonstrated its concern for her well-being, as well as respect for 
her as a person: 
I’m very big on respect and stuff like that.  I thought that by 
asking me my opinion, and helping me to live where I 
would feel comfortable, they were respecting me as a 
person. 
 
 M’Chelle was also asked whether she wished to attend a court hearing on the 
impending termination of her mother’s parental rights, but she declined: 
I think that’s the only reason, the only court, but I didn’t 
have to go. They asked if I wanted to – but I didn’t.  I 
didn’t have any problems with what was happening.  I 
really didn’t have anything to say. It was for the better – it 
was best for both of us. So I didn’t see any reason to go. I 
didn’t want to add extra emotions or whatever. 
 
 M’Chelle felt comfortable being involved in both decisions, largely because she 
already had experience making decisions on her own. 
I took care of myself. I took care of my little brother. So it 
was like I had to make a lot of decisions for me and him 
both.  I’d been doing that for, since I was old enough to 
understand.  Maybe like, since I was 10. 
 
 M’Chelle also acknowledges that independence and choice comes with a price.  
For example, she regrets her decision to attend the private college in Northern New 





It was my choice to come here, it was all my choice. I 
didn’t do much research on it. Like, if I could go back, I 
would not be here.  But I’m here so I’m making the best of 
it. Um, but it was 100% my choice.  I should have done 
more research on it and I should have, you know, had I 
known it was a private school, again, I wouldn’t have came 
here.  
 
 M’Chelle doesn’t recall ever meeting a law guardian.  She does remember talking 
to someone about the impending court hearing in which her mother’s parental rights were 
to be terminated: 
Maybe she was [a law guardian]. But I thought she was a 
caseworker. I did speak with somebody who came to the 
house. But I assumed she was a caseworker.  I never knew 
who the different players were – but I knew what was going 
on. 
 
M’Chelle feels that she always knew what was going on with her child welfare 
case, even though she usually had to “put it together myself.”  “As I got older,” she 
explains, “I understood more. But I definitely knew from the beginning what was going 
on.” 
She thinks it would be helpful if foster children, especially older ones, could set 
boundaries with their caseworkers about privacy and have “some type of control” over 
the extent to which their relationship with the child welfare agency is made public.  
 M’Chelle also thinks that when young people lack opportunities to have a say in 
their child welfare cases, particularly about important issues, they end up “lashing out, 
not just speaking out.”   As M’Chelle recognizes, though, the ability to speak out and 






I used to be really self-conscious. I felt like people were 
looking at me, judging me. I used to be real self-conscious, 
but now, I don’t care. I used to care a lot about what people 
thought and I used to be like I want to, I don’t want this 
person to think bad about me or they’re going to say I’m 
poor or something like that. Like, but I used to think a lot 
more about that kind of stuff but I don’t care anymore. 
 
The Lived Experiences of Jordan 
 
 Jordan is a 19-year-old African-American man who has lived in a homeless 
shelter in Newark, New Jersey for the past four months. He recently completed his GED 
and currently works two jobs.   
Foster Care Experiences 
 
 Jordan has been involved with the child welfare system “since the moment I came 
out of my mother’s womb.”  Born addicted to cocaine, he was immediately placed in 
foster care.  He doesn’t remember much about his early foster care placements except 
that, for most of the time, he lived with a family that had two other foster children.  “All I 
remember is getting spoiled,” he says. “I was the youngest in the house and I was 
everyone’s favorite. I could pretty much get whatever I wanted.” 
 Although he referred to his foster parents as “mommy” and “daddy,” Jordan 
remembers being aware, even at a young age, that his “real mother was out there 
somewhere trying to get me back.”  He was returned to live with his biological mother 
when he was about seven years old.  “I guess she did what she had to do to get me back,” 





By the time Jordan was nine years old, his mother had slipped back into hardcore 
drug use. At 12, Jordan was again involved with the child welfare system:  
Basically my mother has been in and out of jail, and has 
been struggling with addiction for the longest time. She had 
a warrant out for her arrest, and I guess she thought she 
couldn’t provide the things to take care of me anymore so 
she called DYFS.  I didn’t really care.  It wasn’t a good 
situation so I wanted to leave anyway. 
 
 Jordan’s caseworker convinced an aunt and uncle who lived nearby to take him in 
through a kinship placement. The arrangement lasted only two months. 
They were very strict and, frankly, really didn’t want to 
have me around. As soon as I broke one rule I was kicked 
out. That’s when I went to go stay with my other aunt and 
uncle.  
 
 This second kinship placement, in a rural New Jersey community, also created 
problems. His aunt and uncle were raising three biological children.  The situation was 
further complicated by his aunt’s chronic health problems: 
I was like the scapegoat, you know. I did everything around 
the house. I really messed up my school life because of it.  
My aunt had lupus and I felt bad because her husband 
really wasn’t doing anything. He worked; I mean he slept 
in, until he had to go to work. I got the kids ready for 
school, which caused me to be extremely late and miss my 
major subjects.    
 
 At age 12, Jordan felt that he was essentially raising three children, including one 
who was being treated for both bipolar and attention deficit-hyperactivity disorders. He 
resented the caretaker responsibilities and began acting out.  “I really didn’t want to be 
there at all,” he explains. “I ran away so many times. But I kept ending up back there 





 Jordan began causing trouble at school and getting into mischief around town, 
primarily stealing and fighting. He became involved with the juvenile justice system and 
was referred to receive mental health services from the state’s children’s behavioral 
health program. Although Jordan says he liked going to counseling, it did little to change 
his behavior.   
He continued to cause trouble both at home and at school.  At 14, Jordan was sent 
to a residential program for troubled youth.   
Both my DYFS case manager and my mental health worker 
decided that was where I should be. They probably talked 
to my aunt and uncle about it. But I had no idea until the 
day it happened. They just said, ‘Get your stuff together. 
You’re going away.’ 
 
 He ended up staying at the institution for about two years. The facility was 
located in southern New Jersey, more than two hours away from his aunt and uncle. 
Jordan describes the program as “a cross between a school and a lock-down facility”:  
“There were no fences but we weren’t allowed to leave and if we were to leave they 
would call the cops on us and we would get locked up.” 
Nonetheless Jordan recalls the home for troubled youth as “better than being with 
a foster family.”   He lived in a cottage with four other boys and attended school on site.  
He liked the required individual and group therapy sessions. He also worked in the waste 
management department to fulfill the program’s requirement that all residents have a job:  
 It had its ups and downs. We weren’t independent, but we 
were independent. Like, what I mean by that is, we were 







Jordan wasn’t allowed to have contact with family members while he was in the 
program – no letters, no phone calls, no visits.  He didn’t see his family once during his 
two-year stay at the facility. He filled the void by joining a gang:  “Basically, when I was 
in there I was cut off from everything; I had no family. The only family that was in there 
was the gang. I became affiliated with the gang and that still carries on with me.” 
When he was 16, Jordan was transferred to a group home in Jersey City, a place 
he describes as “crazy.”   “I had never been in the city before. I went to one of the 
baddest schools,” Jordan says. “And what happened in the school got brought back to the 
house, so it was never quiet, you were always on edge.” 
Although the program had staff on site 24-hours a day, 7-days a week, Jordan 
never felt safe there, particularly because several of his housemates were in rival gangs.  
“I couldn’t wait to get out of there,” he explains. “Finally I convinced my aunt and uncle 
to let me come back.”  
That arrangement, which began shortly before Jordan turned 18, was short-lived. 
He dropped out of high school and “didn’t look too hard for a job.”  After living with his 
aunt and uncle for a couple of months, Jordan decided to take a weekend-long trip to 
Boston with his girlfriend.  He didn’t let his aunt and uncle know about his travel plans 
and, when he returned, they asked him to leave.  Jordan spent the next couple of nights 
with his girlfriend at a hotel in northern New Jersey.  Their money quickly ran out and 





Leaving Foster Care 
 
 Although his case remained open until he turned 18, Jordan doesn’t recall seeing 
or speaking with a child welfare caseworker after age 14.  “I saw them a couple of times 
when I was in South Jersey, but then they just disappeared,” Jordan says. “I saw my case 
manager from the [state] mental health program, but not from DYFS.” 
Jordan says that nobody talked with him about aging out of foster care or his 
eligibility for services to ease that transition. He never participated in developing a 
transition plan.  
Jordan and his girlfriend, who had also been in foster care, are currently living in 
a shelter.  Shelter staff helped him to take classes and receive his general equivalency 
diploma.  He applied to the local community college and started his first class in the 
summer of 2011. 
The shelter also connected him with a workforce development program that 
helped him find work. Jordan has two jobs and is saving up to move into an apartment. 
Although he likes the shelter and can stay there until he’s 22, Jordan is hoping to be out 
on his own fairly soon.  
I plan on leaving there [the shelter] way before I’m 22.  I 
work and we don’t have to pay for anything so they save 
our money up for us. And my girlfriend also works. So I 
hope to leave there pretty soon once I have enough to get 
my own place.   
 
Other than finding an affordable apartment and leaving the shelter, Jordan’s long-





he says.  “My girlfriend wants to move to Boston. It doesn’t really matter to me. Here, 
there, it’s all the same.” 
Making Decisions While in Care 
 
 Jordan recalls having few opportunities to be involved in decisions about his life 
while he was in foster care.  He doesn’t remember having a law guardian or a CASA 
volunteer and generally didn’t feel that anyone advocated on his behalf when he was in 
care.   
Until he participated in his first interview for this research study, Jordan was 
unaware that the courts were responsible for overseeing his case and making many of the 
key decisions about his placement.  
I always thought it was my caseworker deciding all those 
things like taking me away from my mother, putting me in 
foster care, moving me around from one place to another. I 
never knew the courts had anything to do with it. 
 
He cannot recall anyone asking his opinion about any of those decisions.  
It was always, ‘This is what’s going to happen.’ I really had 
no control over my life. What made it worse was that I 
don’t think anyone else did either. Somebody was always 
just showing up saying, ‘You have to do this. You have to 
go there.’ They never had an explanation of anything. 
Never told me why.  
 
Jordan was not involved in any discussions in advance of the changes in his 
placement. “DYFS just showed up one day and drove me to the home in South Jersey.  
That was pretty much the last time they dropped me off.”  His case manager from the 
South Jersey facility drove him to the group home in Jersey City when he moved there.   
I had like one day’s notice.  I had been living there for two 





Like I’m just supposed to get up and go just because 
someone tells me to.  Who else has to move like that?  It’s 
like you’re not even a person, just some sort of thing that 
can be moved around like a book or a doll. 
 
 Jordan did receive advance notice about one other matter: the termination of his 
mother’s parental rights. He’s not sure, but he thinks the discussion occurred just before 
he moved to the residential facility in southern New Jersey. His aunt and uncle sat down 
with him and talked about why they thought it was best if his mother’s parental rights 
were terminated: 
He [Jordan’s uncle] just said that he thought it would be the 
right thing. In order for them like to fully help me and take 
care of me, he thought it would be the right thing. No one 
really asked me whether I wanted it – at that point, it didn’t 
really matter to me. It was probably for the best. At least I 
knew it was going to happen.  
 
 Jordan feels that at his later placements – with his aunt and uncle, at the facility in 
southern New Jersey, at the group home in Jersey City – he had few opportunities to 
make decisions about his everyday life.  At his aunt and uncle’s house, for example, he 
was expected to help care for their biological children. His congregate care placements 
were particularly restrictive: 
It was a very regimented life. I worked in my maintenance 
job from 6 a.m. to 8 a.m., then I went to school from 8 a.m. 
to 3:30 p.m. Twice a week we had group counseling. The 
other days we had recreation. We ate dinner, cleaned up, 
did our chore and then went to the Y for a couple of hours. 
Then when we got back from the Y, we showered and went 
to bed. Same thing, every day. 
 






Everything is based on the schedule because they felt like if 
we don’t have a schedule and structure there’s chaos. So 
everything was coordinated because they felt as though we 
tend to get in more trouble when we have free time, and the 
less free time we have the less trouble they think that we 
were going to get in. 
 
 Jordan particularly resented restrictions on cell phones and leaving the facility’s 
grounds: 
The minute we stepped off the grounds it was considered 
an AWOL, even if you walk across the street, or even if 
you step in the street.  Once you get an AWOL, you don’t 
come back, that’s when they call the cops, and you have 
three strikes – it’s like baseball game – three strikes and 
you’re out. The third strike, you’re out. They lock you up. 
 
 As a result, Jordan became adept at hiding his cell phone from program staff.  
Because of his job at the waste management department, he knew “all the best places to 
hide something.”   He believes he was able to sneak his cell phone past metal detectors by 
wrapping it in several layers of paper towels and sticking it deep into his pants. 
Chores, laundry and cooking were areas in which Jordan felt he was regularly 
allowed to make some decisions.   
If you weren’t in any kind of trouble, you got to pick your 
chore each week.  If you have laundry, you get to do your 
laundry pretty much when you want to. We were also able 
to cook for ourselves, like that’s part of the independent 
part. 
 
 While he was in care, Jordan gave little thought to being involved in decisions 
about his life. “Back then, I really didn’t care,” he says.  Looking back on his foster care 
experience today, however, he regrets not having been involved in more decisions.   
Maybe if they had given me more decisions I would’ve had 





be in a better predicament than what I am in now.  I think 
like if I would have some say when DYFS was in my life, I 
would have had more resources and more places to go to, 
financial-wise and mental-wise. ‘Cause like going through 
so much stuff when I was younger, it has left like a big toll 
on my mental health. And maybe if I would have had more 
to say about what was going on, I could have gotten 
counseling and stuff like that. 
 
The Lived Experiences of Lakesha 
 
 Lakesha is an 18-year old African American woman who lives in a suburban 
community with her former guardian and attends a local state college.  She hopes 
eventually to work in animal rescue, environmental science or as an emergency medical 
technician. 
Foster Care Experiences 
 
 Lakesha and her older sister entered foster care when they were toddlers. Her 
father died when she was eight months old.  Their mother, while high on drugs, was 
accused of shoplifting grapes from a local supermarket.  Lakesha’s mother got into a 
physical altercation with the store’s security guard and slashed him with a knife.  The 
mother ended up in jail and Lakesha and her sister ended up in the child welfare system. 
At first, they lived briefly with their grandfather.  “He was old so I understand 
why he couldn’t take two kids at a young age,” Lakesha recalls. “We were a lot.”  Next, 
they were placed with an aunt, who returned Lakesha and her sister back to DYFS when 
she decided “she didn’t want us.”  Within a few months of entering foster care and after 





 By the time she was seven years old, Lakesha estimates that she had lived in 
about eight different foster homes.  She doesn’t remember the details of all these 
placements but, looking back, she believes that most of her foster parents were motivated 
more by the stipend they received from the state for caring for the girls, rather than by a 
desire to help them:  
Most of the people we went with, it was like all about the 
money.  When DYFS wouldn’t pay that month, they’re 
like, ‘Oh, well, we don’t want them no more.’ That’s one 
thing I remember. 
 
 Other placement disruptions, she believes, were related to a chronic bed-wetting 
problem that both she and her sister experienced.  “She used to wet the bed,” Lakesha 
explains. “Then she would stop and I would start. Then I’d stop and she’d start. They 
[foster parents] just got tired of dealing with that.” 
 Lakesha and her sister were placed mostly in foster homes and typically were able 
to stay together.  Around second or third grade, however, the sisters were separated, 
although Lakesha doesn’t remember why:  “Even though I wasn’t with my sister I loved 
living there with that foster mom. I loved her. Oh my gosh, I still look for her.”  
A court hearing was scheduled to review the girls’ placements and to decide 
whether Lakesha would leave her current placement to join her sister, or whether she 
would be joined by her sister in the home where she was living.  Lakesha’s foster mother 
missed the hearing. The next day Lakesha’s caseworker showed up at the door to take her 
to her new home. 
She [the foster mother] didn’t know of a court case that we 
were supposed to go to. It was on her daughter’s birthday, 





day they [caseworker] come to the door saying that I’m 
moving out to be with my sister.  I’m like, um, ‘Why?’  I 
was confused because I was happy to be with my sister, but 
then I was sad because I didn’t want to leave her [the foster 
mother] cause I, I enjoyed staying at that house. It was 
awesome. And, like, she actually cared about me compared 
to other people, and so that was fun and nice.  I still can’t 
believe they didn’t even try to ask me what I wanted. They 
didn’t call or nothing. They just show up and take me out. 
 
 In 2001, when Lakesha was about nine years old, the sisters moved to a new 
foster home.  Her mother’s parental rights were terminated a couple of years later.  
Finally, when Lakesha was almost 17 and her sister was nearly 18, their foster mother 
agreed to take on permanent legal guardianship of both girls.  Lakesha believes the 
guardianship move was financially motivated: 
Even though we’ve been with her for a while, like, I used to 
think it was about the money. Well, in the back of my head, 
I still do because she was getting paid a lot for two 
teenagers, as well, so I think it was about that. I think the 
only reason she did the guardianship was because she 
wanted to keep getting the checks until we were twenty 
one. Otherwise we’d be getting the checks ourselves. 
 
Leaving Foster Care 
 
 Lakesha still lives with her last foster mother and guardian.  Her case was 
officially closed when the permanent legal guardianship arrangement was finalized. 
The minute those papers were signed, they [DYFS] kicked 
us out. We were like, ‘Dang – that’s harsh.’ They didn’t 
even call to check on us to see if we’re okay. Nobody come 
to our [high school] graduation. They didn’t call to say 
they’re not coming. 
 
 Lakesha did participate in some services to assist her in transitioning out of foster 





profit agency, Lakesha and her sister had a case manager from that program in addition to 
their child welfare caseworker.  When Lakesha was about 16 and her sister was a year 
older, their case manager from the foster care agency arranged for the two girls to attend 
a meeting for youth who were preparing to age out of foster care.  
One day she asked us if we’d heard about aging out and the 
programs we’re supposed to attend before we, um, actually 
turned 18.  And we’re like, ‘No.’  So she called our case 
manager from DYFS and they got it together.  We went to 
the meeting and everything at the court with the “aging-out, 
don’t miss out” program.  The judge told us so many stuff 
that was going to happen and it never did, so I was like, 
‘Forget it.’  
 
 Lakesha believes that the last-minute legal guardianship arrangement limited her 
access to independent living and transitional living programs. 
When we were in DYFS we were told that there was an 
independent living program that we could go to when we 
were done [being in care].  And then, when our case was 
closed, they just dropped half of the programs we were in 
and we didn’t receive anything.  
 
 The one service that Lakesha currently receives is a scholarship through the New 
Jersey Foster Scholars Program.  The funds cover the tuition and books for her courses at 
the state college. 
 Lakesha hopes to move into her own apartment when she turns 19 in a few 
months. 
Right now, I would love to move out but I don’t have 
sufficient funds to do so and it’s like DYFS, just, you call 
them to see what programs that are available, that’s 
available to us. It’s like they don’t call you back and when 
you call them again, they say ‘Hold on, I’ll call you back’, 
which turns into weeks.  It’s like you just give up at the end 





Making Decisions While in Care 
 
 Lakesha was involved in one very important life decision while in foster care: 
whether she and her sister would return to live with their biological mother or remain 
with the foster mother who later became their permanent legal guardian: “The only 
decision I made was if I wanted to stay with my foster mom that’s here or go back to my 
mother. That’s about it.” 
 Lakesha recalls being involved in this decision when she was in sixth grade and 
about 11 years old.  Her foster mother told Lakesha and her sister that they would be 
going to a foster care meeting, but provided no further details. A couple of days later, her 
caseworker picked both girls up at school in the middle of the day and drove them to an 
office building.  Lakesha thinks it was a courthouse in Newark.  The girls were escorted 
up to a conference room, where they found their biological mother, their foster mother, 
their younger brother (a toddler who was still living with their mother) and “some other 
people I didn’t know” waiting for them. 
I don’t remember how it was, but it was all us, all the 
sisters, them [child welfare staff], and our mom, and our 
little brother.  I think there was some lawyers there. We 
were all within the room. They were like, ‘Well, who do 
you want to live with?’  It was just like – I looked at this 
person, I looked at that person.  Look at this person, look at 
that person, and you just had to choose. 
 
 Although Lakesha wished she could talk privately with her sister about the choice 
they were being asked to make, they weren’t given that chance. 
They were doing all the talking . . . going through our 
history, talking about stuff I wasn’t paying attention to. 
Then, in the last moment, it was like ‘Now, with all that 






 Lakesha remembers feeling relieved that they asked her older sister to speak first.  
She already knew how she was going to respond: “I did just about everything with my 
sister when I was younger,” Lakesha recalls. “If she said ‘Yes,’ I was going to say ‘Yes.’  
If she said ‘No,’ I was going to say ‘No.’” 
 Lakesha’s sister told the group that she wanted to stay with her foster mother.  
Looking back, Lakesha thinks it was the right choice:   
I didn’t want to live in Newark. I didn’t want to be stressful 
to her, to make her go back to drugs.  I wasn’t sure she 
could handle both of us and my little brother [who was 
born while she was in foster care]. I didn’t want him to end 
up in foster care too. 
 
 When the meeting concluded, Lakesha and her sister were driven back to school. 
 Looking back, Lakesha feels angry about the circumstances under which she had 
to make such an important decision.  She wishes she had known in advance what was 
going to happen at that meeting so that she could have considered her options more 
carefully.  “Now that I’m older, when I think about it, like, I feel that it was our life so we 
should have been told before we got there,” Lakesha said. 
 Lakesha believes that forcing the girls to make a speedy decision about the issue 
was intentional:  
I don’t think were allowed to [talk to each other] because 
they didn’t want, like, my decision to be impaired. It was 
like a flash, like, we were in the building. We were out of 
the building. I was back at school. 
 
 She also believes that her foster mother may have been to blame for not letting 





They knew, but the thing about our foster mom, she don’t 
tell us nothing. Well, she never did. She never told us 
nothing until the day of or, like, hours before, anything that 
revolved around my mom. She likes to keep things 
secretive and like she just brought us there. She really 
didn’t tell us because it was a lot of days when it was 
cancelled, it didn’t show up, uh, she didn’t show up or 
things like that, so she never really told us anything when 
we were going. And that’s like, she used to have problems 
with the case manager who was the one who told us 
everything. 
 
 Lakesha also would have preferred to talk through her options and feelings 
without her biological or foster mother being present.  
I didn’t like that it was on the spot and you had to talk 
about it in front of everybody. I was glad they asked me my 
opinion but I thought that I should have been able to speak 
in private.  I was scared because I didn’t want to say like 
the wrong answer. Like, I didn’t want to hurt her [the foster 
mother’s] feelings because, like, every time we wanted to 
leave or see our mom, she would say, like, say – how do I 
put this? It’s like she, she’ll put us down about it, saying 
that she took care of us and she did all this for us. She took 
us here, she took us there, but then, now that I think about 
it, I felt like well, you did it, yeah, because you were 
getting money and it was paying your bills, so you had no 
choice. She [the foster mother] always claimed that she 
didn’t want us [Lakesha and her sister] to be separated 
again. And, like, I didn’t know how my [biological] mom 
felt about my decision. 
  
 Lakesha thinks she attended court two additional times. Once, she went to court 
for a review meeting and to receive a computer that she had been promised.  
It was like a checkup of what I needed to be doing in 
school and all. The judge asked me about school, what I 
wanted to do after high school. I thought it was strange 
because it was really focused on academic stuff.  They 







 Her other court visit was for a special program for aging-out youth.  
The aging out thing, that was in like a court setting, where 
it was all those kids there. We’ll they’re not kids. They 
were teenagers. Some were pregnant. Some weren’t. Some 
were hoodlums, some were decent. It was crazy.   
 
 At the event a judge spoke to the teenagers briefly and then distributed 
information about services to ease their transition to independent adulthood.  They also 
had a chance to talk a little bit about what they wanted to do with their lives in the future.   
They gave out folders with the aging out process of what 
you get, the insurance, the um, the funds if we need 
anything to make sure, school, that they’ll pay for school.  
Um, they gave us this book…it was like a comic book. 
They served us food. They told us to interact with other, 
um, well, our peers. They gave us book bags with stuff in 
it.   
 
 Lakesha recalls meeting her assigned law guardian only once, somewhere around 
ninth grade.  “I think she came just to show her face,” Lakesha says. “She was here once 
and she never called or heard from her again.”  Lakesha does not recall having a CASA 
volunteer assigned to her case. 
 While in foster care, Lakesha would have liked to receive more information about 
events and decisions that were important to her life. For example, Lakesha resents not 
being informed of her great grandfather’s death in a timely manner.  By the time she 
learned of his passing, his funeral had long been over. 
There are funerals for my family members that we were 
supposed to go to and we never knew until months, 
sometimes years later, that someone had died. Our great 
granddad died and because she [Lakesha’s foster mother] 
didn’t want us to know, we didn’t find out until two years 
later, and I was upset because that was, he was our only 





grandmother died before we were born, while my mother 
was young.  Our dad’s side, we don’t know him because he 
died when I was eight months old, so that’s that. 
 
 Looking back on her foster care experiences, Lakesha feels that her child welfare 
worker rarely talked to her directly.  Instead, the caseworker gathered information about 
Lakesha’s well being from her foster mother. 
My experience with DYFS was that they rarely ask you 
your opinion or ask you any questions except for ‘Are you 
getting beat?,’ ‘Are they feeding you?,’ ‘Are you going to 
school?’ They always used to talk to the parent, mostly. 
They were more like the parent worker than the worker for 
the child. 
 
 Lakesha thinks her caseworker and foster mother would team up to withhold 
information about important decisions from her. 
To me, the case managers were really for the [foster] 
parents. Like when the children said something or 
requested something, they will brush past us and go to our 
[foster] parents, and like, they [foster parents] really had 
the last say in our whole case. Like, I guess, because they 
[caseworkers] formed friendships and stuff and they forgot 
that they’re here for the child and not the foster parent, 
because half of the time the decisions were made just 
between them [the caseworker and the foster parent], we 
had no say or found out way after everything happened. 
 
 Lakesha also felt the caseworkers were not receptive to the ideas that she or her 
sister initiated.  She cites her sister’s desire to move to a different foster home as one 
example: 
They swore they knew what was best for you. If you told 
them what you wanted, they’d try to fight back. Like, my 
sister didn’t want to be here and they kept doing that 30 day 
notice [informing the foster parent that the child would be 
moving in 30 days]. She [Lakesha’s sister] didn’t want a 





you want to leave?  It’s a nice house. It’s a nice area.’  
They kept going around and around, beating around the 
bush, ‘Why do you want to leave? Why can’t you just stay 
here?  Why can’t you just do that?’ They obviously weren’t 
going to let her do what she wanted. 
 
 Lakesha believes that her limited participation in decisions about her life while 
she was in foster care mirrors her lack of choice about being in foster care: “Basically 
being in foster care sets the bar for you not making decisions at all because it wasn’t your 
decision to be in foster care, so that’s the whole start of it.” 
The Lived Experiences of Christina 
 
 Christina is a 19-year-old white female who lives in northern New Jersey. She 
takes classes as a part-time student at a local community college and works part time as a 
bartender.  Christina has experienced the child welfare system both as a child and as a 
parent.  Her son, who is four, is currently in foster care. Christina lives with her sister but 
hopes to move into her own apartment soon. 
Foster Care Experiences 
 
 Christina entered the child welfare system when she was about nine years old.  
Her father, a single parent, had become addicted to heroin. She remembers her first 
meeting with a DYFS worker:   
I was probably about nine when the DYFS worker had 
actually come into my school and it was – it was very 
embarrassing, because, you know, I was young, but I still 
knew and the other kids knew that it wasn’t something 
good, and that’s – I think that’s one of the things that 
actually I will never forget and that if they could, you 
know, I don’t think that that was right that they came into 





teacher knew why, but somehow it had gotten out into the 
class that, you know, that I was in that situation.  
 
 Christina was placed with a relative and saw her father infrequently.  “He was 
pretty much completely out of my life for a long time,” she explains.  Christina enjoyed 
living in the kinship care placement and refers to her foster mother as her “mom.”   
Foster care for me wasn’t a bad experience, because it was 
with someone I was comfortable with and I love.  She’s 
been there my whole life. I never at all really felt like I was 
benefitting anything from DYFS being in my life. 
 
 Satisfied with her placement, Christina felt that the case worker devoted too much 
effort to investigating her foster mother. 
My foster mom had a problem – I call her my mom – had 
had a problem and years ago, and they [DYFS] basically, 
were trying to use that against her so they could put me 
with strangers, and they tried so hard to use it against her 
and because it was so many years later they couldn’t but 
they would always bring that up.  
 
 As a result, Christina became hesitant to talk openly with her caseworker.  
Christina worried that anything she said – even positive things – could potentially be 
twisted and used to pull her from her foster home. Conversations with the caseworker 
resembled interrogations: 
Instead of them trying to help me, they were trying to pull 
things out of me. They would ask the same question, but in 
a different way to see if you answered it differently. 
Honestly, anytime I would talk to anyone, I kind of felt like 
it was them against me, or them against my caretaker.  It 
was kind of like I was getting interrogated.  I felt like they 







 Christina’s time in care was otherwise unremarkable until she became pregnant at 
age 14.  “I had my son when I was 15,” she explains.  “He was in day care so I was able 
to go back to school.  It wasn’t easy but my mom really helped me. I was doing the best I 
could.” 
 Christina’s life changed significantly when DYFS alleged that she put her son at 
risk by using drugs. 
It all started because I had gotten in trouble in school.  I 
was writing a note to my friend about smoking weed, and 
they, you know, the school drug tested me and called 
DYFS and it was just a whole big mess.  DYFS comes, 
they do an investigation, and they bring up all this stuff 
about how my father was a drug user so I was probably a 
drug user too. They were completely against me and kept 
trying to bring up my father’s drug history. They were 
trying to sabotage me. 
 
 Christina was told that if she did not enter a substance abuse treatment program 
the child welfare agency would move to have her son placed in foster care. Although she 
didn’t believe she had a substance abuse problem or needed treatment, Christina agreed 
to enroll in an intensive outpatient program.   
I messed that up. I didn’t go, because I, you know, I didn’t 
think that it was a problem. So I would, like, tell my mom 
that I was going and I just wouldn’t go.  
 
 When her DYFS case manager called the program to check up on Christina’s 
progress, the program staff told them that she wasn’t complying with treatment.  
Christina was then moved to an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. Christina 
does not recall agreeing to enter the program and believes she was “placed there by 





 Christina describes inpatient treatment as a “horrible experience.”  She was first 
placed in a facility in the southern-most portion of New Jersey, more than three hours 
away from her home. She stayed there for about three months.  Next, Christina spent five 
months at an inpatient treatment facility in northern New Jersey, followed by additional 
seven months at a program in central New Jersey. During the 15 months that she was in 
inpatient programs, her son was able to remain in the custody of Christina’s foster 
mother. “That’s the thing. They were trying to reunite me with my son, but at the same 
time I was missing all this time out of his life,” Christina says.  
 Christina says that her lack of progress in the treatment programs wasn’t due to 
continued substance abuse.  In fact, she says, various screening tests always turned out 
negative.  
It was just misbehaving and stuff. So I wasn’t going to the 
levels I should have been. Why? Because I didn’t want to 
be there, you know. It was hard for me.   
 
 She admits that she acted out intentionally because she thought that such 
behaviors would get her expelled from the program.  “I thought they would get tired of it 
and just discharge me,” she explains. “I thought they would just give me my son back.” 
I shouldn’t have been doing what I was doing, but it was 
just so ridiculous because I was in there with kids that, like, 
were way far gone and I was learning, you know, I didn’t 
know about half the stuff before I went in there . . . all I had 
done was smoke weed. And then I was learning about 
heroin and cocaine and all this crystal meth. There were 
people on all sorts of different things. I was learning about 
all these things I never knew about. 
 
 When she returned home after finally completing a treatment program, Christina 





year-old high school sophomore, Christina dropped out of school. She continued to live 
with her foster mother, who still had temporary custody of her son.  Without a high 
school diploma, Christina found it difficult to find a job.  Nonetheless, she was able to 
patch together a couple of part-time positions to provide some income for herself and her 
son. 
Leaving Foster Care 
 
 Christina does not recall attending any meetings to develop a transition plan, or 
even talking to her case worker about services that would be available to support her 
transition out of foster care.  Although she asked that her case be closed when she turned 
18, Christina feels like she has never left foster care, primarily because the child welfare 
agency continues to be involved with her son. 
 Since leaving care, Christina has completed her general equivalency diploma and 
has completed a class at a county college in northeastern New Jersey, where she lives. 
She works part-time as a bartender. She stays in touch with her foster mother, who has 
since moved to Southern New Jersey. 
 Christina’s son continues to live with her foster mother, who has legal custody of 
him.  Christina is hoping that she will be awarded custody when her case returns to court 
in a couple of months:  “I can still go back to family court, I think in three more months, 
to get custody back.  They’ll do like, I guess, a screening on me. Then I can get it 
[custody] back.” 
 One positive outcome of her son’s child welfare case is that Christina’s father, not 





addiction problems. He entered treatment and has stayed sober.  Christina says that he’s 
supported her efforts to win back her son:  “My son was born and my dad was in 
recovery – like that. Like as soon as my son was born he was like, ‘Enough is enough.’  
That’s when he got his act together.” 
Making Decisions While in Care 
 
 Christina does not remember being involved in many decisions about her life 
while in foster care. She never attended a case review meeting.  She never saw a case 
plan. She never attended a court session concerning the case in which she was the child.  
I didn’t have much say actually. I didn’t have much of a 
choice. I was young but I can’t remember them ever really 
asking me or giving me the chance to say, you know, my 
piece.   
 
 Christina says that she never asked to be involved in any decisions about her case 
while she was in foster care, primarily because that would have required a conversation 
with her caseworker. Looking back, Christina feels that if she hadn’t been so 
uncomfortable with her caseworker – constantly worrying that anything she said could be 
misinterpreted and used against her – she might have been able to improve her foster care 
experience. 
Now that I think about it, it was frustrating, especially 
because there were so many things that I could have 
probably changed if I did have the chance to express 
myself. But I didn’t.  The DYFS workers write down every 
little thing that you say and sometimes they take your 
words and they kind of mix them up a little bit and make 
them seem like something that they’re not. And I noticed 
that a couple of times. I would be like, ‘No, that’s not what 
I said.’ They’re taking my words and mixing them up –






 Christina does not recall ever meeting with a law guardian assigned to her case.  
She did have a CASA volunteer, whom she felt she could talk with comfortably and who 
showed an interest in her life.  Christina was not aware, however, that the CASA 
volunteer had been assigned to report on her case in court. 
I do vaguely remember someone coming in and talking to 
me for an hour every – I think it was two times a week.  
Basically they were asking how I like living where I was 
living, if I were being taken care of the way I should have 
been, if I was attending school regularly, you know, the 
basic things. It was kind of a little bit like counseling, parts 
of it. They would ask questions about our feelings and how 
we cope with our feelings.  
 
 Some of Christina’s frustration stems from being involved with two separate child 
welfare cases: one as a child, the other as a parent. She says she feared that not 
complying with the agency’s demands in her son’s case would leave her vulnerable to 
repercussions in her own case.  For example, she felt that if she did not agree to give 
custody to her foster mother, DYFS could possibly take custody of her son and remove 
her from the foster home in which she was comfortable. 
The DYFS worker hated me. I got past the whole rehab 
thing. And, the DYFS worker still thought that I wasn’t 
capable of taking care of him. So at that time, she was 
pushing for me to give up custody. So, you know, I finally 
did and I gave him to my mother. 
 
 Christina says she felt coerced into signing over temporary custody of her son to 
her foster mother: 
Basically, it was ‘You go or we’re taking your child.’ That 
was it. If I didn’t go they were threatening to take my son 
and not even give him to my mother. They were just going 






 Christina was particularly frustrated by her inability to advocate for herself in the 
case involving her son. 
The workers weren’t very nice. They didn’t want to hear 
my side of the story. They didn’t give me a lot of chances. 
They were constantly trying to put me into a rehab, and, 
which had me away from my child for half of his life – part 
of his life, you know, six months here, eight months there.  
It was too much, and they just – they weren’t giving me a 
chance and giving me as a minor, they weren’t giving me a 
chance to say my piece, which I didn’t feel was fair, either.  
 
 Christina believes that the child welfare workers who handled her son’s case were 
particularly tough on her because they knew she had been in foster care.  “It was kind of 
like prejudice. A stigma,” she explains. “They knew my father had been a drug user so 
they just assumed that I was one too.” 
 Christina did have a lawyer who represented her in the case involving her son.  
She felt that the lawyer in her son’s case provided (and continues to provide) helpful 
guidance that enabled her to understand the implications more clearly. 
I talk to him all the time. He helped tremendously. He was 
great. He basically just talked to me on a personal level, 
which I respected that a lot more, because he made me see 
things for what they really were.  And he didn’t talk to me 
like all the other DYFS workers. He talked to me as a 
friend and, you know, he just basically told me that this is 
your son, like this is your baby boy and if you don’t do 
right for him, if you keep messing up in these rehabs, 
they’re going to take him. And there’s really, after that, 
there’s not much that I can do for you. 
 
 Christina found the lawyer’s approach refreshing, and quite different from the one 





Instead of, ‘If you don’t do this, we’re going to take your 
kid,’ he went out of his way to explain things to me. Like, 
even when I was in the rehabs, he would come to the 
rehabs. DYFS never did that. He actually drove three hours 
to visit me and to talk to me. 
 
The Lived Experiences of Janelle 
 
 Janelle is a 21-year-old African American woman who resides in a transitional 
living program in a suburban New Jersey community.  She is taking courses toward a 
degree in respiratory therapy at a county college located about an hour from her home.   
Foster Care Experiences 
 
 Janelle was born in Newark, New Jersey.  She has three brothers, who are eight, 
nine and ten years older than herself.  All four children entered foster care when their 
mother died suddenly: 
I remember her [mother] falling out on the floor. So the 
ambulance just came and got her. So, I don’t really know 
what she died from. I wanted to go see her after she died. I 
was like, ‘I want to go see my mommy.’ But my aunty was 
like, ‘No, you can’t see her.’ I think it was because of my 
age and stuff. 
 
 The children’s father, who did not live with their mother, was an alcoholic and 
could not take them in. The three boys were placed together in non-relative foster care.  
Janelle, who was six when her mother died, was sent to live with an aunt. Health issues 
made the aunt unable to continue caring for Janelle, and soon she was also placed in non-
relative foster care. 
 Janelle doesn’t remember much about the foster homes where she stayed as a 





general, Janelle feels she has struggled to adapt to many new settings over a short period 
of time.  Homes in which there were other foster children typically required the most 
difficult adjustments: 
It was pretty hard because, like I really didn’t fit in with, 
like, the other foster children that was living there.  I really 
didn’t do that much with them, and like, every time I joined 
in, like, they would just single me out, so it was like, it was 
pretty hard for me to get to know them and stuff and spend 
time with them. 
 
 Between ages 13 and 19, Janelle lived in three different foster homes, with most 
placements lasting about two years. She blames her frequent moves on her trouble getting 
along with other foster children.  “Mostly I ended up leaving because it was not working 
out with the families,” she says. “Like either, I would get in fights with, like, you know, 
arguments, not really fights, but arguments with other foster children.” 
 While in care, Janelle had minimal contact with her three brothers.  Once they 
became adults and left the child welfare system, she lost contact with them completely.  
She also had minimal contact with her biological father: 
I rarely saw him when I was young. The year of my 
graduation I started staying in contact with them, my 
biological family, and they was telling me that my dad was 
in a nursing home, and I wanted to go see him, but my 
foster family wouldn’t let me, and then DYFS wouldn’t let 
me. So, um, I couldn’t get a chance to see him before he 
died. 
 
 While in foster care, Janelle did manage to maintain some contact with a 
grandmother.  “The DYFS worker would drive her down to see me.  I guess I was about 
an hour, maybe more than an hour away,” Janelle says. “She’d take me out shopping at 





 Janelle is proud that during her time in foster care she “managed to hold on. . . 
stay in there, keep the faith.” 
Leaving Foster Care 
 
 Janelle recalls talking to her caseworker about aging out of foster care.  The main 
message she received was that, when she turned 21, services would stop. 
They were just saying that, basically when I aged out that, 
the only thing that they told me is that the services will stop 
at age 21, which I’m 21 now, and, um, that was basically it. 
That’s all they basically told me. 
 
  Although she never received life skills classes or training for independent living, 
Janelle does recall participating in “emancipation conference meetings” at a community 
center in Newark. Janelle remembers the other attendees at these meetings being her child 
welfare caseworker, her biological grandmother, her biological aunt and a child welfare 
supervisor.   
We just talked about, like, my plans. They asked me about 
my future, I mean, what I’m doing now with it. . . They 
also asked what I needed from DYFS. They put that down 
there too. Anything that they wanted DYFS to work on, 
like one of them was driving lessons. 
 
 Just before Janelle turned 21 this past spring, her caseworker helped her to find an 
apartment in a transitional living program that is affiliated with a church in a suburban, 
central New Jersey community.  About 70% of her rent is covered by a housing voucher.  
Janelle is responsible for the remaining 30%. She can continue to live in the program 
until she is 25 and hopes to do so. 
I like it. It’s nice. I have my own bedroom. I have my own 
bathroom.  The five of us share the living room, dining 





need more time to stay, they’ll let me stay for like a little 
longer. 
 
  “We have a resident assistant who stays here over night,” Janelle says.  “She 
watches over us and we just knock on her door if we need anything. There’s always 
church staff downstairs. They give us a lot of support too.” 
 Janelle receives a scholarship through the New Jersey Foster Scholars Program, 
which has enabled her to pursue a degree in respiratory care.  The one-hour, two-train 
commute to her county college is tiring and expensive, but she is enjoying her studies.  
So far, Janelle has completed five semesters.  In spring 2012, she will transfer to the 
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, where she anticipates completing 
her studies by spring 2013.  Janelle chose respiratory care primarily because she always 
wanted to work in a hospital:  
At first I wanted to work in an emergency department 
where, um, there’s lots of doctors doing surgery and stuff. 
Like, you know, patients that has, um, wounds and stuff, 
like shot wounds and stuff and I wanted to do that first. 
And then, then, I moved on. I said you know, well let me 
do physical therapy. But then I just changed my mind and 
did respiratory care.   
 
 Janelle’s greatest concern at the moment is finding a source of income after 
having lost her work-study position at the college.   
They’re telling me now, this semester, something changed. 
They’re telling me I have to go back to financial aid. So 
right now, I’m broke.  I’m kind of without any money, but 
I’m trying to, um, see my financial aid counselor. . . so I’m 
going to talk to her to see if she can let me come back for 






 Her back-up plan is to find a part-time job near her residence.  Meanwhile, Janelle 
has applied to the local board of social services for financial assistance.  She’s not 
optimistic that she will be eligible, however, because the program would require her to 
work 30 hours each week – which would conflict with her classes.  She participates in the 
food stamp program, which has enabled her to buy groceries. 
 Janelle has also applied for help from foundations that make grants to individuals 
in need: 
I did apply for One Simple Wish, which is an organization 
on my foster care scholarship website. A long time ago 
they sent me a gift card for Walmart. So I did apply again 
cause on their website it says wishes can range from $5 to 
$500 for gift cards. So, um, I put down a request for $500, 
just to see if they could possibly send me a gift card to help 
out. 
 
 Janelle finds life after foster care to be a bit lonely. She feels like she still 
struggles with social skills and has a hard time making friends.  
With friends it’s hard for me to fit in. Nowadays people 
have their own social groups, their way of talking and 
doing things and when I come one different way and when 
I try to get to know people, they just stop talking to me all 
together. I wind up getting hurt. That’s why I back away 
from trying to find friends. I’m putting myself out there and 
getting hurt. 
 
 In particular, Janelle misses the safety net that the child welfare system had 
provided:  
At a certain age I was getting treatment and services that I 
needed but as I started getting older it seems like they 
started pulling away, that they weren’t doing as much. 
That’s what made me feel depressed. I felt like I didn’t 





about what I should do now since I don’t have anybody to 
count on to help me along the way.  
 
Making Decisions While in Care 
 
 Janelle doesn’t recall being involved in many decisions about her foster care 
placements.  She thinks, however, that she might have had much more stability in her life 
if she had been involved. 
Well, when things wasn’t working out I would tell my 
DYFS worker and that’s when my DYFS worker would put 
me in a different foster home but you know, choices where 
I wanted to live, they made the choices for me. It might 
have been different if I met the family first. It would have 
made a difference because I would have known who they 
were and what they were about and stuff.  It would have 
really have helped me because it would have made me 
choose whether this was the ideal family for me. 
 
 During her transition planning meetings, Janelle was asked about the programs 
and services that she thought she needed from the child welfare agency in order to 
transition successfully to independent living.  Not knowing the scope of programs that 
were available to her, Janelle asked for clothes and driving lessons:  “I really didn’t get to 
talk a lot. They just asked me, you know, basically what my plans were and, um, what I 
plan on doing when I aged out.”  
 In the end, Janelle did receive driving lessons but failed her road test, leaving her 
without a license.  She would like to retake the test, but cannot do so because she doesn’t 
have access to a car.  As a result, her learner’s permit has lapsed. 
 Janelle remembers having only one law guardian throughout her 15 years in foster 





She says he was particularly helpful in helping her to secure things she needed – like a 
computer for school, clothes, and other items. 
He really did represent me in the court. Not only that, but 
whatever he felt that I needed, he really pushed for it.  He 
told me that he felt like I had a hard life so he was pushing 
for a lot of stuff that he thought that I needed. He said he 
was going to be there to help me. He was a really nice law 
guardian, he was really nice and I really liked him.  
 
 Around age 15, Janelle asked her caseworker if she could attend a court hearing. 
“I guess I knew about them because my caseworker or law guardian, I don’t remember 
which one, started to tell me the court date,” explains Janelle. She ended up going to 
court and speaking with the judge several times. 
I used to go to court, um, only three times I went to court, 
and, um, I told the judge, the only thing I told him is like, 
you know, I’m in school, um, and he wanted to know, you 
know, how I was doing and stuff. And I told him how I was 
doing in my foster homes, and that was, that’s all we talked 
about.   
 
 She says she wanted to go to court so that the judge would know that “I’m a 
person, not just a name.” 
I wanted to let the judge, you know, see who I am, but just 
tell him, you know, the um, perseverance that I’ve had in 
my life, and what I’m doing for my life. And also, no, and 
also, before I forget, I was also asking him for clothes 
because they used to give me clothes. 
 
 Janelle admits to being nervous in court, primarily because other people – court 
staff, law guardians, and child welfare workers – were present when she talked to the 
judge.  Her law guardian would help her prepare for these sessions. 
Before I went into the courtroom I was talking to my law 





go in [to the courtroom] was my law guardian would say to 
me, ‘Is there anything you want me to bring up to the 
judge?’ He’d write it down in his notebook. He’d go in first 
and they’d bring me in after.  The law guardian would tell 
the judge what I needed before I even talked to him. 
 
 Janelle says she was allowed to be in the court room only when she spoke to the 
judge.  She wasn’t allowed to sit in the courtroom for the entire hearing. 
It was okay as long as I was talking to the judge.  
Otherwise, I couldn’t be there.  No one ever really told me 
why but it didn’t matter that much to me. The important 
thing was that I got to talk with him myself. He knew who I 
was. 
 
 Although she doesn’t recall making many decisions while in foster care, Janelle 
says that she wasn’t afraid to ask for the things that she thought she needed.  “I’m a push, 
push person,” she says. “I don’t know how to explain it. Whatever I want to do, whatever 
I need, I ask for it and go after it.” 
 She was frustrated, at times, when she faced resistance – from her caseworkers, 
foster parents, and others. 
I used to cry all the time because I felt like it was a struggle 
all the time – with me pushing for one thing and then not 
having help on the other end. And me trying to make ends 
meet and then being stuck. I felt like I really needed help 
because I want so much for myself every day of my life and 
that’s why I pushed for it every day. 
 
 Janelle also felt that the few decisions in which she was involved – such as 
deciding where to live after leaving foster care – weren’t really “decisions” because she 
was not presented with alternatives.  
This is the place they told me was the best for me because 
they said this one gives out vouchers. The other ones don’t 





why they pushed the paper work for here because they 
didn’t want me to miss out on it. In the end though, it really 
wasn’t a choice.  I didn’t get to decide which program I 
went to – I only got to decide whether or not to come here 
[to the transitional living program]. 
 
The Lived Experiences of Emilia 
 
 Emilia is a 20-year-year old Muslim woman who lives in a dormitory at a state 
college in southern New Jersey. She is a junior and is studying criminal justice.   
Foster Care Experiences 
 
 Emilia experienced foster care placement in New York and, more recently, in 
New Jersey.  She entered foster care the first time when she was eight years old.  At the 
time, her family – both parents, a younger sister, and two younger brothers – was living 
in Staten Island, New York.  (Another brother was being cared for in an institution due to 
severe cerebral palsy.) 
 One day, Emilia’s mother left all four children alone while she ran out to the 
grocery store.  Emilia was left in charge.   
It happened a lot. I was really used to it. I mean, I was 
eight, but I was, I’d say, I’d really say I was very mature 
for my age because I always took that on. I was used to it. I 
was used to kind of being like a mother figure to them. 
 
 This time, however, a home health aide stopped by to check up on Emilia’s 
younger sister, who also had cerebral palsy. At first, Emilia wouldn’t answer the door.  
Then she peeked out. The aide saw her and, realizing the children had been left alone, 





Emilia’s sister was placed in a hospital to meet her care needs.  “I didn’t know it 
then but it was the last time I would see her until last year,” says Emilia, who was placed, 
along with her two younger brothers, in a temporary foster home in Brooklyn.  It didn’t 
take long for Emilia to realize that something was seriously wrong in that foster home.  
Yeah, um, it was pretty bad. I mean, it was a very dirty 
apartment, roaches, it was disgusting. We weren’t fed for a 
week and that’s why I regretted not eating at the 
Administration for Children Services building because they 
offered us food and I didn’t eat.  
 
 Emilia and her brothers were removed from that foster home after their foster 
parents failed to seek medical treatment for an injury her youngest brother had sustained.  
Their second placement lasted two years. While this foster home was cleaner and they 
were fed regularly, there were still problems. For example, Emilia’s foster mother 
wouldn’t allow the children to turn on the lights in an effort to conserve electricity.  One 
day, Emilia was walking her brother down the stairs in the dark house, he slipped and 
tumbled down a flight of stairs, hitting his head on the floor.  “I’m pretty sure that did 
affect him big, because ever since then he hasn’t been the same,” Emilia said. 
Emilia coped by distracting herself with school. “I was very, very into my studies 
– I was consumed with school,” she says.  “I guess it was kind of like, just to ignore 
everything else going on, just to pretend I wasn’t there I guess.” 
 After being in out-of-home care for more than three years, Emilia and her two 
younger brothers were reunited with their biological parents. They stayed in Staten Island 





 Emilia re-entered foster care the second time when she was in high school, at age 
16.  “Um, well, my dad, he’s always been a very abusive person, like, since I could 
remember,” Emilia explains. “Since I was about three years old I can remember being 
told to go to my room and lock the door. Then he would always start hitting my mother.” 
One night, her father began abusing his wife in front of Emilia’s best friend.  
He started bashing her head against the wall and my best 
friend is sitting right there.  So it was almost like 
traumatizing for her. She was really scared.  I was so 
fricking used to it. My whole life I felt like, it’s just how 
life is I guess. But that night I realized, all right, well, this 
isn’t right. 
 
 A week before Emilia’s seventeenth birthday, her father was yet again abusing 
her mother.  Emilia called the police.  Emilia’s mother denied the altercation and the 
police left.  Later, Emilia confronted her mother: 
I was like defiant. I don’t know what came over me, and I 
went to my mom and it was like, “Listen, I’m turning 17 in 
a week.  It’s your 18-year anniversary on my birthday, and 
like, what are you doing? Do you want my brothers to grow 
up the way I did? It wasn’t fun. Finally, she said, ‘Alright, 
call the cops.’ I guess she just couldn’t do it herself. 
 
 Her father was arrested. A restraining order was issued to keep him away from the 
entire family but soon Emilia’s mother had begun seeing her father behind her back. 
And that’s when she had the restraining order lifted. And I 
begged and I pleaded, but then me and my mom started 
getting really bad. We started getting physical with each 
other. We were fighting. It was just like a very abusive 
relationship between me and her because I was extremely 
angry because she was trying to bring my dad back.  
 
 Emilia eventually confided in her guidance counselor, telling her what was going 





welfare authorities and report the case. She and her brothers were removed from their 
home the same day. 
Basically, what was told to my mom is, ‘You have a 
choice. You can either take your husband out of your life 
and get your kids back, or take your husband back and 
good luck getting your kids back, because chances are you 
won’t get them back before they’re 18.   
 
 They spent the first night together in a foster home.  The next day Emilia took a 
bus to high school but, at the end of the day, couldn’t find one that would bring her back. 
“So I didn’t go back,” she says. “I stayed with my boyfriend instead.”  Feeling guilty 
about abandoning her brothers, Emilia called her caseworker and was returned to the 
foster home the next day. The foster parents, upset over Emilia’s absence, refused to let 
her return. The next day, Emilia was moved to a shelter. 
Although she found the placement restrictive, Emilia became close friends with 
the other residents. “I ended up being like the favorite person there,” she says. “So when 
my 30 days was up, I asked my social worker if they could extend my stay until they 
found a home for me.” 
And, um, she’s like, all right, yeah we’ll do that. Then next 
day comes, and she’s like, ‘Pack your bags, get ready to go. 
And I’m like, screaming and crying. Now I don’t want to 
leave the shelter. I’m like, ‘Are you serious right now?’ So 
I’m like crying, and I’m like, ‘Where are you taking me?’ 
She wouldn’t tell me where she was taking me until she 
took me there. She brought me back to that first foster 
home we were in before I went into the shelter. 
 
 Shortly thereafter, Emilia was placed in a different foster home.  This time, she 
liked both the older woman who was her foster mother, as well as a younger foster child 





And then my social worker came to me with an ultimatum. 
She was always kind of screwing me over, but, she said, 
‘You can either apply to be in a program that would let you 
go back to your high school or you would stay with this 
foster mother and go to a different school.’ It was a pretty 
big decision for me because – I was supposed to be in the 
first graduating class of my high school, and all my friends 
were there and that was the only thing I was holding onto, 
my friends and high school. I had nothing else. But I wasn’t 
sure I wanted to live in a group home. I finally made a 
decision to stay with my foster mother and to go do a 
different high school.  Then my worker’s like, ‘That’s not a 
choice anymore.’ Like literally, the day I made the 
decision. 
 
 Emilia calls her placement in the group home a “turning point.”  “I kind of 
changed for the worse,” she says. “I was just mean. I didn’t like it. I didn’t want to be 
confined to another house again. I didn’t want to get along with the other people there.”   
After getting into a physical altercation with an older youth after he referred to her 
siblings with cerebral palsy as “retarded,” Emilia called her caseworker and demanded a 
change. 
She wasn’t there so I had to leave her a voice mail – like, 
go figure. I was like, ‘Listen, you need to do something 
now.  You figure out what to do with me or I’m just going 
back to the shelter.’ A light bulb went off in her [the 
caseworker’s] head and she decided to do something for 
once in her life. I wanted to live with my best friend and 
she finally pushed it [the placement] through. 
 
That arrangement carried Emilia through her senior year in high school but it 
wasn’t ideal. Her friend’s parents 
…were charging me $400 a month in rent, on top of the 
$1,000 they were getting from DYFS each month, which I 
knew she [the foster mother] wasn’t allowed to do. I was 





or three cars that year but they wouldn’t even put a little 
toward helping me. 
 
Leaving Foster Care 
 
 Emilia never received training in independent living skills and doesn’t recall 
being involved in any type of transition planning meeting.  She turned 18 in the spring of 
her senior year in high school.  “I thought I would join the Marines,” she said. “But when 
I found out that women can’t do artillery, I figured it wasn’t for me.”  At the behest of her 
guidance counselor, Emilia began applying to college in March, somewhat late in the 
college admissions season. She was admitted to all seven schools to which she had 
applied. 
Emilia’s child welfare caseworker told her that if she stayed in foster care past age 
18, the child welfare agency would pay the living stipend to her instead of her foster 
parents. “They completely flipped the script on me,” she says. “I turned 18 and never got 
any money.”  Even though her case was still open, Emilia returned to live with her 
biological parents until college started.  
Emilia was also told that she was eligible for a scholarship through the New 
Jersey Foster Scholars Program.  
Then, the day before I’m supposed to leave for school, they 
[DYFS] tell me that they can’t help me financially in any 
way, shape or form. They promised me so much and they 
just went back on it. The day before I’m leaving for school 
– my mom is trying her best to buy things for my apartment 
at school.  I need to take out loans since I’m not getting the 






 Emilia tracked down her new caseworker and hounded her until the situation was 
straightened out.  It turned out that Emilia was indeed eligible for the scholarship even 
though her case officially closed when she entered college:  “They weren’t doing 
anything they said they were going to do until I was 21. So when they told me I couldn’t 
get help, I told them to close my case.” 
 During the school year, Emilia lives the life of a regular college student.  She 
shares an on-campus apartment with a group of close friends. She has done well in her 
classes and is thinking about majoring in criminal justice.  Her career goal is to work with 
children. 
 Holidays, winter break, and summers are sometimes difficult to manage.  “I don’t 
even know how I made it so far,” she says. “I don’t have a permanent home. I’m all over 
the place. Holidays, vacations, I end up staying God knows where.”  This past summer, 
Emilia waitressed on Long Beach Island and took a summer rental there. Her last resort is 
living at home with her parents.  
Decision Making Experiences 
 
 Emilia doesn’t recall being involved in any decisions about her life the first time 
she was in foster care. “I was way too young back them,” Emilia says. “I didn’t really 
know what was best for me. I would have just wanted to go home.” 
 During her second placement, Emilia was involved in making some decisions 
about her case.  
They asked me what I wanted but then, in the end, even if I 
made a decision for myself, the decisions ended up being 





wanted it would end up as ‘Oh, well, we’re not going that 
way. 
 
 While she had been asked about her placement preferences and, at times, led to 
believe that her preference would be honored, Emilia says she had little meaningful input 
into her placement options: 
Decisions to stay with my brothers [while they were in 
care], I didn’t get to make that one. The decision to go into 
these homes I didn’t want to be in, I didn’t get to make that 
one either.   
 
 As an example, Emilia cites the instance in which she was given a choice between 
remaining with a foster mother she liked while attending a different high school, or 
moving to a group home while remaining in her current high school. Emilia took a few 
days to consider her options.  She identified several benefits of moving to the group home 
and remaining in her current high school.  In particular, she felt she could count on 
support from teachers and counselors familiar with her situation: “My guidance 
counselor, my English teacher, my art teacher – they knew what was going on, they were 
understanding, they would talk to me. They helped me a lot. I didn’t want to lose that.” 
 On the other hand, Emilia felt comfortable in her foster home. In addition to 
having a good relationship with her foster mother, Emilia had grown close to a younger 
foster child who had begun thinking of Emilia as her big sister. In the end, Emilia decided 
that she preferred to stay in the foster home.  But when her caseworker came to talk with 
her about her next placement, she told Emilia that the matter had already been decided: 





 Emilia felt very frustrated by that and similar experiences. She felt it was 
“disrespectful” and “a huge waste of time” to be asked to consider different options and 
to agonize over the decision, only to have the choice made for her in the end, without 
considering her input. 
 Emilia also remembers feeling that her caseworker aggressively advocated for 
living arrangements that were easy to organize administratively, but detrimental to 
Emilia’s well-being. 
When we were talking about whether I should stay in my 
foster home or go to a group home my caseworker 
advocated for the group home a lot. She said it was better 
for me, that they’d teach me to be independent and link me 
to college.  She said that if I stayed in the foster home then 
I’m still dependent on the foster home.  She made it sound 
better than it really was, just like, ‘You’ll have friends, a 
counselor there all the time.’ She definitely overstated it. 
That’s what she thought would be best for me but I didn’t 
think it would be the best for me. If anything, that group 
home changed me for the worse, I became more violent, I 
was making bad decisions, I just stopped caring. 
 
 Another example Emilia cites is being forced to attend counseling sessions to 
discuss being raped two weeks before entering foster care the second time.  
My DYFS worker was adamant about me talking to 
somebody, so she got this counselor for me, this rape 
counselor. What I wanted to talk about – what I needed to 
talk about – was what was going on right now with my 
family. I didn’t want to talk about being raped. 
 
 The counseling sessions became a huge source of conflict between Emilia and her 
caseworker. 
She [the caseworker] just didn’t want to hear it – she was 
told she has to bring me to see a counselor.  It didn’t matter 





the car, I’d be like, ‘I’m not going, I’m not going, I’m not 
going.’ She dragged me out anyway.  My DYFS worker 
just didn’t care. She just took me there – I had no idea 
where I was going. She just took me there.  
 
 Emilia says that she was “pretty defiant” toward the counselor and eventually just 
flat-out refused to participate. 
I decided that I would be a bitch when I was in there. 
I was offended and upset about the way I was being treated. 
I sat in the chair and refused to say anything. I was so 
angry. I wanted to push her through a wall. I was so mad – 
if I want to talk, I’ll talk. I can talk to anyone, I can talk to 
myself if I want to. She [the counselor] said ‘Well, we have 
to.’ I said, ‘Well, I don’t want to.’ She said, ‘But we have 
to.’ Finally I told her ‘You can’t make me talk about it.’ 
Then I just left the room and was waiting outside. I was 
crying because I was upset.  
 
 The rape counseling sessions finally came to an end when a different psychologist 
intervened on Emilia’s behalf: 
He said he was impressed with me because I added up my 
own score on the test. He said he never had a client do that 
before. So I started talking to him about this [rape] 
counselor I was seeing and how it made me feel. And he 
listened, he listened. I wish I knew who he was because I 
would go back and thank him, because he helped me a lot. 
He really listened and he told my DYFS worker don’t let 
her see that counselor ever again. It’s not helping her, it’s 
hurting her. This girl has gone through so much and I can’t 
believe you’re doing that and making things harder for her. 
After that I never saw the counselor again. I never had to 
see her ever again. 
 
 Emilia recalled having little control over her day-to-day life when she was living 
in the congregate care facilities. 
Group homes and shelters, they’re very structured.  You 
couldn’t go outside. You have to have a job. You can’t stay 





month in advance.  Don’t even think about having a friend 
over. 
 
 She found some of the rules to be “insane and counterproductive.” 
 
You weren’t allowed in your room after 8 a.m. Whether 
you have class or not, you have to be up at 8 a.m. and down 
the stairs. You’re allowed to make one trip upstairs at like 6 
p.m. Then you had to be in bed by 10 p.m.  I felt like I was 
in the military. 
 
 Emilia says the rigid institutional schedule often interfered with something she 
cared about sincerely, her school work.  
It was crazy. You couldn’t study upstairs in your room. 
Instead you had to find a place downstairs with everyone 
screaming so loud that you couldn’t concentrate. You 
couldn’t study after 10 p.m. I ended up dropping honors 
and AP [advanced placement] courses because I didn’t 
have time to study. 
 
 Emilia would like to have had greater control over various aspects of her 
relationship with DYFS. She feels that little consideration was given to her need for 
privacy while she was in care.  
They make this big deal about how your child welfare 
records are sealed then they do things like pick you up at 
school in their State of New Jersey van. There’d always be 
a friend out there and I’d try to shoo them away or hope 
that their ride came first so that they wouldn’t see this state 
government van. I feel like you were an idiot if you didn’t 
know I was in foster care. 
 
 Emilia felt that even her individual meetings with her caseworker should have 
also been more private. 
She would show up randomly at the foster home I was in, 
I’d have friends over and she’d just show up and talk to me 





want to talk about this right here.’  She’d be like, ‘You 
have no choice because I need to make this visit.’ 
 
 Emilia does not recall ever meeting a CASA volunteer. She knows she had a law 
guardian during her second stay in foster care who represented her in court.  While she 
was supposed to meet monthly with the law guardian, Emilia estimates that she typically 
met with her every other month “for a couple of minutes.”  In general, Emilia felt that the 
law guardian was not responsive to her as a client: “She gave me her phone number and 
told me to call anytime. But in reality, I could never get a hold of her for any reason. I 
would call her and get a response three or four weeks later.” 
She made me feel like I was a hassle to her and that she 
was too busy to deal with me. And I mean, I think that, I 
don’t really know what her purpose was to be honest.  I 
mean if you don’t want to advocate for what’s right for me 
what are you doing here, why do I even have a law 
guardian, why should I have one?  I don’t think she knew 
me at all. I don’t think she knew what was right for me 
either. She was asking me questions – ‘How do you like it 
here?’ ‘I don’t like it.’  ‘Okay, how’s school?’  ‘It’s 
alright.’ She never asked ‘Why don’t you like it? What can 
we do about this? Do you want to see if we can move you 
somewhere else?’ 
 
 Emilia also thinks that her law guardian’s focus was misplaced:  
 
 She [the law guardian] hated my case worker and hated 
DYFS in general. Pretty much what she was fighting for 
was to get us home and I knew that wasn’t realistic.  I’m 
like, ‘Why are you trying when I know it’s not going to 
happen?  I’ve been here before, my parents aren’t ready to 
get us [Emilia and her brothers] back yet. Why do you keep 
fighting about when we’re going home?’  I feel like, if 
anything, she was fighting for my parents. I don’t really 
think she was advocating what was best for me and my 
brothers but rather for what my parents wanted. She’d say, 
‘Well they want you back so that’s what I’m going to try to 






 Emilia followed what was happening in her court hearings through her mother. 
“My mom actually told me when my case was going to be in court. I never heard about it 
from my social worker or law guardian.”  Convinced that she could do a better job than 
the law guardian, Emilia eventually decided she wanted to represent her interests in court. 
For some reason I thought 16 was the age when you could 
go to court if you wanted to. I wanted to fight my own 
battles. I wanted to go live with my friend – and get them to 
stop putting me in group homes and shelters I didn’t want 
to be in. I always wanted to go to court and talk for myself. 
 
 A primary reason Emilia wanted to attend court was to focus attention on 
problems she was currently experiencing: 
There was always a lot of attention on preparing for the 
future but not a lot of interest in what my life was like right 
now. I think that’s where my letters came from – this is 
what I’m feeling right now. I’m not worried about what’s 
going to happen in a year – I’m worried about my 
education, my living situation – I’m worried about now.  
 
 Emilia’s law guardian objected to her appearing in court and encouraged her to 
write letters to the judge instead. 
She was like, ‘What do you need to go for?’ I said, ‘I need 
to talk to him [the judge].’ She said, ‘Well, that’s what I’m 
here for.’  I told her, ‘Technically, you could be there, but I 
really don’t need you to talk for me. I can talk for myself. I 
understand that you need to talk for my little brothers. I 
totally get that. But I can talk for myself.’ In the end, she 
[the law guardian] wouldn’t let me go to court but she said 
I could write a letter. So that was my new thing – writing 






 The law guardian gave Emilia specific instructions to guide her letter-writing. 
“She told me the judge didn’t want to read excessive amounts of stuff,” Emilia explains. 
“She said the letters had to be one page, one side.” 
 Although she viewed herself as a good writer, Emilia agonized over every word 
she wrote to the judge.  At first, Emilia wasn’t convinced that her letters would make a 
difference. 
I didn’t think they were going to listen to me anyway.  At 
first I was like discouraged, cause I mean, my DYFS 
worker had told me it wouldn’t help and that he [the judge] 
might not even read it. And my law guardian told me there 
was a chance that he [the judge] might not even read it. She 
said he might not care, he might make his decision before 
even reading it so it was kind of discouraging. Then it made 
me made, like ‘Why shouldn’t I have a say – why can’t you 
read two paragraphs.’ 
 
 Emilia would give each letter to her law guardian, who brought it to court. “I 
always checked with my mom,” Emilia says. “I’d call her after the hearing and ask her 
whether the judge read my letter.” 
 Emilia’s letter-writing campaign turned out to be successful, and she was pleased 
with the results. 
Anytime I asked for something, the judge was more than 
accommodating. The judge was like, ‘Get her out of this 
group home. We’ll definitely help her with college.’ My 
law guardian would call me and say, ‘Oh my god, I have 
great news.  The judge read your letter . . . he was just 
amazed. I don’t know what you wrote but – good for you – 
you got exactly what you wanted. I was so happy, I was 
like, ‘Hell, I should be a journalist or something.’ 
 
 Emilia believes she wrote three letters to the judge. One letter was about school, a 





The last one was kind of like a farewell letter.  I told him I 
was going to college and I became a better person. I told 
him that I feel like my mom has changed and that things are 
different. I told him that I thought my little brothers could 
go back home. 
 
 In the end, Emilia feels that she did a much better job advocating for herself 
through her letters than her law guardian ever did in court. 
There was such a huge difference between her [law 
guardian] always going to court and nothing happening and 
once I started writing my letters. That’s when I saw things 
start to change. That’s when things started going my way. It 
felt unreal to accomplish it.  
 
 Emilia thinks her letters were so successful because she could clearly explain why 
she was requesting changes that were in her best interest, not just things she wanted. 
Usually kids in foster care what they want isn’t always best 
for them. They want to go home – see mommy and daddy – 
they don’t’ really know that it’s not a safe environment for 
them. But I knew what I wanted was best for me. If I 
thought it was silly what I was asking for, I never would 
have asked for it.  I never said I wanted to go home to my 
mother and father – I never said that in these letters. I did 
say that after visiting with my mom that my mom was 
changed dramatically. My dad, I would not say a good 
thing about him. The judge didn’t think I was b.s-ing him I 
guess. 
 
 Emilia feels that the opportunity she had to influence some of the important 
decisions about her life gave her hope for the future. 
Until then, it was just like all this was going on and you 
have no say. It’s like you expect the worst, you don’t even 
hope for the best anymore. You don’t expect anything to go 
your way. You’re just thinking I’m going to keep spiraling 
downwards. It belittles you and makes you feel worthless 
because nobody wants to hear what you have to say. 
Feeling like someone actually heard what I was saying – 





for me. I realized that I could actually change things and 




 The purpose of this chapter was to provide a rich description to enable readers to 
begin to understand the lived experience of participating in life decisions while in foster 
care.  The vignettes presented above attempt to describe informant’s experiences in foster 
care, with particular attention to their experiences participating in decisions about their 





CHAPTER 7: THE ESSENCE OF PARTICIPATING IN DECISIONS ABOUT 
ONE’S LIFE WHILE IN FOSTER CARE 
 
Introduction and Purpose of the Chapter 
 
 What is the essential experience of participating in decisions about one’s life 
while in foster care?  This chapter draws upon the narratives in the previous chapter to 
develop and present a “thoughtful, reflective grasping of what it is that renders this . . . 
particular experience its special significance” (van Manen, 1990, p. 32).  The chapter 
highlights themes, or the “experiential structures that make up the experience” (van 
Manen, 1990, p. 78).  Van Manen (1990) likens such themes to “the stars that make up 
the universes of meaning we live through,” by the light of which “we can navigate and 
explore such universes” (p. 90).  
The chapter begins with a brief profile of the group of former foster youth who 
participated in this study.  Next, the essential themes that emerged from analysis are 
identified: (1) No Control; (2) Being Voiceless; (3) A Focus on Now; (4) Not Being 
Heard; (5) Settling; (6) Living a Public Life; (7) I Can Talk for Myself; (8) Being Spoken 
For; (9) Powerlessness; (10) An Unclear System; (11) No One Cares; (12) Alone; (13) 
Confidence; (14) Broken Promises; and (15) Acting Out. 
Informant Profiles 
 
 The eight former foster youth interviewed for this dissertation are participants in 
Project MYSELF, a program sponsored by the Rutgers School of Social Work.  Project 





Fulfillment, provides support to current and former foster youth who receive scholarships 
to pursue post-secondary education through the New Jersey Foster Scholars Program.  
All eight participants had aged out of the child welfare system in New Jersey; their cases 
were closed at the time of the interviews.  One informant had also experienced a stay in 
foster care in New York City.   
The participants included one male and seven female students, ranging in age 
from 18 to 23.  Most came to the attention of the child welfare system due to a parent’s 
substance abuse problem.  One informant entered the system when her mother died, 
while another entered the system due to domestic violence and physical abuse issues.   
Five participants were African-American and three were white.  Demographic data on the 
participants is summarized in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Informant Demographics 
Informant Age Gender Race Years in 
Care 
Reason for entering foster care 
Patrice 23 Female African 
American 
8 Mother abusing substances  
Angelina 23 Female White 8 Mother incarcerated, father 
abusing substances 
M’Chelle 21 Female African 
American 
11 Mother abusing substances and 
incarcerated 
Jordan 19 Male African 
American 
15 Mother abusing substances 
Lakesha 18 Female African 
American 
17 Mother abusing substances and 
incarcerated  
Christina 19 Female White 10 Father abusing substances 
Janelle 21 Female African 
American 
16 Mother died, father abusing 
substances 











 The former foster youth who participated in this study described themselves as 
having no control over most decisions that affected their lives while they were in foster 
care.  The perceived lack of control was present in all levels of decision making, from 
life-altering decisions about terminating parental rights to minor choices about day-to-day 
activities. 
 For many informants, the sense of having no control over decisions about their 
lives began with the decision to place them in foster care. As Lakesha observed, foster 
children have no choice about becoming involved with the child welfare system: 
“Basically being in foster care sets the bar for you not making decisions at all because it 
wasn’t your decision to be in foster care, so that’s the whole start of it.”  
 Similarly, Angelina talked about feeling that she had “no control over anything” 
once she entered foster care. She felt that her life was controlled by adults – caseworkers, 
attorneys, judges – who had the advantage of both age and status:  “I mean they were 
adults and on top of that, they were the state, so I had no control over what they did. I just 
had to listen to it and put up with it.” 
 Unexpectedly, none of the study participants questioned the decision to place 
them in out-of-home care. Emilia, M’Chelle, Jordan and Angelina all expressed the view 
that they could no longer continue living with their biological parent(s).  While not 





gave no indication that they disagreed with the decision to place them in the care of the 
state.  (Angelina, however, felt that her case could have been closed sooner than it was.) 
Placement decisions were one area over which study participants felt they had 
particularly little control. Although a handful of informants recalled being asked their 
preferences about some moves, most felt they lacked control over the actual decision-
making process. Janelle, for example, described the decision to enter a transitional living 
program as not being hers:  
This is the place they told me was the best for me…that’s 
why they put me here…In the end, though, it really wasn’t 
a choice.  I didn’t get to decide which program I went to – I 
only got to decide whether or not to come here [to the 
transitional living program]. 
 
Jordan felt that his child welfare and mental health caseworkers, along with his 
aunt and uncle, had orchestrated his move from a foster home to a residential treatment 
center:  
Both my DYFS case manager and my mental health worker 
decided that was where I should be. They probably talked 
to my aunt and uncle about it. But I had no idea until the 
day it happened. They just said, ‘Get your stuff together. 
You’re going away.’ 
 
The participants’ lack of control over placement decisions was felt most acutely 
when they experienced frequent, abrupt and unexpected moves from one foster care 
setting to another.  Jordan, for example, recalls being surprised when he was removed 
from a kinship foster care placement with his aunt and uncle and placed in an institution 
for troubled youth located more than two hours away:  “DYFS just showed up one day 






 Lakesha also spoke about being removed abruptly from a foster home she liked 
after her foster mother missed a placement hearing.   
The next day they [caseworker] come to the door saying 
that I’m moving out to be with my sister. I’m like, um, 
‘Why?’ . . . I still can’t believe they didn’t even try to ask 
me what I wanted. They didn’t call or nothing. They just 
show up and take me out. 
 
Janelle distinguished between being able to influence her removal from a foster 
home and actually choosing a placement.  “Well, when things wasn’t working out I 
would tell my DYFS worker and that’s when my DYFS worker would put me in a 
different foster home,” Janelle said. “But you know, choices where I wanted to live, they 
made the choices for me.” 
When study participants had opportunities to be involved in arranging their 
placements, they typically felt more satisfied with their foster care situation.  Due to her 
mother’s deteriorating ability to care for her children, M’Chelle had made alternate living 
arrangements for herself and her brother before the child welfare system became involved 
in their case a second time.  The caseworker was able to make arrangements so that 
M’Chelle’s temporary solution could become a permanent foster care placement. “The 
second time [entering care] they definitely asked me what I wanted because I was old 
enough at that point,” M’Chelle said. “They asked me if I was happy. I let them know 
everything was okay.” 
Similarly, the family of a high school friend was willing to take Emilia in the 
second time she entered foster care.  After several unsuccessful attempts to be placed 





While the placement turned out not to be as ideal as Emilia had hoped, she still felt it was 
a better option than remaining in the group home: “I knew what I wanted was best for 
me.” 
 In addition to feeling that they had little control over major decisions about their 
lives while in foster care, study participants also described having little say in many of 
the day-to-day aspects of their lives.  Lakesha spoke about her foster mother refusing to 
allow her to visit with biological relatives and requiring her to adapt her school schedule 
so that Lakesha could assist with the day care business that her foster mother ran at her 
suburban home.  
Youth in congregate care had even less control over day-to-day matters.  Jordan, 
who spent time in both an institution for troubled youth and a group home, said that 
institutional schedules dominated his life while in those facilities. He described a typical 
day as having set times for work, school, counseling, recreation and bed.  
Everything is based on the schedule because they felt like if 
we don’t have a schedule and structure there’s chaos. So 
everything was coordinated because they felt as though we 
tend to get in more trouble when we have free time, and the 
less free time we have the less trouble they think that we 
were going to get in. 
 
 Similarly, Emilia felt that her lack of control over daily decisions while living in a 
group home frequently deprived her of typical adolescent experiences, such as bringing a 
friend home after school to complete an assignment, having a sleepover with friends, or 
participating in some school-sponsored events.   
You couldn’t have a friend come over, you couldn’t be 
gone for more than three hours, unless it was for school or 





problem was that they would only approve your request at 
the all-staff meeting and the all-staff meeting was once a 
month. 
 
Emilia felt that her group home’s restrictions on day-to-day activities and 
decisions were particularly harmful to her studies.  Emilia said the group home’s rules 
left her without sufficient time and resources to handle the honors and advanced 
placement classes in which she was enrolled. For example, the group home prohibited 
residents from spending time in their bedrooms during the day.  As a result, Emilia 
typically had to study at a communal table with other residents who were talking, eating 
and watching television.  She also was not permitted to study past the facility’s 
mandatory 10 p.m. bedtime.  Feeling unsupported in her academic pursuits, Emilia ended 
up dropping several advanced placement classes and seriously considered leaving high 
school altogether at the beginning of her senior year. 
Lack of control also characterized the participants’ ability to receive information 
and make decisions regarding their families of origin.  Information about the deaths of 
several relatives was kept from Lakesha and her sister by their foster mother and 
caseworker: “There are funerals for my family members that we were supposed to go to 
and we never knew until months, sometimes years later, that someone had died.”  
Similarly, Janelle’s desire to visit with her dying father – her sole surviving parent –was 
also out of her control: “I wanted to go see him, but my foster family wouldn’t let me, 








 Echoing an important theme in the procedural justice literature, the perception of 
not having a voice in decision making was an essential part of the informants’ experience 
while in foster care.  Being voiceless refers to not having a say in decisions, regardless of 
whether that say ultimately influences the decision that is made. It reflects an unfulfilled 
desire to indicate a preference or opinion. The study participants universally felt that their 
voices were too often stifled when it came to making decisions about their lives. 
 Although federal legislation requires that youth aging out of foster care be 
involved in developing a self-directed transition plan, Janelle felt she didn’t have much 
say in creating her plan.  “I really didn’t get to talk a lot,” she said. “They just asked me, 
you know, basically what my plans were and, um, what I plan on doing when I aged out.”  
As a result, her transition plan focused on obtaining driving lessons and clothing, and 
failed to reflect Janelle’s broader life goals. 
 Jordan was told in advance about the prospect of terminating his mother’s 
parental rights, but felt he had no say in the matter. 
He [Jordan’s uncle] just said he thought it would be the 
right thing. In order for them like to fully help me and take 
care of me, he thought it would be the right thing. No one 
really asked me whether I wanted it. 
 
 While Emilia attempted to express her voice through her letters to the family 
court judge, she felt that her caseworker and law guardian minimized her voice by 
restricting the length of her letters.  “She [the law guardian] told me the judge didn’t want 





 Study participants felt that not having a voice robbed them of an essential human 
experience – the ability to express one’s feelings, opinions and preferences and to make 
meaningful changes in their lives.  Patrice, who observed that she “always had … 
someone else talking for me,” said that being voiceless left her feeling that she “wasn’t a 
human being that have decisions or make decisions and have a voice.”  
Christina felt that not having a voice in decisions limited her ability to make 
positive life changes.   
I didn’t have much say actually. I didn’t have much of a 
choice. Now that I think about it, it was frustrating, 
especially because there were so many things that I could 
have probably changed if I did have the chance to express 
myself. But I didn’t. 
 
Being voiceless also raised issues of procedural fairness for Christina: “They 
weren’t giving me a chance to say my piece, which I didn’t feel was fair, either.” 
Some informants linked their feelings of voicelessness to a belief that the social 
services agencies did not respect them as people. Former foster youth who participated in 
the study felt disrespected by their caseworkers when decisions were made about their 
lives without their involvement or consultation.  Conversely, the informants interpreted 
being allowed to express an opinion about an issue as a demonstration of respect, 
particularly if that opinion appeared to be taken seriously. 
M’Chelle, for example, described her caseworker as treating her respectfully 
when they discussed placement options upon her second entry into foster care: “I’m very 
big on respect and stuff like that. I thought that by asking me my opinion, and helping me 





Emilia felt disrespected when her caseworker asked her to choose between 
remaining with a foster parent and changing schools, or remaining at her current school 
and moving to a group home, only to ignore the choice Emilia made. After weighing the 
pros and cons of each option, Emilia concluded that she preferred to stay in the foster 
home, even if it meant switching high schools for her senior year.  When Emilia 
announced her decision to her caseworker, she was told “[t]hat’s not a choice anymore,” 
and was summarily moved to the group home. 
A Focus on Now 
 
 A desire to focus the system’s attention on their current quality of life emerged 
from this study as another essential aspect of the respondents’ participation in life 
decisions while in foster care. Informants felt that the rare opportunities they had to 
participate in decision making focused too heavily on planning for the future and too little 
on their present quality of life. This perceived focus on the future may be explained, in 
part, by federal legislation requiring youth to participate in developing an individualized 
plan to identify services that will help them transition out of care (Fostering Connections 
to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act, 2008).  The former foster youth interviewed for 
this study thought more attention should have been given to their most pressing, current 
concerns. 
Lakesha, for example, recounted attending a “check-up” meeting at which the 
judge asked her about what she wanted to do after high school and what her other plans 
were for the future. She was surprised that “they didn’t ask me anything about the house 





Similarly, Emilia observed “a lot of attention on preparing for the future but not a 
lot of interest in what my life was like right now.”  She used her letters to the judge who 
presided over her case as a vehicle for expressing her current concerns: “This is what I’m 
feeling right now. I’m not worried about what’s going to happen in a year – I’m worried 
about my education, my living situation – I’m worried about now.” 
Participants typically reached out to their caseworkers or law guardians only for 
immediate assistance with a problem.  Emilia, for example, asked her caseworker to be 
moved to another placement after having a physical altercation with another resident.  
She gave her caseworker an ultimatum: “I was like, ‘Listen, you need to do something 
now. You figure out what to do with me or I’m just going back to the shelter.’”  
Emilia reported similar frustrations with her law guardian, who “gave me her 
phone number and told me to call anytime.  But in reality, I could never get a hold of her 
for any reason. I would call her and get a response three or four weeks later.” 
Not Being Heard 
 
 Closely linked to lacking control and not having a voice in decisions, not being 
heard was an experience shared by the respondents when participating in decisions about 
their lives while in care.  Sometimes, respondents felt their communications were either 
misunderstood or deliberately misinterpreted. 
Patrice recounted feeling “like they just ignored me” when she complained to her 
caseworker that she was physically mistreated in her first foster home. The experience of 
being ignored led Patrice to conclude that her allegations either were not important 





Emilia felt that her caseworker ignored her pleas not to participate in rape 
counseling sessions and described being physically forced to attend the sessions:  
She [the caseworker] didn’t want to hear it – she was told 
she has to bring me to see a counselor. It didn’t matter if I 
didn’t want to go. I would kick and scream and sit in the 
car. I’d be like, “I’m not going. I’m not going. I’m not 
going.’ She dragged me out anyway. 
 
Janelle was the only informant who participated in a formal, individual meeting to 
plan the services she would need to transition out of foster care, even though such a 
meeting was required by the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions 
Act of 2008. She asked for two things she thought she would need: a driver’s license and 
clothes.  Arrangements were made for Janelle to take driving lessons, but she failed her 
road test and to date has been unable to retake it.  The new clothes that were promised to 
Janelle never materialized.  
Both Patrice and Janelle had expected that their concerns and requests would be 
heard and acted upon by the adults with whom they had spoken.  When undertaking her 
letter-writing campaign to the judge, Emilia was told outright by her caseworker and law 
guardian that her missives could be ignored.   
At first I was like discouraged, cause I mean, my DYFS 
worker had told me it wouldn’t help and that he [the judge] 
might not even read it. And my law guardian told me there 
was a chance that he [the judge] might not even read it. She 
said he might not care, he might make his decision before 
even reading it so it was kind of discouraging. 
 
 Angelina and Christina both shared experiences of not being heard, which they 
believed resulted from being unintentionally misunderstood or intentionally 





and they kind of mix them up a little bit and make them seem like something that they’re 
not.”  Christina worried that her caseworker was trying to trick her into divulging 
negative information about her foster mother, who had been the subject of a previous 
maltreatment report.   
Instead of them trying to help me, they were trying to pull 
things out of me.  They would ask the same question, but in 
a different way to see if you answered it differently. 
Honestly, anytime I would talk to anyone, I kind of felt like 




 Study participants identified “settling” for decisions that were acceptable, but less 
than optimal, as an aspect of their experience in foster care. They reported settling when 
they accepted a decision that they perceived to be relatively close (but not an exact 
match) to their personal preferences or when they felt that challenging a decision might 
result in an even less desirable option being forced upon them.  Yet, some of the former 
foster youth who participated in this study “settled” by abandoning any hope of 
influencing important decisions about their lives. 
M’Chelle settled for being placed in foster care a second time after her mother 
relapsed into substance abuse.  She had already made alternate living arrangements for 
herself and her brother and recognized that she could not stay with her mother.  Although 
she was upset when a child welfare worker called her to initiate an out-of-home 
placement, M’Chelle ultimately accepted the decision: “So I was upset, but at the end of 
the day, it happened. But afterwards it didn’t bother me. I knew it was for the best.”  





related to the termination of her mother’s parental rights: “I really didn’t have anything to 
say. It was for the better – it was best for both of us. So I didn’t see any reason to go.” 
Settling for options that are acceptable, but less than what was originally desired, 
was also reflected in Angelina’s attitude toward the decisions made in her case.  So long 
as the decision makers maintained the status quo, Angelina was uninterested in being 
involved in the decision-making process. “I was so focused on just really doing my own 
thing – thinking about the future. As long as nothing was going to change, I’d rather just 
go to school and work. I didn’t want to have to deal with it.”   
In some cases, Angelina settled for decisions on her foster care placement out of 
fear that challenging the decision could land her in an even less attractive living situation. 
With her father’s girlfriend serving as her foster mother, Angelina felt comfortable, if not 
perfectly happy.  
If I didn’t like the decisions they were making about my 
life – if they tried to change my foster home, if they 
separated me and my sister – you can bet I would have 
made a stink about that. But I was fairly happy with the 
way things were and I didn’t want to rock the boat. I didn’t 
have much but I had too much to lose. 
 
 Sometimes settling resulted from the informant’s losing all hope of being 
involved in major decisions while in care. Patrice, for example, did not express her 
preferences. “I just settled,” she said. “I was never the type to try to put up a fight…. And 
I was always smart and I was aware of things but I just didn’t open my mouth.”   Emilia 
admitted to giving up after she was placed in a group home that she disliked: “If 
anything, that group home changed me for the worse, I became more violent, I was 





Similarly, Jordan’s expressed disinterest reflected giving up: “Back then, I really 
didn’t care.”  Emilia pointed to the lack of opportunities to participate in decision making 
as a source of foster children’s apathy. “[I]t was just like all this was going on and you 
have no say. It’s like you expect the worst, you don’t even hope for the best anymore. 
You don’t expect anything to go your way.” 
Living a Public Life 
 
 In some respects, foster youth live public lives. Intimate details about their lives, 
including important decisions, are discussed in front of family members, other foster 
youth, service providers, co-workers and even strangers.  Having the most personal and 
private details of their lives casually publicized emerged from this study as a theme that 
elicited perhaps the strongest reaction from the respondents. 
Nearly all the informants recalled feelings of embarrassment because their status 
as foster children was widely known among their peers. Christina’s first memory of being 
involved with the child welfare system, for example, was an instance when her 
caseworker  
. . . had actually come into my school and it was – it was 
very embarrassing, because you know, I was young, but I 
still knew and the other kids knew that it wasn’t something 
good … I think that’s one of the things that actually I will 
never forget and that if they could, you know, I don’t think 
that that was right that they came into the school. 
 
 Patrice, Angelina, Christina and Emilia provided vivid descriptions of the shame 
they felt when they were picked up or dropped off in what Patrice described as “this 
vehicle that says State of New Jersey on it.”  They all felt that the state-identified 





described trying to avoid entering or leaving the state vehicle when her friends were 
nearby.  “They make this big deal about how your child welfare records are sealed then 
they do things like pick you up at school in their State of New Jersey van,” Emilia said. “I 
feel like you were an idiot if you didn’t know I was in foster care.” 
Similarly, Angelina recounted her caseworkers wearing “these big nametags, like, 
you know they’re a DYFS worker” when they came to meet her at school or work.  She 
often felt she had to explain the visit – and, with it, private details of her living situation – 
to friends, teachers, and even supervisors at her job. 
 Informants also lamented their lack of privacy in discussing their options and 
preferences.  Lakesha, for example, felt that she should have been able to talk with her 
sister and the judge privately when discussing whether she wanted to return to live with 
her biological mother or remain with her foster mother.  Being forced unexpectedly to 
make that choice at a meeting in front of all the parties concerned – including both her 
biological mother and her foster mother – was stressful:  
I was scared because I didn’t want to say like the wrong 
answer… I was glad they asked me my opinion but I 
thought that I should have been able to speak in private. I 
didn’t like that it was on the spot and you had to talk about 
it in front of everybody. 
 
 Emilia recounted various episodes in which she was required to discuss personal 
issues in front of friends and other foster children.   
She [the caseworker] would show up randomly at the foster 
home I was in, I’d have friends over and she’d just show up 
and talk to me right here in front of everyone. I was just 
like, ‘I don’t want to talk about this right here.’ She’d be 






Another time, Emilia said she was embarrassed when her caseworker pulled her 
into a crowded hallway at the group home in which she was living and loudly asked 
whether she was sexually active. 
I Can Talk for Myself 
 
 The former foster youth who participated in this study wanted to speak for 
themselves. They felt that they were capable of identifying their own best interests and 
advocating for themselves when important decisions were being made about their lives. 
This theme mirrors findings from previous literature which suggest that foster youth wish 
to have a greater say in decisions about their lives regardless of whether those decisions 
are being made by their child welfare caseworkers in an office or by a judge in court.  
For Emilia, talking for herself was a way to “fight my own battles” such as 
persuading the child welfare system “to stop putting me in group homes and shelters I 
didn’t want to be in.”  Emilia felt she was more able than her law guardian to recognize 
her best interests and advocate for them convincingly. Thus, when her law guardian told 
Emilia that it was the guardian’s job to talk for Emilia in court, Emilia responded by 
telling her “I really don’t need you to talk for me. I can talk for myself.” Although Emilia 
was not permitted to attend court, she spoke for herself through letters she wrote to the 
judge. She feels the messages in those letters were clear and effective: “There was such a 
huge difference between her [the law guardian] always going to court and nothing 






M’Chelle felt that previous decision-making experiences demonstrated her 
competence to make her own decisions while she was in care:  
I took care of myself.  I took care of my little brother. So it 
was like I had to make a lot of decisions for me and him 
both. I’d been doing that for, since I was old enough to 
understand. Maybe like, since I was 10. 
 
Angelina felt that being able to speak for herself was essential, given that she had 
the most intimate understanding of her own life: “They assumed that we have no idea 
what’s going on but in actuality, we should be the ones governing things because we are 
the ones that know what’s going you, you know?” 
Speaking for one’s self also provides youth in foster care with a way to ensure 
that the bureaucrats and judges who make important decisions about their lives know 
them as individuals.  This was important to Janelle: Despite praising her law guardian’s 
efforts to represent her interests and wishes in court, Janelle ultimately decided that she 
wanted to talk personally with the judge who presided over her case.  “I’m a person, not 
just a name…I wanted to let the judge, you know, see who I am . . . The important thing 
was that I got to talk with him myself. He knew who I was.” 
Being Spoken For 
 
Being spoken for – the converse of speaking for one’s self – was equally an 
element of participating in life decisions while in foster care that emerged from this 
study. In some cases, respondents identified particular individuals, such as CASA 
volunteers and law guardians, who were officially charged with representing their 
preferences and interests in formal decision-making arenas.  In addition, informants 





general, the respondents felt that the people who were charged with speaking for them 
often did so with little information about their lives or their preferences. 
Informants who had CASA volunteers assigned to their cases typically understood 
that the volunteer’s role was to represent their interests in court.  “I was too young. I 
didn’t go to court,” Angelina said. “ But I know they [CASA volunteer] went to court on 
our behalf and would speak for us.”  The respondents had a less clear understanding of 
the role played by their appointed law guardian.  
Although law guardians are assigned to all youth, several study participants did 
not know who their law guardians were and some had no idea they had one.  
I don’t really know what her [the law guardian’s] purpose 
was to be honest. I mean if you don’t want to advocate for 
what’s right for me what are you doing here?  Why do I 
even have a law guardian? Why should I have one?  I don’t 
think she knew me at all.  I don’t think she knew what was 
right for me either. 
 
Several respondents reported having difficulty keeping up with frequent changes 
in the CASA volunteers and law guardians assigned to their cases.  As Angelina said 
about her succession of CASA volunteers: “Eventually they just disappeared and we 
didn’t talk to them anymore.” 
Informants also cited many examples of their caseworkers and other decision 
makers asking foster parents, parents and other caregivers for information that the 
respondents felt should have been obtained directly from them.  M’Chelle reported that 
during her second stay in foster care, her caseworker typically would check up on her by 
speaking or exchanging emails with her foster mother, rather than visiting M’Chelle or 





Well, she [the caseworker] didn’t speak to me, but she 
would speak with who I was staying with. She [the foster 
mother] would tell me like ‘Oh, your caseworker called and 
asked about you’ or ‘She emailed me and asked about you.’ 
I was like ‘Oh, okay, that’s nice of her but I’m fine. 
 
Although M’Chelle said she preferred having little interaction with her 
caseworker, Lakesha felt angry that her caseworker consulted solely with her foster 
mother regarding the decisions that were being made about Lakesha’s life. “My 
experience with DYFS was that they rarely ask your opinion or ask you any question 
except for, ‘Are you getting beat?,’ ‘Are they feeding you?,’ ‘Are you going to school?’ 
They always used to talk to the parent, mostly.” 
Lakesha felt that her foster mother and her caseworker conspired to keep secret an 
upcoming meeting at which Lakesha and her sister would tell the court whether they 
preferred to return to their biological mother or remain in foster care.  As a result, 
Lakesha and her sister had essentially no time to discuss or think through the answer they 
would give at the meeting: “They were like who do you want to live with?  It was like – I 
looked at this person, I looked at that person. Look at this person, look at that person, and 
you just had to choose.”  
In Lakesha’s case, she felt that her caseworker developed a stronger bond with her 
foster mother than with her. “They were more like the parent worker than the worker for 
the child.”  She thinks that foster parents and caseworkers formed friendships and “forgot 
that they’re here for the child and not the foster parent, because half of the time the 
decisions were made just between them [the caseworker and the foster parent], we had no 





Emilia also felt that her law guardian’s focus was misdirected.  She described her 
law guardian as “hating” the child welfare agency and, as a result, advocating for family 
reunification against Emilia’s wishes.  
Pretty much what she was fighting for was to get us home 
and I knew that wasn’t realistic . . . I feel like, if anything, 
she was fighting for my parents. I don’t really think she was 
advocating what was best for me and my brothers but rather 
for what my parents wanted.  She’d say, ‘Well they want 
you back so that’s what I’m going to try to do.’ Like her job 




 Powerlessness covers a wide range of experiences and feelings that stem from 
having little control over important aspects of one’s life.  For some informants, 
powerlessness was reflected in the feeling of being bullied or coerced into choosing a 
specific option. For others it manifested itself as a sense of dependency, or a feeling that 
many aspects of their lives were contingent on the actions of others.  
 Several respondents described incidents in which they felt pressured by a 
caseworker or other adult to make a specific choice. Patrice, for example, felt pushed by 
her caseworker to live with her sister after leaving care although she had serious concerns 
about that arrangement. Her caseworker told her directly that “if I was you Patrice that 
would be my best first option, to go home.” 
 Emilia felt that her caseworker put an unrealistically idyllic spin on a potential 
group home placement in an effort to deceive Emilia into consenting:  “She definitely 
overstated it. That’s what she thought would be best for me but I didn’t think it would be 





 Christina, who was involved with the child welfare system both as a child and as a 
parent – felt that her dual role left her vulnerable to coercion by caseworkers.  Christina 
reported feeling that if she didn’t comply with the agency’s demands in her son’s case 
(specifically that she complete a substance abuse treatment program), her caseworker 
would retaliate by removing her from a foster home that she liked.  Conversely, Christina 
felt that if she caused any friction in her own case (as the child-victim), the agency would 
retaliate by taking away her son. 
Powerlessness was also reflected in the general sense expressed by study 
participants that their lives were contingent upon the actions of others, including their 
biological parents. Jordan, for example, was able to return home after his first stint in 
foster care only because his mother, a substance abuser,  “did what she had to do to get 
me back. She cleaned herself up. She got a job, an apartment.”  His leaving a group home 
in Jersey City was contingent upon his aunt and uncle agreeing to take him back into their 
home. 
Caseworkers sometimes contributed to the respondents’ feelings of 
powerlessness.  Emilia described being asked to choose between two placements and 
then, after having done so, having the option she had selected taken away.  
A lot of times they asked me what I wanted but then, in the 
end, even if I made a decision for myself, the decisions 
ended up being made for me. It seemed that whenever I 
told them what I wanted it would end up as ‘Oh, well, 






An Unclear System 
 
 Being involved in life decisions while in foster care often involves not having a 
clear understanding of the people, practices, policies and procedures that determine the 
direction one’s life will take. The former foster youth who participated in this study 
reported knowing little about how the child welfare system worked or the roles that 
caseworkers, foster parents, law guardians, and CASA volunteers were supposed to play 
in their lives.   
 Most respondents lacked a clear understanding of the court processes that were 
supposed to guide and protect them while in an out-of- home placement.  M’Chelle, for 
example, knew that “somebody had to go to court – I think it was my mother. I’m not 
sure.”  Similarly, Angelina knew that “they were going to court to straighten everything 
out. But it’s really all I knew. I didn’t really know the details.” 
 The interviewees for this study were also confused about the roles that different 
professionals and volunteers played in their lives.  M’Chelle recalled a meeting in which 
the termination of her mother’s parental rights was discussed, but was confused about 
who, exactly, spoke with her about this important matter: “Maybe she was [a law 
guardian]. But I thought she was a caseworker. I did speak with somebody who came to 
the house. But I assumed she was a caseworker. I never knew who the different players 
were.”   
Being involved with both the child welfare and the children’s mental health 
systems, Jordan also had a difficult time telling his caseworkers apart.   Although he 





age 16 was a foster care placement, he did not recall seeing a child welfare worker after 
age 14: “I saw them a couple of times when I was in South Jersey, but then they just 
disappeared.” 
 Study participants also reported knowing little about the rules and policies that 
influenced their individual cases.  Most did not know that they could ask to attend court 
hearings.  Emilia, who asked to do so after learning that a friend attended a custody 
hearing at age 16, was told she would not be allowed in court, although no reason was 
ever provided for that pronouncement. 
 Jordan indicated that he understood very little about the child welfare system and 
how it worked.  He did not recall ever speaking with a law guardian during the 15 years 
he spent in foster care.  In fact, he didn’t know that the courts were involved in his case:  
“I always thought it was my caseworker deciding all those things like taking me away 
from my mother, putting me in foster care, moving me around from one place to another. 
I never knew the courts had anything to do with it.”  Although Jordan was aware that his 
child welfare case had been closed, he was uncertain how or when that had happened.   
 Christina did not recall making a transition plan or talking about leaving care, 
never attended a case review meeting, never heard of a case plan and never attended court 
in the case in which she was the foster child.  She was better informed about the case in 
which she was a parent.  As a parent, Christina found her legal representative very 
helpful:   
I talk to him all the time. He helped me tremendously. He 
was great. He basically just talked to me on a personal 
level, which I respected a lot more, because he made me 





me like all the other DYFS workers. He talked to me as a 
friend…. 
 
 In some cases, participants believed that adults had intentionally withheld from 
them information that would have helped them to understand various aspects of decisions 
that were made about their lives.  Lakesha, for example, felt that her foster mother and 
caseworker deliberately avoided telling her and her sister about an upcoming meeting at 
which they would be asked whether they wanted to return to their mother’s care.  
[T]he thing about our foster mom, she don’t tell us nothing. 
Well, she never did. She never told us nothing until the day 
of or, like, hours before anything that revolved around my 
mom. She likes to keep things secretive and like she just 
brought us there. She used to have problems with the case 
manager who was the one who told us everything. 
 
 Janelle felt that information about available services was kept from her at her 
transition-planning meeting.  Although the team agreed to provide her with driving 
lessons and some clothing, the discussion focused on making sure Janelle was aware that 
services would soon be stopping:   
They were just saying that, basically, when I aged out that, 
the only thing that they told me is that the services will stop 
at age 21, when I’m 21 now, and um, that was basically it.  
That’s all they basically told me. 
 
 Both Angelina and M’Chelle had caseworkers who failed to provide them with 
information about the transition-related services for which they were eligible. Both 
women learned about the New Jersey Foster Scholars Program from high school 
guidance counselors rather than from child welfare agency representatives.  In addition, 





which would have provided her with health care and prescription benefits through age 21.  
By the time she learned about this option, it was too late for her to enroll in the program. 
No One Cares 
 
 Some of the youth who participated in this study felt that the professionals 
involved in their cases were not interested in hearing their opinions.  They saw that lack 
of interest as an indication that the professionals did not care about them as people.  That 
conclusion was confirmed in their minds by infrequent visits from caseworkers, an 
unresponsive system of government-supervised care, and a lack of focus on the 
respondents as the primary clients of the system. 
 For many informants, the feeling that no one cared about them was exacerbated 
by the instability of their placements.  Lakesha, for example, was first placed with her 
grandfather, who was unable to care for her because of his age.  Next, she went to live 
with an aunt who eventually decided “she didn’t want us.”  As Lakesha progressed 
through about eight different foster homes, she felt that the adults charged with her care 
were motivated more by the financial compensation they received for being foster parents 
than by a sincere interest in caring for her: “Most of the people we went with, it was like 
all about the money. When DYFS wouldn’t pay that month, they’re like, ‘Oh, well, we 
don’t want them no more.’ That’s one thing I remember.” 
 Several study participants interpreted their caseworkers’ and law guardians’ lack 
of responsiveness as another sign that the system did not care about them.  Recalling her 
time in foster care, Patrice said: “I was like a client to them. I wasn’t a human being that 





I just felt that anyone who was a part of DYFS just didn’t 
have no sympathy for how my life went. It was like a 
project they had to do…They wasn’t too much into my 
wellbeing and how I would turn up. 
 
Lakesha described calling the child welfare agency to inquire about getting her 
own apartment.   
You call them to see what programs that are available, 
that’s available to us. It’s like they don’t call you back and 
when you call them again, they say, ‘Hold on, I’ll call you 
back,’ which turns into weeks. It’s like you just give up at 
the end because it’s like they really don’t care. 
 
 The theme of confronting an uncaring system surfaced in Angelina’s statements 
about the lack of face-to-face interaction with her DYFS worker. She described how 
DYFS failed to visit her foster home frequently enough to notice that her father, who had 
been banned from living there, actually stayed with them “for months on end.” Angelina 
encountered the same lack of attention when she moved into her own apartment at age 
17:  “Should I have been on my own? No, but they didn’t even know.”  Angelina 
described her caseworker as having met with her rarely, and as not having shown up for 
planned appointments: “Even when I was little, they didn’t care enough about me to even 
talk to me.” 
The lack of follow-up by the child welfare system after their cases were closed 
confirmed to some of the respondents that the system did not care about them.   
The minute those papers [awarding legal guardianship to 
her foster mother] were signed, they [DYFS] kicked us out. 
We were like, ‘Dang – that’s harsh.’ They didn’t even call 
to check to us to see if we’re okay. Nobody come to our 









 Being in foster care involves loneliness.  Foster youth have a sense of being 
abandoned by people they love and being pulled away from their families. They also feel 
alone in their placement settings, whether they are the only child living with a foster 
family or are one of many youth living in a group home.  In this study, respondents 
reported feeling that they did not fit in with care providers and other youth.  And their 
loneliness often was exacerbated by their own actions, including deliberately isolating 
themselves from others to avoid having to divulge details about their foster care 
experience.  Finally, upon aging out of foster care, youth find themselves truly alone: left 
to survive on their own with little or no social or financial support. 
Citing the embarrassment they felt about being in foster care, Patrice and 
M’Chelle both limited their social interactions with peers and co-workers to avoid having 
to explain their involvement with the child welfare system. Angelina’s early decision to 
fill her time with school and work enabled her to “keep to myself.” 
Janelle and Emilia both recalled feeling they did not fit in with their foster 
families. For Janelle, making friends with the other children in her placement was 
difficult. “That’s why I back away from trying to find friends,” Janelle said. “I’m putting 
myself out there and getting hurt.” 
 Jordan described feeling alone, even when he was placed in a large residential 
treatment facility: “It had its ups and downs. We weren’t independent, but we were 
independent. Like, what I mean by that is, we were pretty much left alone and had to do 





during the two years he resided at the facility, which contributed to his sense of isolation.  
He eventually joined a gang: “Basically, when I was in there I was cut off from 
everything; I had no family. The only family that was in there was the gang.” 
The feeling of being solitary was heightened after leaving foster care. Patrice, for 
example, described feeling alone in her basement apartment. M’Chelle spoke about 
staying up at night worrying about what would happen if she needed to leave where she 
lives. “I’d really have no place to go. No place. I’m really on my own.” 
 Of the study participants, Although Janelle probably received the most transition 
services. Still, Janelle felt that as she grew older, the child welfare system “started pulling 
away” and ultimately abandoned her completely: “I didn’t have anybody to count on and 
stuff.  I worry a lot about what I should do now since I don’t have anybody to count on to 
help me along the way.” 
Confidence 
 
 Participating in decisions about one’s life while in foster care both requires and 
promotes self-confidence. The former foster youth who participated in this study said 
they needed to feel confident in order to advocate for themselves.  They also reported 
gaining confidence when they were able to advocate successfully for their own interests. 
 According to M’Chelle, advocating for herself when she entered foster care a 
second time required self-confidence according to M’Chelle.  
I used to be really self-conscious. I felt people were looking 
at me, judging me. I used to be real self-conscious but now, 
I don’t care. I used to care a lot about what people thought 
and I used to be like I want to, I don’t want this person to 





something like that. Like, but I used to think a lot more 
about that kind of stuff but I don’t care anymore. 
 
In her interview, M’Chelle spoke about the role of self-confidence in being able to 
advocate for her needs. “I feel like that all starts from first of all having some type of self 
confidence or something, so when I was younger, like I just started getting self 
confidence. I had to build that on my own.” 
 Discussing the success of her letter-writing campaign, Emilia recognized the link 
between self-advocacy and self-confidence. “Feeling like someone actually heard what I 
was saying – even if I didn’t get to go to court – really changed all of that for me,” Emilia 
said. “I realized that I could actually change things and make them better.” 
The respondents who lacked opportunities to participate in decisions about their 
lives while in care surmised that they might have gained confidence if they had been 
allowed to do so.  According to Patrice,  
If I would have had those decisions I think I would have 
been a little bit more…Like…I don’t know, I’m so timid 
sometimes. Like I know I can do it but I’m so worried 




 Broken promises are common in foster care.  The former foster youth who 
participated in this study cited numerous examples of being told by their caseworker that 
an event or development was going to happen and then being told later that it would not.  





Sometimes study participants were provided with incorrect information about 
their eligibility for services upon leaving care. Lakesha recalls being promised services 
and assistance when she attended a court-sponsored program for aging-out youth.  
The judge told us so many stuff that was going to happen 
and it never did. When we were in DYFS we were told that 
there was an independent living program that we could go 
to when we were done [being in care]. And then, when our 
case was closed, they just dropped half of the programs we 
were in and we didn’t receive anything. 
 
 Emilia was advised that if she stayed in foster care past age 18, she would receive 
a living stipend directly from the child welfare agency, which would enable her to move 
into her own apartment.  However, “[t]hey completely flipped the script on me. I turned 
18 and never got any money.”  Emilia also had trouble accessing scholarship money that 
she had been promised.  
[T]he day before I’m supposed to leave for school, they 
[DYFS] tell me that they can’t help me financially in any 
way, shape, or form. They promised me so much and they 
just went back on it. The day before I’m leaving for school 
– my mom is trying her best to buy things for my apartment 
at school. I need to take out loans since I’m not getting the 
scholarship. It’s a mess. 
 
 When Emilia was given the opportunity to decide which of two placement 
settings she preferred, one of the two options was then withdrawn with no explanation. 
“She [caseworker] was always kind of screwing me over,” Emilia remembered.
 Participants were particularly upset about being offered no explanation of why a 
decision was changed.  Emilia, for instance, was told that she could remain in a shelter 





The next day comes and she’s [caseworker] like: ‘Pack 
your bags, get ready to go.’ And I’m like, screaming and 
crying. Now I don’t want to leave the shelter. I’m like, ‘Are 
you serious right now?’ So I’m like crying, and I’m like, 
‘Where are you taking me?’ She wouldn’t tell me where 
she was taking me until she took me there.  She brought me 
back to the first foster home we [Emilia and her brothers] 
were in before I went to the shelter. 
 
 In discussing his placement changes, Jordan noted that he was rarely told the 
reason for those moves: “It was always, ‘This is what’s going to happen.’ . . . Somebody 
was always showing up saying, ‘You have to do this. You have to go there.’ They never 
had an explanation of anything.  Never told me why.” 
Acting Out 
 
 When they were not given the opportunity to participate in decisions about their 
lives while in foster care, the informants interviewed for this study found other ways to 
express their opinions.  While some channeled their energies into constructive efforts 
such as writing letters and attending court sessions, most acted out in negative ways both 
to express their displeasure and to get what they want.  
 The interviewees described various ways in which they “acted out” as a response 
to not being involved in decision making.  Patrice, for example, admitted to acting out 
intentionally with the goal of being removed from a placement that she disliked.  
Patrice’s decision to act out, rather than discussing the situation with a caseworker, may 
not be surprising since her caseworker had ignored her report of physical abuse in her 
first placement.  Janelle also recalled getting into arguments and being disruptive in order 





For Angelina, acting out involved refusing to cooperate with her caseworker.  She 
viewed her lack of cooperation as an effort to gain some control over the situation:  “I 
couldn’t control the fact that they [DYFS] were involved, but I could control how 
involved they were going to be.”  Angelina described behaving in a way that made her 
caseworker’s job more difficult – for example, refusing to alter her work schedule in 
order to attend meetings with her caseworker.  Angelina also would refuse to engage in 
conversations with her caseworkers.  
I would never give them any information. Anything they 
asked, all I’m going to say is ‘No.’. . . That was probably 
the only control I had in the situation was, you know, I can 
control not to say anything to you and eventually, I’m 
hoping you’re going to eventually go away. 
 
Angelina felt that refusing to cooperate was a way of expressing her discontent 
over her involvement with the child welfare system:  
I kind of liked pissing them off. I know they came to the 
meeting thinking that they would get all of this information 
out of me. But I was always a jerk about it. I was like, ‘No, 
you’re not getting anything today.’ 
 
Later, Angelina began to challenge her caseworker about agency rules and 
procedures: “Eventually it just got to the point where I would say, ‘Quote it from your 
book. Show it to me in writing. Let me see exactly where it says that.’” 
 Like Angelina, Emilia acted out against decisions with which she disagreed by 
shutting down communications with the agency and its workers.  For example, when 
forced to attend rape counseling, Emilia was difficult and uncooperative:   
I decided that I would be a bitch when I was in there. I was 
offended and upset about the way I was being treated. I sat 





her, ‘You can’t make me talk about it.’ Then I just left the 
room and was waiting outside.  
 
Jordan acted out against a placement he disliked by running away:  “I really didn’t 
want to be there at all. I ran away so many times. But I kept ending up back there because 
they [DYFS] said they didn’t have anywhere else to send me.” 
 Unhappy with the requirement that she complete a substance abuse treatment 
program, Christina acted out by skipping sessions and by not participating when she 
attended: “It was just misbehaving and stuff . . . .Why?  Because I didn’t want to be there  
. . . I thought they would just get tired of it and just discharge me. I thought they would 
just give me my son back.” 
Chapter Summary 
 
 The purpose of this chapter was to identify the specific themes that make up the 
essence of participating in decisions about one’s life while in foster care. Using thematic 
analysis, fifteen essential themes emerged that comprised the experience of participating 
in life decisions while in foster care.  These themes included (1) No Control; (2) Being 
Voiceless; (3) A Focus on Now; (4) Not Being Heard; (5) Settling; (6) Living a Public 
Life; (7) I Can Talk for Myself; (8) Being Spoken For; (9) Powerlessness; (10) Not 
Knowing; (11) No One Cares; (12) Alone; (13) Confidence; (14) Broken Promises; and 
(15) Acting Out.  The individual cases summarized in Chapter 6 served as the basis for 
identifying these essential themes.  Analysis began by reading the transcripts and texts as 





Meaning units were then organized into broader themes to illustrate the phenomenon of 








CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION 
 
We gather other people’s experiences because  
they allow us to become more experienced ourselves. 
--- Max van Manen (1990) 
 
Introduction and Plan for the Chapter 
 
 This chapter summarizes the findings of the study and discusses the study’s 
contribution to our understanding of the experience of participating in decisions about 
one’s life while in foster care.  Additionally, the chapter outlines the limitations of this 
research, assesses the study’s implications for child welfare practice and policy, and 
suggests future areas of inquiry. 
Summary of Findings 
 
This study explored the lived experiences of foster youth in participating in 
decisions about their lives while in care.  Using a research methodology grounded in 
hermeneutic phenomenology, the study sought to identify the “essence” of this 
experience through careful analysis of the self-reported experiences of eight former foster 
youth.  Fifteen themes emerged from the interviews of those young adults: (1) No 
Control; (2) Being Voiceless; (3) A Focus on Now; (4) Not Being Heard; (5) Settling; (6) 
Living a Public Life; (7) I Can Talk for Myself; (8) Being Spoken For; (9) 
Powerlessness; (10) Not Knowing; (11) No One Cares; (12) Alone; (13) Confidence; (14) 





Some of these themes – such as “No Control,” “Being Voiceless,” “Not Being 
Heard,” “I Can Talk for Myself” and “Being Spoken For” – echo findings from earlier 
literature that identified a lack of meaningful opportunities for foster youth to participate 
in important decisions about their lives while in care (Baldry & Kemmis, 1998; 
Freundlich & Avery, 2005; Freundlich, Avery, & Padgett, 2007; Murray & Hallet, 2000; 
Thomas & O’Kane, 1999; Wilson & Conroy, 1999; Zinn & Slowriver, 2008; Bridge, 
2010).   
For the informants in this study, “No Control” described the experience of having 
little or no influence over the events in one’s own life. No Control is the converse of 
empowerment, which is defined as the process by which “individuals gain control over 
their lives” (Perkins & Zimmerman, 1995, p. 570).   Hence, being involved in decisions 
about one’s life while in foster care – or, more often, not being involved in such decisions 
– proved to be a disempowering experience for study participants. 
“I Can Talk for Myself,” another theme that emerged from this study, describes 
the informants’ expressed desire to state their preferences, to influence decisions, and to 
make decisions themselves. Previous research on children’s participation in decisions 
about their lives while in foster care has consistently yielded similar findings. In a survey 
of foster care alumni, Lake, Snell, Perry and associates (2004) found that 14% of 
respondents felt that allowing children to have more say in their cases was the single 
most important improvement the foster care system could make.  Further, 99% of the 
respondents in that study viewed it as important to allow children in foster care to have 





the majority of the 21 foster youth they interviewed for an evaluation of a Florida legal 
representation program for children entering shelter care desired a direct say in the 
decisions made about their cases. 
“Being Voiceless,” “Not Being Heard” and “Being Spoken For” describe some of 
the ways in which the informants lost a sense of control over their lives. While related, 
these four themes are conceptually distinct and reflect ideas from different social and 
behavioral science disciplines. 
“Being Voiceless” captures the experience of not having an opportunity to speak 
on one’s own behalf and, as a result, relinquishing the responsibility of directing one’s 
present or future life. This theme converges with the concept of “voice” that emerges 
from procedural justice theory.  In a procedural justice framework, voice describes the 
ability to express a viewpoint about an issue under consideration, regardless of whether 
one has a say in the final decision.  Voice has been found to further the client’s sense of 
control over the decision-making process (Cohen, 1985; Thibault & Walker, 1978).  
Having a voice promotes a sense of procedural fairness, which in turn contributes to 
greater satisfaction with the decision being made.  From a procedural justice viewpoint, 
Being Voiceless suggests that foster children who do not participate in decisions about 
their lives while in care may form negative opinions about the decisions that ultimately 
are made, because they believe the procedures which gave rise to those decisions were 
unfair.  
Having their opinions ignored, misunderstood or misinterpreted was central to the 





informants’ feeling disrespected.  That link reflected another key concept in the 
procedural justice literature.  Previous studies have found that respect, which is defined 
as the extent to which individuals feel they are treated with dignity during proceedings 
and believe their rights are protected, is positively correlated with satisfaction with 
decision outcomes (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Burke & Leben, 2007; Tyler, 1994a).  Hence, 
Not Being Heard and the lack of respect that it implied for study participants may 
facilitate negative feelings among foster youth about both the decision-making process 
and the decisions that are made.  
“Being Spoken For” captured another experience that contributed to the feeling of 
having no control over one’s life for study participants.  It stemmed from the child 
welfare system’s reliance on caseworkers, law guardians, CASA volunteers, foster 
parents and other adults to communicate the interests and desires of foster children when 
important decisions were being made. The experience of Being Spoken For was 
particularly frustrating for some informants because they felt that the individuals charged 
with representing them did not know enough about them to fulfill that responsibility 
adequately.   
Like Being Voiceless and Not Being Heard, the theme of Being Spoken For 
reflects concepts from procedural justice literature, particularly the roles of neutrality and 
trust in authorities in influencing perceptions of procedural fairness.  In procedural justice 
theory, neutrality refers to the extent to which legal principles are consistently applied, 
decision makers are perceived as unbiased, and decision making is transparent (Blader & 





as the extent to which decision makers are viewed as benevolent, caring and sincere in 
their efforts (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Burke & Leben, 2007; Tyler, 1994a).  Being Spoken 
For by adults who are perceived as neither neutral nor trustworthy is likely to provoke 
negative feelings among foster youth about the ways in which decisions about their lives 
are made while they are in care. 
A second group of themes – “Settling” and “Acting Out” – captured the study 
participants’ experience in reacting to having few opportunities to contribute to decisions 
about their lives while in care.  Both of the themes in this group reflect a core concept 
from literature on the sociology of childhood, namely, that children are social actors 
within their own lives (Corsaro, 2011; James & James, 2001; Reich, 2010). 
“Settling” refers to accepting a decision or situation that is perceived as being less 
than optimal.  Informants typically settled because they feared that challenging a decision 
could leave them vulnerable, like the frogs in Aesop’s fable, to having their situation 
altered for the worse. Informants also settled because they feared retaliation by the adults 
in charge or because they had just given up. 
The respondents described “Acting Out” as a reaction to having little control over 
decisions about their lives. Acting Out involved engaging in undesirable behaviors with 
the ultimate goal of expressing displeasure, with either a specific decision or with the 
general sense of having no control over a situation.  Acting Out included an array of 
disruptive behaviors, such as engaging in altercations with foster parents and other 






The themes in the final group – “A Focus On Now,” “Living a Public Life,” 
“Powerlessness,” “An Unclear System,” “No One Cares,” “Alone,” “Confidence” and 
“Broken Promises” – provide a more nuanced understanding of the experience of being 
involved in decisions about one’s life while in foster care.  These elements of the 
experience also reflect theories and concepts found in social and behavioral science 
literature. 
“A Focus on Now,” as a theme, reflects the informants’ desire to convey opinions 
about, and focus decision making on, their current quality of life.  While some informants 
had opportunities to participate in planning for their future transition out of the child 
welfare system, most felt the system failed to focus sufficient attention on aspects of their 
current lives.  This theme is consistent with academic critiques of the focus of early 
literature on the sociology of childhood on the outcomes of socialization, or how children 
grow into adults.  While it was the standard paradigm for studying childhood for many 
decades, the outcome of socialization has been criticized for focusing on what the child 
will become in the future, rather than what the child currently is (Alanen, 1998; Corsaro, 
2011). 
Another theme that emerged in this study, “Living a Public Life,” highlighted 
informants’ experience of feeling that intimate details of their lives were shared publicly 
without their consent or approval.  Subjects described the embarrassment of admitting to 
others that they were involved with the child welfare system and their antipathy toward 
routinely having to discuss personal issues with caseworkers and others in public 





disrespected and unvalued as a person.  In addition to the relationship between respect 
and perceptions of process fairness that was previously discussed, feeling unvalued has 
been identified as a barrier to successful identity development, a key developmental task 
in adolescence (Erickson, 1968; Steinberg, 2008).  In studies that examined the 
developmental trajectories of children in foster care, lack of support, individual 
consideration and respect were identified as barriers to successful identity development 
(Kools, 1997; Mulkerns & Owens, 2008). 
The theme of “Powerlessness” captures the informants’ feeling that they lacked 
the ability to influence their own lives.  Powerlessness reflected a sense of feeling 
dependent upon the adults who make decisions for them, speak for them, and advocate 
for them. Powerlessness in that sense has been linked to clients’ perception of decreased 
control, reduced access to resources, and limited social networks (Perkins & Zimmerman, 
1995). 
Informants interviewed for the study often were in a position of experiencing “An 
Unclear System” meaning that they lacked critical information about how the child 
welfare system operates, the checks and balances that are (or should be) in place to 
protect clients, and the roles that various adults play in the system.  The interactional 
component of psychological empowerment, which focuses on “the understanding people 
have about their community and related sociopolitical issues,” offers some insights into 
assessing the broader implications of this finding (Zimmerman, 1995, p. 589).  
Empowerment theory suggests that to be capable of becoming empowered to achieve 





environment (Zimmerman, 1995). The former foster youth in this study knew little about 
the child welfare system or the legal system, the primary domains in which major 
decisions about their lives are made.  That lack of knowledge impeded their ability to 
participate meaningfully in those decisions.   
“No One Cares” describes the respondents’ experience of feeling unwanted and 
unvalued.  The interviewees also described this theme as a feeling that others are not 
committed to their present or their future. Developmental theories suggest that the 
perception that No One Cares may portend difficulty in establishing an individual 
identity, a key developmental task in adolescence. Kools (1997) found that foster care 
had a negative effect on adolescent identity development, and linked that effect to the 
experience of being devalued by others.  Kools found that “excessive restrictiveness, a 
lack of individual consideration and respect, a focus on pathology and deviance, and 
discontinuity of caregiving . . . negatively shaped the central process of identity 
development” for youth in foster care (p. 266). 
“Alone” describes how many informants felt both while in foster care and after 
leaving the system.  They often did not feel they were a part of the families in which they 
were fostered and viewed themselves as separated and alone, even while living in 
congregate care settings.  Many sought solitude intentionally, particularly to avoid having 
to explain their involvement with the child welfare system to others.  The positive youth 
development framework, which has emerged as an alternative to traditional stage-based 
models of adolescent development, suggests that adolescents’ interactions and 





facilitate healthy development (Bornstein et al., 2003; Dowling et al., 2004). The sense of 
isolation described by study respondents suggests that youth in foster care may be 
deprived of the positive benefits of feeling connected and supported. 
The theme of “Confidence” emerged as another essential element of the 
experience of participating in life decisions while in foster care. Informants spoke about 
the dual role that Confidence played in participating in decisions. Confidence was viewed 
as a prerequisite for advocating for one’s self while in foster care.  Yet, advocating for 
one’s self (particularly if successful) also raised the informants’ feelings of self-
confidence.  The role of Confidence, as described by study participants, mirrors the 
concept of empowering processes and empowerment outcomes in the literature on 
psychological empowerment (Perkins & Zimmerman, 1995; Swift & Levin, 1987).  The 
dual role of Confidence described by informants is also reflected in Chinman and 
Linney’s (1998) adolescent empowerment cycle.  Those authors suggest that the process 
of empowerment allows adolescents to engage in different roles and develop a stable 
identity, ultimately leading to positive identity development, positive role choice, 
enhanced self-efficacy, bonding with positive social institutions, and higher self-esteem.  
Finally, “Broken Promises” reflects the study participants’ experience of being 
given inaccurate information, either intentionally or unintentionally.  Respondents 
described numerous incidents in which they had been promised services, resources or 
options only to learn later that they were either ineligible or that the items were no longer 
available to them.  The prevalence of Broken Promises suggests that key components that 





foster care.  Specifically, Broken Promises could lead to reduced trust in authorities and 
be interpreted as a sign of disrespect, both of which increase perceptions of unfairness 
(Burke & Leben, 2007; Tyler, 1994a; Blader & Tyler, 2003).   
Limitations of the Research 
 
 Adhering to a phenomenological approach, this study did not attempt to develop 
new theories. Rather, its ultimate contribution should be judged by the extent to which it 
enables readers to gain a greater understanding of a unique experience:  participating in 
decisions about one’s life while in foster care. 
 The study is subject to several limitations. First, the study depended upon the 
informants’ ability to recall events and their willingness to share personal experiences 
and feelings. The capacity of informants to remember details about their lives while in 
foster care proved to be uneven, with the greatest variation in the extent and specificity of 
early memories. Some participants were able to recall with ease vivid details about their 
lives at age eight, while others remembered little about significant, life-changing events, 
such as being placed in foster care. Respondents were able to provide the most detail 
about their later lives in foster care, particularly after age 14.   The clarity of those later 
memories was more critical to this study than the informants’ earliest recollections.  
Because studies have shown that older children are more competent to make important 
decisions about their lives, the respondents may be expected to have become more 
interested, if not involved, in such experiences as they grew older (Grisso, 1980; Grisso 
et al., 2003; Overton, 1990; Weithorn & Campbell, 1982). Hence, the period in their lives 





which they were most likely to have the capacity and the desire to be involved in decision 
making. 
Second, this study is limited by the extent to which informants were willing to 
share personal stories and feelings with the researcher.  Since several of the subjects 
expressed feelings of embarrassment over their involvement with the child welfare 
system, they may have been hesitant to share memories or feelings of their time in foster 
care honestly and openly.   The study attempted to overcome participants’ reticence by 
conducting two interviews with each informant and asking each informant to review the 
initial analysis and findings.  In general, respondents appeared more engaged during the 
second interview – perhaps due to an increased comfort level with the researcher.  The 
respondents also may have used the time between the first and second interviews to 
reflect upon the questions and their foster care experiences.  In the second interviews, 
several participants indicated that they wished to supplement or clarify information 
provided at the first meeting. 
Third, only eight foster youth were interviewed for this study. The small, 
convenience sample limits the ability to generalize the findings of this study to the larger 
population of former foster youth.  Although a small sample size is typical for 
phenomenological studies, it reduces the likelihood of capturing the entire spectrum of 
experiences that foster youth undergo in making decisions about their lives while in care.   
Fourth, the use of a convenience sample that included only former foster youth 
who were enrolled in post-secondary educational pursuits limits the suitability of this 





youth is low, the informants in this study may not fairly represent the population of foster 
youth as a whole. The primary goal of this study, however, was not to generalize its 
findings to a larger population of foster youth.  Rather, the aim of this research was to 
describe the essence of participating in decisions about one’s life while in foster care in a 
manner that drew on the experiences of a unique group of study participants.  
Finally, a single researcher interviewed all the participants and conducted all the 
data analysis for this study.  As a result, the study’s findings are susceptible to the 
researcher’s individual biases.  Several steps were taken to minimize any bias the 
researcher brought to the study.  The researcher engaged in bracketing, a 
phenomenological technique that seeks to have the researcher identify and set aside any 
preconceived notions that the researcher holds regarding the experience being studied.  
For example, the researcher’s motives for investigating this topic are identified in the first 
chapter of this study.  Efforts to minimize the influence of theory on the analysis included 
conducting a theory review and preparing the chapter on theoretical frameworks after 
interviews had commenced.   Finally, efforts to reduce bias brought to the project by the 
researcher were assisted by engaging informants as co-researchers in the study. Each 
participant reviewed a summary description of his or her own interviews, as well as the 
preliminary analysis of themes that emerged from the interviews.  By using the 
participants as reviewers of the data, the researcher was able to confirm that she had 






Implications for Practice 
 
 The primary purpose of this phenomenological study was to understand the lived 
experiences of former foster youth in participating in decisions about their lives while in 
care. The essence of the experience that emerged from the study offers several 
implications for improving child welfare practice. 
Implications for Practice Emerging Directly from Interviews 
 Study subjects suggested numerous changes in practice that could improve the 
experiences of youth while in foster care.  The implications for practice discussed below 
are drawn directly from subjects’ experiences of participating in life decisions while in 
foster care. 
Respect the Need for Confidentiality and Privacy 
 Subjects perceived a lack of confidentiality and privacy in their relationship with 
the child welfare system.  Youth felt that standard child welfare practices – such as 
conducting interviews at their schools or their places of employment – made their status 
as foster children broadly known in their immediate communities.  As a result, they felt 
that personal information was too frequently shared with others when they would have 
preferred to keep it private.  The former foster children similarly reported being required 
to discuss personal information with their case workers in inappropriately public settings 
and, at times, in the presence of others (e.g., foster parents, other foster children, and 
school staff).  The lack of confidentiality and privacy was equated with disrespect, and 






 Because investigatory processes are involved, child welfare practice cannot be 
imbued with the same standard of privacy and confidentiality afforded to other social 
work practice areas.  Nonetheless, this study’s findings suggest that greater attention 
should be paid to finding the appropriate balance between providing thorough child 
welfare services and protecting the privacy of children involved with the system. 
 For example, former foster youth interviewed for this study felt strongly about the 
need to eliminate what they viewed as public symbols of foster children’s involvement 
with the child welfare system.  They voiced heartfelt complaints about decals that 
identified the vehicles driven by their child welfare workers as state vehicles, as well as 
the large identification badges worn by child welfare workers.  Eliminating such decals 
and badges would allow child welfare workers to be more discreet in their interactions 
with children.   
 Youth concerns related to privacy and confidentiality could also be addressed by 
applying established social work ethics to child welfare practice. This would require, at a 
minimum, that issues related to confidentiality and privacy be discussed with youth at the 
onset of their involvement with the child welfare system.  Specific activities might 
include asking children, if and to the extent that they are able to do so competently, to 
assent to a plan that establishes the type of information that would be shared and with 
whom it would be shared. Additionally, child welfare workers could protect their clients’ 
privacy by educating the individuals with whom they share information about a specific 





Particular emphasis should be placed on safeguarding confidentiality in school settings, 
where many study participants felt stigmatized due to their foster care status. 
 Finally, youth should have some say in establishing parameters for meeting with 
their social workers and others involved in their child welfare cases.  Foster youth should 
be afforded the opportunity to agree on the time and location of a meeting and what other 
parties, if any, would also attend the meeting.  Providing children in care with some 
control over the parameters of their relationship with their child welfare worker should 
increase the likelihood that their privacy needs will be met on an individual basis.  
Clarify How the Child Welfare System Works 
 The respondents in this study varied in the extent to which they understood how 
the child welfare system operates. Even those who boasted of their knowledge of the 
system often were unaware of key activities and players.  Findings from the youth who 
participated in this study suggest that child welfare practitioners should educate youth 
about the system in an age-appropriate manner and on a regular basis.  
 Information about the proceedings should be presented at the inception of a child 
welfare case.  It should include, at a minimum, a description of the key components of 
the child welfare system, an estimated timeline for case activity, and an overview of the 
roles of the adults who will be involved. This information should be presented in multiple 
ways (e.g., through pamphlets, verbal descriptions, videos, and even role play) to help 
children understand the system using their preferred learning style. Caseworkers should 
review the procedural status of the case with youth on a regular basis, providing 





The state child welfare agency should maintain a youth-oriented website that provides 
foster children with factual information about the child welfare system. 
 Helping children understand the child welfare system should not be limited to 
formal instruction.  Reflective listening practices can help caseworkers and others to 
gauge the extent to which children understand the child welfare process and the roles 
played by the adults involved.  When children seem confused or uncertain about 
particular issues, adults – especially caseworkers and law guardians – must clarify 
information for children rather than allowing them to continue to be misinformed or 
uninformed.  
 The participants in this study did not fully understand the different roles of adults 
involved with the child welfare system. Efforts to reduce confusion about the adults’ 
functions should draw upon best practices in hospital-based medical care.  Specifically, 
child welfare professionals should introduce themselves to the child every time they meet 
and provide an age-appropriate description of the role they play in the child’s case.  
Contact information for the adults involved in their case should be provided to the 
children in writing and updated on a regular basis.   
 Changes in case staffing should be clearly explained to children before they 
occur.  Where possible, departing professionals assigned to the child’s case should 
introduce their replacements directly to the child.  This type of formal transition process 
would allow children to terminate their relationships with one worker and to begin to 






Increase Opportunities to be Heard 
 The youth who participated in this study wanted opportunities to be heard when 
important decisions about their lives were being made.  While some respondents were 
consulted about their preferences on particular decisions, most recalled having little or no 
say in formal decision-making proceedings, particularly court decisions.  The child 
welfare system should create formal opportunities for children to be heard on issues 
related to their lives while in foster care.  These opportunities should be administered to 
accommodate each child’s unique preferences as to participation, needs and capabilities. 
 Youth in this study had varying experiences with being permitted to attend court 
proceedings.  Attending court was never broached in most cases.  Of the two youth who 
explicitly asked to attend court proceedings, one was permitted to do so while the other 
was told that she was not allowed to be in court.  A critical step would be to afford youth 
greater procedural rights in their court cases.  Youth should receive formal notice of 
upcoming hearings and have a right to attend court proceedings if they wish.  Such a 
move would require an array of supportive practices such as holding hearings during 
after-school hours, providing transportation to and from the courthouse, and helping 
youth to understand court procedures.  When hearings are held, children should be given 
the opportunity to speak privately with the judge on issues relating to their cases.  Such 
policies would be implemented with the goal of ensuring that children in foster care have 
opportunities to be involved in decisions about their lives.  
 Foster children’s involvement in the important decisions made about their lives 





can be facilitated by requiring that youth preferences be documented in case records.  
Where developmentally appropriate, children can be asked to sign case plans to 
document their concurrence or disagreement with specific decisions.  While it may not be 
advisable or feasible to honor the child’s preferences at all times, such a process would 
formalize the practice of asking children about their preferences and would make it easier 
to take their opinions into consideration.   
Facilitate a Sense of Control 
 The young people who participated in this study felt that they had very little 
control over most aspects of their lives while in foster care.  In addition to not being 
asked about their preferences and not being involved in decisions, respondents identified 
the lack of opportunities for recourse as having contributed to their sense of 
powerlessness. 
 Some of the previously-suggested recommendations, such as allowing youth to 
establish parameters around agency contacts, providing information about how the child 
welfare system works, and enhancing the procedural rights of children in their own cases, 
may foster children’s sense of control over key aspects of their lives.  The perceived lack 
of recourse could be addressed by providing an outlet through which foster youth can 
question or challenge decisions that are made while they are in care.  For example, an 
ombudsperson could be appointed to handle youth concerns, youth advisory boards could 
be formed to provide input into agency programs, practices and policies, and user-





 In addition to feeling a lack of control over major issues in their lives while in 
care, the youth felt unable to control many day-to-day aspects of their lives while in care. 
Youth who resided in foster homes felt that their foster parents frequently did not adapt 
their parenting styles to meet the needs of youth as they aged. As a result, some youth in 
the study felt they missed out on “typical” opportunities and experiences of growing up.  
 Similarly, youth who were placed in congregate care settings often felt 
overwhelmed by agency rules and, in some cases, felt that the rules blocked them from 
achieving their potential.  For instance, rules that limited access to bedrooms during day 
and early evening hours prevented one subject from completing homework and interfered 
with studying for tests and exams.  As a result, she ended up dropping several advanced 
placement and honors-level courses. 
 Measures to address the perception of powerlessness may include ensuring that 
foster parents and congregate care staff are trained on topics related to youth 
development, with particular attention to understanding the types of opportunities that 
youth need in order to become successful, independent adults. In addition, licensing 
requirements for congregate care settings should be reviewed to ensure that the facilities 
are attentive to developmental issues and promote, rather than hinder, the delivery of 
developmentally-appropriate services to youth in care.  Congregate care facilities should 
be discouraged from adopting a “one-size-fits-all” approach to establishing policies and 
procedures.  Finally, congregate care facilities should be required to establish an internal 





opportunity to comment on – and, where appropriate, to influence – the procedures, 
policies, rules and decisions of the facility in which they live. 
Reduce Feelings of Isolation 
 Several of the youth in this study felt a strong sense of isolation while in foster 
care.  For some participants, isolation stemmed from having limited or no contact with 
their parents, siblings, friends or other people who are important to them while they were 
in foster care. In addition, some youth reported feeling like an outsider in their foster 
families – even when they liked the family and had lived with them for an extended 
period of time.  Finally, difficult adjustments to new neighborhoods and new schools also 
contributed to a sense of isolation for some youth. 
 The participants in this study suggested numerous ways to reduce feelings of 
isolation among foster youth.  First, helping foster youth to maintain connections with 
people who are important to them must be prioritized. While policies to facilitate 
continued contact with relatives are common in child welfare, it is unclear the extent to 
which these policies help foster youth maintain connections with other people who are 
important to them, such as friends, teachers, former foster parents and neighbors.  Child 
welfare workers could proactively involve youth in identifying the people with whom 
they wish to maintain connections rather than limiting visitation to family members. 
 The finding that foster youth often feel very isolated within their foster families 
may be more difficult to remedy because it likely reflects the “temporary” nature of foster 
care. The current focus on permanency planning in child welfare – aiming for speedy 





foster parents from developing attachments to each other.  While on one hand this may 
reflect a self-protective instinct, it likely contributes to both the difficulty that many 
former foster youth have in developing healthy attachments to other people and to the 
long-term sense of “feeling different” that many study participants described.  Training 
for foster parents and counseling for foster youth may help to address these issues. 
Today Matters 
 Youth involved in this study felt that child welfare professionals paid insufficient 
attention to their present experiences in foster care.  They wanted their case workers and 
law guardians to ask them for details about their foster care placements, their school 
experiences, and other aspects of their everyday lives.  Cursory inquiries into such areas 
left study participants feeling that the child welfare system cared little about their well 
being once they entered foster care.   
 Conversely, study participants reported that volunteer advocates often took a 
more personal approach to their work, focusing on understanding the child’s current 
experiences and bringing those experiences to the attention of key decision makers.  
Former foster youth who participated in this study valued that approach and generally 
reported feeling that volunteer advocates were more caring than the professional child 
welfare staff they encountered. 
 Recommendations for practice that stem from this finding include incorporating a 
greater focus on understanding the foster youth’s current life experiences into 
professional child welfare practice and/or expanding the volunteer advocate program so 





Reduce Broken Promises 
 Youth in the study felt that promises made to them were frequently broken by the 
child welfare system.  Often this occurred when administrative or policy changes voided 
a previous agreement or decision.  In cases in which a specific plan has already been 
communicated to a child, procedures should be put into place that would allow the 
caseworker and the child to request that the agreement be “grandfathered” or allowed to 
proceed as planned.   At a minimum, youth should have the opportunity to appeal or 
request a review of any decisions that are reversed due to a policy change. 
Implications Emerging from Study Findings and Reflecting Theory, Prior Literature, 
Practice Values and Child Welfare Policy 
 
 In addition to the practice implications suggested directly by study subjects, 
implications for practice also emerge through a reflection on study findings in relation to 
social science theory, prior literature, practice values and child welfare policy.  
Involving Foster Children in Decision Making 
 
This study suggests that foster children would benefit from expanded 
opportunities to be involved in decisions about their lives while in care.  For most 
subjects in this study, the experience of participating in decisions about their lives while 
in care proved to be an experience of having few chances to do so.   
The lack of opportunities to participate in life decisions, in turn, contributed to 
several negative consequences for study participants.  In some cases, the lack of 
participation in decision making encouraged subjects to find alternative – and often 





than being able to direct their energies into collaborating with their caseworkers and law 
guardians to make careful and informed decisions about their lives, respondents ended up 
“acting out” to express discontent with the decisions that were made for them.  For the 
former foster youth in this study, acting out involved an array of behaviors that included 
fighting with foster parents and other youth, refusing to cooperate with caseworkers, and 
running away. That acting-out behavior contributed to frequent placement moves and 
unproductive client-caseworker relationships.  
The lack of decision-making opportunities may also contribute to the difficulty 
that many former foster youth face when they transition from care to adulthood.  Because 
much of their childhood is spent having little control over their day-to-day activities and 
even less control over major decisions, it is not surprising that many foster youth struggle 
with independence after leaving care (Barth, 1990; Courtney et al., 2007; Courtney & 
Piliavin, 1998; Pecora et al., 2005; Westat, 1991).   The experience of participating in 
decision making while in the child welfare system, as described by study participants, is 
essentially one that provides youth with few skills to prepare them for self-sufficiency 
immediately after leaving care.  Allowing youth gradually to assume more responsibility 
for decisions about their lives while in care would provide foster youth with more 
experience in developing and exercising the decision-making skills required for 
autonomous adult life. 
Lack of participation in decision making also contributed to informants’ feelings 
of being disrespected, uncared for and alone.  Theories across a range of social and 





consequences for foster youth (Chinman & Linney, 1998; Steinberg, 2008; Cote, 2000; 
Mulkerns & Owen, 2008; Kool, 1997; Lerner et al., 2005).  Feeling disrespected, for 
example, could breed negative perceptions of the fairness of the decision-making process 
and rejection of the decisions that are made (Burke & Leben, 2007; Lind et al., 1990; 
Roberson et al., 1999).  Similarly, the sense of feeling uncared for and alone has been 
demonstrated to have negative consequences on identity development among foster youth 
(Steinberg, 2008; Cote, 2000; Mulkerns & Owen, 2008; Kool, 1997; Lerner et al., 2005).  
Ensuring Frequent, Meaningful Interactions 
 
 In addition to a general recommendation that the child welfare system involve 
foster children in making decisions about their lives while in care, findings from this 
study also suggest specific ways in which increased participation may be facilitated. 
To begin with, caseworkers and law guardians should spend more time having 
meaningful discussions about life decisions with the foster children for whom they are 
responsible. Although caseworkers and law guardians were expected to meet regularly 
with their child clients, informants in the study indicated that such meetings rarely 
happened.  One respondent met so infrequently with her child welfare caseworker that 
she was able to move out of her foster care placement and into her own apartment at age 
17 without her caseworker’s knowledge. Another study participant could not recall 
meeting with his caseworker after turning 14.   
With few exceptions, the former foster youth who participated in this study also 
had little interaction with their law guardians.  Although one informant recalled talking 





meetings as sporadic at best.  One respondent did not even know that a law guardian had 
been assigned to his case.  
As a result, study participants expressed the belief that the adults who had the 
greatest influence on the decisions made about their lives rarely knew enough about them 
to advocate for decisions that reflected either their preferences or their best interests. 
Several efforts could be made to ensure that foster children have regular, 
meaningful interactions with their caseworkers and law guardians. First, courts could take 
a more active role in ensuring that caseworkers and law guardians indeed meet regularly 
with the foster children assigned to them to discuss important decisions and to assess 
more thoroughly what is in the children’s best interests.  Judges could support increased 
interaction by requiring caseworkers and law guardians appearing in court to provide 
documentation of such meetings, along with details about the youth’s preferences toward 
the topics that were discussed.  When assigning law guardians to represent children in 
foster care, courts could make payments for law guardian services contingent upon the 
submission of documentation confirming face-to-face meetings with their clients.   
States could also encourage enhanced interaction with foster youth by limiting 
caseload sizes for both caseworkers and law guardians as part of an effort to ensure 
facilitate meaningful interactions with foster youth. While some states have made efforts 
to reduce average caseloads for child welfare case managers, few have set limits on 
caseloads for law guardians or other legal representatives (Child Welfare Information 
Gateway, 2010a). Additionally, if there is a shortage of law guardians to handle the 





expanded by offering training programs to a broader cross-section of the profession and 
partnering with law firms and qualified private attorneys that could provide pro bono 
representation.  
Children in Court 
 
 Findings from this study also suggest that older children should have a legal right 
to attend court hearings about their cases and should be encouraged to appear in court for 
hearings where attendance would be age-appropriate.  Consistent with concepts in the 
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, establishing a legal right to attend court and 
encouraging the exercise of that right would provide foster children with “the opportunity 
to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either 
directly, or through a representative or appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the 
procedural rules of national law” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, 1989).   While the United States is not bound by a convention it has not 
signed, adhering to these standards in child welfare would afford greater protection for a 
particularly disadvantaged and vulnerable segment of the youth population. 
Children’s attendance in court would serve multiple purposes.  First, seeing 
children in court would remind adult decision makers that their choices have 
consequences for a specific child, rather than just a faceless name.  With one exception, 
respondents in this study indicated that they were never invited to attend court 
proceedings.  One respondent who expressed an interest in attending court was not 
permitted to do so. The practice of keeping foster children out of the courtroom when 





from the administrative convenience of conducting proceedings while the subject of those 
proceedings is out of the room.  
 Second, encouraging foster youth to attend court would afford them an 
opportunity to receive definitive information about the issues that are being considered 
and the decisions that are made in their cases.  Being physically present when decisions 
are made and court orders are issued would mitigate the information gap described by 
study participants.  Respondents identified various points at which they received 
inadequate information about their court cases.  In one instance, the informant did not 
even know that a court case existed.  Respondents attributed the inaccuracy or 
incompleteness of the information they received to the fact that details were filtered 
through caseworkers, foster parents, biological parents, law guardians, caseworkers 
and/or CASA volunteers before reaching them. Direct access to information about their 
cases would provide foster children with a better understanding of the child welfare 
system as it affects them.  That understanding, in turn, could translate into their increased 
respect for the processes involved.   
Third, encouraging children to attend court proceedings would assist the judiciary 
in exercising control over the child welfare agency’s administrative power, which 
presently operates largely unchecked.  Having foster children participate in court 
proceedings for their cases would help courts ensure that the children are being cared for 
appropriately and that their rights are being respected. When children attend court, judges 
can question them directly about their living situations, their interactions with their child 





understanding of the children whose cases they have responsibility for administering.  
Knowing the interests, personalities, values and goals of those children would contribute 
to more informed decisions about their best interests. Having seen and spoken to the 
children involved, judges also will be better positioned to determine the extent to which 
children understand the matters at issue and the options for their resolution.   
Finally, the opportunity to meet with the child privately would provide the judge 
with the ability to assess, from the child’s perspective, the extent to which his or her 
needs are being considered and met.  
Children’s attendance at court could be facilitated by policies that require children 
to be named as a party in child protective hearings. As of 2007, children were considered 
a party in child welfare cases in only 38 out of 50 states and the District of Columbia 
(Frederick & Sams, 2007). Children were universally required to receive notice of 
proceedings in only five states of those states.  In an additional nine states, children were 
required to be notified only after reaching a certain age (generally between 10 and 14) 
(Frederick & Sams, 2007). 
Issues that may arise in procuring children’s attendance at court include arranging 
transportation to and from court, scheduling proceedings to avoid conflicts with school or 
other activities, and providing the assistance and support necessary to prepare the child 
for court attendance and to ensure that the child will understand the nature of the 
proceedings.  While such matters would require attention and coordination, they do not 







Findings from this study underscore the need for child-centered practice in child 
welfare services (Gelles, 1996; Lonne, Parton, Thomson & Harries, 2009; Wulczyn, 
Barth, Yuan, Harden & Landsverk, 2005). This recommendation reflects current calls to 
focus the attention of the child welfare system on the children it serves, a practice that 
experts contend is “a moral imperative due to their vulnerability and general lack of 
power” (Lonne et al., 2009, p. 78). 
Former foster youth who were interviewed for this study often felt that their 
caseworkers and law guardians focused too heavily on serving the adults involved in their 
cases, and not enough on meeting the children’s needs.  In light of the statutory pressure 
to move more quickly toward reunification or another permanency option, the need to 
communicate with the child’s past, present and future caregivers, and the ever-present 
need to recruit and retain an adequate supply of foster parents, it is to be expected that 
caseworkers will focus some of their attention on the adults involved in a case (Adoption 
and Safe Families Act of 1997). Law guardians, who are appointed and paid by the courts 
to represent a child, may feel their role is that of neutral court officers rather than 
advocates for the child.  
Yet, the perceived focus on adult issues by caseworkers and law guardians left 
participants in this study feeling that the child welfare system had little interest in what 
one subject described as “how I would turn up.”  Consequently, informants in this study 
often felt alone, unheard, disrespected and uncared for – a regrettable outcome for any 





Reflecting a broader shift toward consumer-centered practice in social work, 
client-centered services would identify the child as the primary client of the child welfare 
system and direct greater attention to the child’s needs (Myers, 2006; Lonne et al., 2009). 
Focusing attention on the needs of foster children would, in turn, provide occasions for 
those children to become involved in decisions about their lives while in care.  
Inherent to a client-centered approach to practice is the recognition of client 
strengths, as well as clients’ knowledge of and expertise in their own experience. Child-
centered practice thus has the potential to introduce an important shift in how children 
who are involved with the child welfare system are viewed. Historically, abused and 
neglected children have been viewed as innocent victims in need of protection from 
inadequate or uncaring parents (Myers, 2006; Lonne et al., 2009). That perspective has 
contributed to the sense of paternalism that informs most aspects of child welfare 
practice.  Child-centered services can assist adults who work in the field in 
acknowledging and building upon the children’s role as experts about their own lives. 
A paradigm shift to child-centered practice would likely require significant 
revision to the policies that guide child welfare services and the practices that carry out 
such policies.  One step toward child-centered practice in the field could be the 
appointment of an ombudsperson to handle directly concerns that foster children have 
about the care they are receiving. The position would address an important finding that 
emerged from this study, specifically that foster children have few viable options when 





Most informants in this study had little clear knowledge of how the child welfare 
system works or how they could challenge a decision with which they disagreed. Further, 
study participants reported that their access to the courts (the objective decision-making 
authority in child welfare cases) was often impeded by foster parents, caseworkers, and 
law guardians. Having no recourse when they disagreed with decisions or felt that their 
care was inadequate, contributed to informants’ feelings of being powerless, voiceless, 
not being heard and uncared for. 
Respecting Children’s Due Process Rights 
 
Findings from this study suggest that greater attention should be paid to the due 
process rights of foster children in their own cases.  Informants complained that their 
opinions were almost universally ignored in the decision making process.  The former 
foster children recalled having little opportunity to voice an opinion and, when they did 
so, having their preferences either ignored or misinterpreted.  As a result, informants felt 
they had little control over most aspects of their lives while in foster care, which 
contributed to a sense of feeling alone, uncared for, and powerless.  Informants also felt 
that caseworkers, law guardians, foster parents and other adults involved with the child 
welfare system who were charged with representing them typically served to block their 
opinions from being expressed or heard. 
Many of the efforts previously described would likely focus attention on the 
scope, extent and quality of judicial procedure afforded to foster children.  For example, 
increasing children’s face-to-face time with caseworkers and law guardians would likely 





works – a prerequisite to understanding and protecting their due process rights.  Having 
an ombudsperson who represents their interests when conflicts arise between the 
preferences of foster children and the adults who care for them would provide a further 
outlet to address due process concerns. 
A more direct way of preserving children’s due process rights would be to adapt 
the model established in the medical field and require that foster children provide their 
views on the decisions that are made about their lives.  While the healthcare model stops 
short of universally honoring children’s preferences or requests, it does at least give them 
a formal opportunity to present their preferences (Committee on Bioethics, 1995; Society 
for Adolescent Medicine, 2004).  As demonstrated by procedural justice theory, 
providing such an opportunity would likely the clients’ perceptions of procedural fairness 
and contribute to greater satisfaction with the decisions that are made (Cohen, 1985; 
Thibault & Walker, 1978; Burke & Leben, 2007).  
Legal Representation of Children in Dependency Cases 
 
 Findings from this study raise concerns about the extent to which children in 
foster care are receiving adequate legal representation.  One former foster youth who 
participated in the study was unaware that he had an assigned law guardian to represent 
him in court. Another informant, who had been involved with the child welfare system as 
both a child-victim and as a parent, met regularly with the attorney who was representing 
her in the case involving her son, but could not recall meeting with any attorney who 
represented her while she was a youth in care.  Only one informant reported meeting with 





representing her interests in court.  Participants who could remember having met with 
their law guardian generally described their interactions with their advocate as superficial 
and sporadic. 
This finding suggests that the long-standing debate over whether lawyers who 
represent children in foster care should pursue a best-interests or client-directed approach 
to counsel may be more academic than practical (Duquette & Ventrell, 2005; Taylor, 
2009). Participants in this study generally felt that their law guardians did not know 
enough about them to be able to represent either their best interests or their preferences.  
This finding indicates that more attention should be paid to ensuring that law guardians 
fulfill their designated function, regardless of their approach to client representation.  
Such efforts might include reducing caseloads to create adequate opportunities to meet 
with the children represented, offering training on child development and related issues to 
help law guardians understand children’s capabilities to make and inform decisions about 
their lives, and assisting law guardians in becoming skilled at communicating with 
children across all age groups. 
Directions for Future Research 
 
Findings from this study suggest numerous directions for future research on how 
foster children are involved in decisions about their lives while they are in care.  First, 
studies should focus on linking participation in decisions about one’s life while in foster 
care with transition to adulthood outcomes.  Findings from the present research suggest 
that the lack of participation in decisions about one’s life while in care may contribute to 





transition to adulthood.  Longitudinal data from the National Youth in Transition 
Database, a longitudinal study currently underway, may be able to contribute to the large, 
quantitative study that would be needed to examine this relationship empirically. 
Studies examining foster children’s understanding of the public child welfare 
system would also be helpful in enhancing the profession’s understanding of how and 
why foster children perceive the child welfare system to be procedurally unjust.  Most 
informants in the present study had little clear understanding about how the child welfare 
system worked or the roles of the various adults within the system.  Knowledge of 
system’s processes and procedures is critical to enhancing attitudes about the procedural 
fairness of that system.  Findings from such a study could also inform the development of 
interventions to help foster youth of all ages increase their understanding of the 
operations of the child welfare system, enabling them to advocate better for themselves. 
Research focusing on the relationships between foster children and the adults in 
the child welfare system – particularly foster parents, caseworkers and law guardians – 
would also enhance our understanding of issues related to this topic.  While study 
respondents complained that their caseworkers and law guardians did not meet with them 
regularly and knew little about them, the former foster youth also admitted to erecting 
barriers to developing positive working relationships with those professionals.  Having a 
better understanding of what encourages foster children to cooperate and engage with 
their caseworkers or law guardians, as well as factors that discourage such cooperation 
and engagement, could inform training and other interventions aimed at facilitating the 





More broadly, this study suggests the importance of additional research focused 
on capturing the experience of growing up in foster care from the perspective of the child. 
Most work done in this area has been conducted from the perspective of the adults who 
staff the child welfare system:  foster parents, caseworkers, and law guardians.  Research 
that enables the profession to hear directly from foster youth about their life experiences 
has the potential to increase greatly our understanding of this unique childhood 
experience and to guide our work to improve it. 
Finally, this study underscores the many benefits of conducting social work 
research that focuses on how clients experience social services.  Reflecting client-
centered practice, such research would allow the profession to understand the experience 
from the perspective of the clients themselves, who are the true experts.  Studies might 
focus on topics such as what it is like to have a social or human service problem or need, 
what it is like to ask for help, and what is it like to connect or engage with an assigned 
social worker. Phenomenology, with its inherent focus on examining lived experiences 
such as these, will provide a helpful tool in exploring such questions.   
Chapter Summary 
 
 This chapter summarized the findings of the study and discussed the study’s 
contribution to our understanding of the experience of participating in decisions about 
one’s life while in foster care.  Additionally, the chapter outlined the limitations of this 
research, assessed the study’s implications for child welfare practice and policy, and 
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Recruitment E-Mail and Flier 
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Protocol Number: IRB-AAAD9220 
Title: Experiences of Participation in Life Decisions by Young Adults Who Have Aged Out of Foster Care 
 
Recruitment Materials: 
This following email will be sent by Project MYSELF staff to Project MYSELF participants. The 
purpose of the email is to introduce the opportunity to participate in the study.  The email will include 
an attachment providing more detailed information (see below). 
 
Introductory Email: 
Dear Project MYSELF Participant: 
 I am writing to let you know about an opportunity to be part of a research project on the 
experiences of young people who have aged-out of foster care.  Donna Van Alst, a doctoral student at 
Columbia University’s School of Social Work, is seeking approximately 10 young adults to participate in 
this qualitative study.  Participants will receive a stipend for completing two required interviews and for 
reviewing preliminary findings based on your interview.  More information can be found in the attached 
flier. 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
IRB# AAAD9220  Approval Date:   01/16/2011 




Dear Project MYSELF Participant, 
I am a doctoral student at the Columbia University School of Social Work and am conducting my 
dissertation research on how youth who age out of the public child welfare system participated in 
decisions about their lives while they were in care.  I am interested in learning about the types of 
decisions you were involved in, and particularly, what the experience of participating in these decisions 
meant to you. 
I am currently in the process of recruiting study participants.  The purpose of this letter is to tell 
you a little bit about the research I am conducting so that you can decide whether you might be 
interested in being a part of my study. 
Participating in the study would require the completion of two in-person interviews that would 
be scheduled at your convenience.  Each interview can be held at a location of your choice and is 
expected to take less than two hours.  The interviews will be audio-taped.  You will be paid $50 after you 
complete each of the two interviews ($100 total). 
As part of the interview you will be asked to provide some information about your foster care 
history and the experience of becoming an “aging-out” youth.  You will also be asked to provide 
information about situations in which you were involved in a decision about your life while you were in 
care.  
Interviews will be confidential and you will not be identified in any research findings.  You will 
also be provided with an informed consent form that will formally detail the study and your 
participation.  The consent form must be signed by you before an interview can begin. 
To be eligible to participate in this study you must meet the following criteria: 
 Be at least 18 years old 
 Have spent at least three years in an out-of-home placement 
 Be fluent in speaking and reading English 
 Have a sincere interest in participating in the research process 
 
If you would like to know more about my study, or discuss the possibility of participating as a 
research subject, please respond to this e-mail by (insert date).  If you prefer, I can be reached by 
telephone at (732) 445-0512, ext. 109. 
































































































































































































































































































Protocol Number: IRB-AAAD9220 
Title: Experiences of Participation in Life Decisions by Young Adults Who Have Aged 
Out of Foster Care 
 
Referrals for Subjects 
Subjects who express any type of distress during their participation in this research 
study will be referred to an aftercare program that provide young adults between the 
ages of 18 and 21 with services to help them achieve independence.  The referral 
process will involve providing to the participant in writing the name, address, and 
telephone number for the appropriate aftercare agency.   These agencies, organized by 
county, are listed below: 
Atlantic County 
Robin’s Nest, Inc. 
“On My Own” 
42 South Delsea Drive 




Care Plus NJ   
“Homeward Bound”  
17-07 Romaine Street  
Fairlawn, NJ 07410  
Phone: 201-265-8200  
 
Burlington County 
Family Services of Burlington County   
“On My Own" 
770 Woodlane Road, Suite 57  
Mount Holly NJ 08055  
Phone: 609-518-2477  
 
Camden County 
Family Services of Burlington County  
“On My Own"  
770 Woodlane Road, Suite 57  
Mount Holly N J 08055  
Phone: 609-518-2477  
 
Cape May County 
Robins' Nest, Inc.  
“On My Own”  
42 South Delsea Drive  
Glassboro NJ 08028  
Phone:  856-881-8689  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
IRB# AAAD9220  Approval Date:   01/16/2011 
IRB Initials:   gg      Expiration Date:  01/15/2012 
334
Cumberland County 
Robins' Nest, Inc.   
“On My Own”  
42 South Delsea Drive  
Glassboro NJ 08028  
Phone: 856-881-8689  
 
Essex County 
Independence: A Family of Services, Inc.  
15 Smalley Terrace  
Irvington, NJ 07111  
Phone: 973-372-5601 x302  
   
Gloucester County 
Robins' Nest, Inc.  
“On My Own”  
42 South Delsea Drive  
Glassboro NJ 08028  
Phone: 856-881-8689  
 
Hudson County   
Urban League of Hudson County   
“Life Skills Program”  
253 Martin Luther King Drive  
Jersey City, NJ 07305  
Phone: 201-451-8888  
 
Hunterdon County   
Catholic Charities  
“Independent Living Program”  
6 Park Avenue  
Flemington, NJ 08822  
Phone: 908-782-7905  
 
Mercer County  
Life Ties, Inc.  
“T.I.L.T.  Program”  
2205 Pennington Road  
Trenton, NJ 08638  
Phone: 609-394-3337  
 
Middlesex County 
Multicultural Community Services  
1 Ethel Road, Bldg. A, 108 B  
Edison, NJ 08817  






Monmouth  County 
Multicultural Community Services  
1 Ethel Road, Bldg. A, 108 B  
Edison, NJ 08817  
Phone: 732-650-0330  
 
Morris County 
Catholic Charities  
“Crossroads”  
700 Sayre Avenue  
Philipsburg, NJ 08865  
Phone: 908-454-2074  
 
Ocean County 
Preferred Children’s Services   
“Project Independence”  
P.O. Box 2036  
Lakewood, NJ 08701  
Phone: 732-367-1352  
 
Passaic County 
Paterson Y.M.C.A.  
“Aging Out Program”  
128 Ward Street  
Paterson, NJ 07505  
Phone: 973-278-8019  
 
Salem County 
Robins' Nest, Inc.  
“On My Own”  
42 South Delsea Drive  
Glassboro NJ 08028  




“Independent Living Program”  
6 Park Avenue  
Flemington, NJ 08822  
Phone: 908-782-7905  
 
Sussex County 
Catholic Charities  
“Crossroads”  
700 Sayre Avenue  
Philipsburg, NJ 08865  






Community Access Unlimited   
“Transitional Services Program”  
80 West Grand Street  
Elizabeth, NJ 07202  




“Independent Living Program”  
6 Park Avenue  
Flemington, NJ 08822  
Phone: 908-782-7905  
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